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Abstract 
 
Language appears to be special. Well-rehearsed arguments that appeal to 
aspects of language acquisition, psycholinguistic processing and linguistic 
universals all suggest that language has certain properties that distinguish it 
from other domain general capacities. The most widely discussed theory of an 
innate, modular, domain specific language faculty is Chomskyan generative 
grammar (CGG) in its various guises. However, an examination of the history 
and development of CGG reveals a constant tension in the relationship of 
syntax, phonology and semantics that has endured up to, and fatally 
undermines, the latest manifestation of the theory: the Minimalist Program. 
 
Evidence from language evolution can be deployed to arrive at a more coherent 
understanding of the nature of the human faculty for language. I suggest that all 
current theories can be classed on the basis of two binary distinctions: firstly, 
that between nativist and non-nativist accounts, and secondly between 
hypotheses that rely on a sudden explanation for the origins of language and 
those that rely on a gradual, incremental picture. All four consequent 
possibilities have serious flaws. 
 
By scrutinising the extant cross-disciplinary data on the evolution of hominins it 
becomes clear that there were two significant periods of rapid evolutionary 
change, corresponding to stages of punctuated equilibrium. The first of these 
occurred approximately two million years ago with the speciation event of 
Homo, saw a doubling in the size, alongside some reorganisation, of hominin 
brains, and resulted in the first irrefutable evidence of cognitive behaviour that 
distinguishes the species from that of our last common ancestor with 
chimpanzees. The second period began seven to eight hundred thousand years 
ago, again involving reorganisation and growth of the brain with associated 
behavioural innovations, and gave rise to modern humans by at least two 
hundred thousand years ago. 
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I suggest that as a consequence of the first of these evolutionary 
breakthroughs, the species Homo erectus was endowed with a proto-‘language 
of thought’ (LoT), a development of the cognitive capacity evident in modern 
chimpanzees, accompanied by a gestural, and then vocal, symbolic 
protolanguage. The second breakthrough constituted a great leap involving the 
emergence of advanced theory of mind and a fully recursive, creative LoT. I 
propose that the theory outlined in the Representational Hypothesis (RH) 
clarifies an understanding of the nature of language as having evolved to 
represent externally this wholly internal, universal LoT, and it is the latter which 
is the sole locus of syntax and semantics. By clearly distinguishing between a 
phonological system for semiotic representation, and that which it represents, a 
syntactico-semantic LoT, the RH offers a fully logical and consistent 
understanding of the human faculty for language. Language may have the 
appearance of domain specific properties, but this is entirely derived from both 
the nature of that which it represents, and the natural constraints of symbolic 
representation. 
iii 
 
 
 
Acknowledgements 
 
To my parents who ensured I had the educational opportunities they lacked. 
 
To the staff of the School of English Literature, Language and Linguistics, 
Newcastle University, who inspired an interest in linguistics. Most importantly to 
my supervisors Noel Burton-Roberts and Maggie Tallerman for their insightful 
discussions, careful reading of draft chapters and detailed feedback. 
 
To Rachel for her support, advice, comments on drafts, general chivvying and 
cups of tea. 
iv 
 
 
Table of contents 
 
Abstract          i 
Acknowledgements         iii 
Table of contents         iv 
List of figures and tables        viii 
 
Chapter 1. Introduction        1 
1.0 Introduction         1 
1.2 What makes language appear special?    2 
1.3 Constraints on a theory of language     3 
1.3.1 Language Evolution as a constraint on a viable 4 
theory of language 
1.4 Outline of the Thesis       6 
 
Chapter 2. The development of Chomskyan Generative Grammar  7 
2.0 Introduction         7 
2.1 The beginning of transformational generative grammar  7 
2.2 The Standard Theory       9 
2.3 The generative semanticists      12 
2.4 The Standard Theory revised and extended    13 
2.5 The Minimalist Program        16 
2.6 Issues in the current state of CGG     19 
2.6.1 Economy principles       19 
2.6.2 The numeration/lexical array     20 
2.6.3 Crash-proof grammar versus unbounded merge   21 
2.6.4 CGG and the status of psychological reality   22 
2.7 Conclusion         24 
 
Chapter 3. Evolution, hominin phylogeny and the emergence of  
language        25 
3.0 Introduction         25 
3.1 The nature of evolution       26 
3.1.1 Genes and adaptive evolution     27 
v 
 
3.1.2 Genes and non-adaptive evolution     29 
3.1.3 Epigenetic evolution       30 
3.1.4 Environment and genetic change     32 
3.1.5 Speciation        34 
3.2 Hominin evolution        35 
3.2.1 Possible and probable earliest hominins.    37 
3.2.2 Transitional and pre-modern Homo    39 
3.2.3 Homo neanderthalensis and Homo sapiens   41 
3.2.4 Cognitive developments in the hominin lineage   43 
3.3 Language evolution         46 
3.3.1 The contribution of genetics      48 
3.3.2 Gradualist accounts of language evolution   50 
3.3.2.1 Adaptive pressures for language    51 
3.3.2.2 Prerequisites for the evolution of phonology  52 
3.3.2.3 Evolution of the lexicon and syntax   56 
3.3.2.4 Option C: Gradual non-nativism    60 
3.3.2.5 Option A: Gradual nativism    61 
3.3.3 Non-Darwinian accounts        64 
3.3.3.1 Option B: Sudden nativism    65 
3.3.3.2 Option D: Sudden non-nativism    70 
3.4 Conclusion         71 
 
Chapter 4. The evolution of the hominin brain and human cognition  73 
4.0 Introduction          73 
4.1 Comparative approaches to human and nonhuman animal  
cognition and communication      74 
4.1.1 Nonhuman cognitive capacities     74 
4.1.1.2 Continuity (and discontinuity) between  
human and nonhuman cognition    76 
4.1.1.3 Evidence for intelligent thought in other primates 76 
4.1.2 Nonhuman communication      79 
4.1.2.1 Animal communication in the wild   79 
4.1.2.2 Primate communication in captivity       81 
4.2 The human brain        85 
4.2.1 Human brain structure      85 
vi 
 
4.2.2 The evolution of the human brain     89 
4.2.2.1 Structural evolution of the hominin brain  90 
4.2.2.2 Reasons for changes in the hominin brain  91 
4.2.3 The size of the hominin brain              91 
4.2.3.1 The evolutionary history of hominin brain size  92 
4.3 Neural and cognitive theories of language evolution   95 
4.3.1 Vocal continuity       96 
4.3.2 Gestural continuity           96 
4.3.2.1 Imitation, gestures and mirror neurons   97 
4.3.2.2 Cooperation       99 
4.3.2.3 Cognitive or communicative continuity?   101 
4.4 Conclusion          101 
 
Chapter 5. The evolutionary nature of language and thought   103 
5.0 Introduction          103 
5.1 Clarifying the nature and evolution of human thought   103 
5.1.1 The relationship of language and thought    103 
5.1.1.2 Language and thought in CGG         106 
5.1.1.3 The Language of Thought     112 
5.2 Language         114 
5.2.1 What is necessary in a theory of language?   115 
5.2.2 Saussure and CGG       118 
5.2.1.3 The Representational Hypothesis explained  120 
5.2.3 Meaning and Semantics      122 
5.3 What evolved that made language possible?     125     
5.3.1 Theory of Mind       125 
5.3.2 Recursion        127 
5.3.3 Dual processing and human thought    128 
5.3.3.1 An overview of dual-processing theory   130 
5.3.3.2 Evidence for DPT      131 
   5.3.3.3 What are System 1 and System 2 like?   133 
   5.3.3.4 Neural correlates of dual processing   134 
5.4 A theory of language evolution      136 
5.4.1 Language, cognition and Homo erectus    136 
5.4.2 The emergence of complex thought     138 
vii 
 
5.4.3 The emergence of complex language    140 
 
Chapter 6: Conclusion        142 
6.0 Introduction         142 
6.1 Evolution as a constraint on conceptions of the FL   142 
6.1.1 Language Evolution and the MP     143 
6.2 Final thoughts        144 
 
Bibliography          146 
 
 
 
 
viii 
 
 
List of figures 
 
 
figure 2.1 The Standard Theory 
figure 2.2 The Revised Extended Standard Theory  
figure 2.3 Derivation in the Minimalist Program 
 
figure 3.1: Possible accounts of language evolution 
 
figure 4.1 Diagram of a neuron  
figure 4.2 The structure of the brain 
figure 4.3 Brodmann’s areas  
figure 4.4 Wason selection task  
 
figure 5.1 The Saussurean sign 
figure 5.2 Sign for UK national speed limit 
figure 5.4 Saussurean sign and the lexical item in CGG 
figure 5.5: A model of the Representational Hypothesis 
figure 5.6: System 1 and 2 processes 
 
 
List of tables 
 
table 5.1: Properties of System 1 and System 2  
table 5.2: Brain regions for C and X systems  
   
 
 
 
 
 1 
 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
 
1.0 Introduction 
 
There are, undoubtedly, several characteristics of Homo sapiens that help to 
distinguish the species from any other. Nettle (2009) identifies a number of traits 
including a proportionately smaller gut size in relation to other mammals (almost 
certainly the consequence of a diet that includes cooked meat); a considerably 
larger brain in proportion to body size; sophisticated tool use (beyond mode 1); 
a longer period of ontogeny; and uniquely, finely honed learning skills. However, 
all of these are a matter of degree in relation other species, particularly 
primates. Language, on the other hand, appears to be an special. No other 
species has this potentially infinite creative capacity. The question remains, 
therefore, why this should be the case.  
 
Explanations for the human faculty for language (FL) fall into two broad camps. 
In the first there are nativists who believe that language is, like vision or the 
auditory system, an informationally encapsulated module of the mind, distinct 
from domain-general cognition (along the lines of Fodor, 1983). Those who 
oppose this view consider language to be a socio-cultural, learned system much 
as any other. In this latter group it is common for explanations of FL to treat 
language as simply another aspect of culture. But language and culture are just 
too different: three year olds, although linguistic geniuses, are generally 
incompetent in other components of culture. Even Sapir, whose entire career 
was devoted to emphasising the cultural nature of language was forced to admit 
(ironically in language that is culturally unacceptable today) that ‘when it comes 
to linguistic form, Plato walks with the Macedonian swineherd, Confucius with 
the head-hunting savage of Assam’ (1921: 234)   
 
One non-nativist argument is founded on the undeniable point that languages 
must be learnable otherwise they would die out. On this basis, the claim is then 
extended to maintain that languages have actually evolved in order to be easily 
acquired. Thus children’s first intuitions about language are likely to be the 
2 
 
correct ones because languages have adapted to the way the human brain 
works. Christiansen and Chater echo this view that language is shaped by the 
brain in order be learnable and processable: ‘languages have adapted to 
conform to the most popular guess’ (2008: 507). Although the authors reproach 
other writers for what they claim is circularity of argument, it is a charge to which 
they themselves are clearly susceptible. Language, they maintain, is learnable 
because it conforms to learning biases so it must have evolved to be so, though 
they do not specify the process by which this could have occurred (or indeed 
what any alternative scenario might look like). Evidence in support of this 
position is often drawn from formal, particularly computer, modelling (e.g. 
Steels, 2003). However, while these simulations are becoming increasingly 
sophisticated, so far they have failed to have a significant impact on the study of 
language evolution and Bickerton’s comment that the approach is ‘a classic 
case of looking for your car-keys where the street lamps are’ (2007: 522) 
remains pertinent. One other striking problem with an argument based on the 
evolution of language for learnability is the vast amount of linguistic variation 
that exists, at least in surface forms. This begs the question why language has 
not evolved into a single optimal ‘learnable’ form. The answer would seem to be 
that as an explanation, rather than addressing biological evolution, this falls into 
the error that Tallerman et al. (2009) identify as confusing language evolution 
and cyclic diachronic change.  
 
 
1.2 What makes language appear special? 
 
Evidence for an innate language module comes from several areas though 
none are uncontroversial and all are fiercely contested (for a polemical overview 
see Sampson, 2005). One characteristic of modularity is double dissociation 
from the general processor and evidence for this is claimed to be found in 
individuals with a range of impairments (e.g. Smith and Tsimpli, 1995). Other 
claims have been made on the basis of psycholinguistic processing, and the 
existence of language universals. However, the largest body of evidence is 
founded on child language acquisition. Sometimes referred to as ‘Plato’s 
problem’ (e.g. Chomsky, 1986), the logical problem of language acquisition 
concerns the way in which children are able to acquire language based on 
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impoverished primary linguistic data (the ‘poverty of the stimulus’ argument). 
Not only that, but children appear to acquire their language with remarkable 
speed and all converge on an approximately identical level of competence (for 
discussion see e.g. Smith, 2005; Lightfoot, 2005).    
 
One particularly intriguing aspect of research on language acquisition relates to 
children who are raised in communities in which there is no common mutually 
intelligible language and the community relies on a pidgin, a much simplified 
code. Bickerton (1981) noted that such children imposed the morphosyntactic 
elements of complex language on pidgins and in effect created a new language, 
a creole. This has been explained in terms of an innate language acquisition 
device (LAD) specified with the features of a Universal Grammar (UG). More 
recently research has been carried out on home signers in Nicaragua 
(Senghas, 2003) who, once brought together as children in deaf schools, 
created Nicaraguan Sign Language which was modified with each generation. 
New work is currently underway with Al-Sayyid Bedouin sign language in the 
Negev desert in Israel (Sandler, et al., 2005) which appears to have emerged in 
the last 70 years and may confirm some of the general work on the creation of 
creoles. 
 
While all of the claims for evidence for an innate language faculty are contested, 
they nevertheless constitute a formidable body of arguments, and a theory that 
seeks to explain language in these terms needs to be taken seriously. 
Undoubtedly the most extensively studied of such a model are the various 
forms of generative grammar put forward by Chomsky and colleagues since the 
late 1950s (Chomskyan Generative Grammar, CGG) and culminating in its 
present form as the Minimalist Program (MP, Chomsky, 1995). As with all 
theories of language, there is a need to account for various constraining factors 
and these are considered next.  
 
 
1.3 Constraints on a theory of language 
 
The first major constraint, as noted above, is to account for the process of child 
language acquisition and this has been a constant theme in CGG. A further 
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constraint is the cross-linguistic variation that is attested in the world (for an 
overview see Evans and Levinson, 2009; Levinson and Evans, 2010). This has 
been explained in CGG in various ways including the setting of binary 
parameters in individual languages, and more recently as the result of features 
on the various items that constitute the different lexicons of the world. A general 
constraining principle on any theory is Occam’s Razor, the tenet that simplicity 
and elegance characterise the most feasible account where more than one 
hypothesis is available. Although CGG became burdened with a vast number of 
components as the scope of the theory expanded, the MP seeks to reaffirm the 
notion of economy principles and a minimalist set of procedures. Recently, an 
additional consideration has been included in the evaluation of theories of 
language: that of evolution, to which I now turn. 
 
1.3.1 Language Evolution as a constraint on a viable theory of language 
It has often been claimed that the human faculty for language (FL) is the only 
unique ability that distinguishes Homo sapiens from all other species. It is 
therefore not surprising that the origin of language has been the object of 
fascination throughout history. In the 7th century BCE, the Egyptian King 
Psamtik I was reported to have isolated two children at birth to discover which 
language they would spontaneously produce and which, it was concluded, was 
therefore the ‘natural’ language of humankind (it was claimed that the first 
sounds they produced resembled the word ‘bread’ in Phrygian, a now extinct 
language that was spoken in parts of what is now modern day Turkey). Along 
with several other similar ‘experiments’ there is a tradition of meditation and 
speculation on the origins of language, from Plato’s Cratylus dialogue, which 
discusses the extent to which words have natural or purely arbitrary 
relationships to their referents, to far less esteemed and wilder speculations in 
the ensuing centuries, such as claims that language originated out of cries of 
pain, grunts from heavy lifting, or imitations of sounds in the environment. It was 
in fact in response to the plethora of such speculations that the Linguistic 
Society of Paris included article two in its statutes in 1866, which stipulated that 
‘La Société n'admet aucune communication concernant, soit l'origine du 
langage, soit la création d'une langue universelle’ (The Society does not accept 
papers on either the origin of language or on the creation of a universal 
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language). 
 
For much of the 20th century, a time when linguistics was anxious to maintain a 
reputation as a ‘scientific’ discipline, discussion of the origins of language were 
infrequent and it was not until the 1970s that the topic began to be rehabilitated. 
Then, seminal papers such as Pinker and Bloom (1990) sparked a renewed, 
vigorous interest in language evolution which has resulted in a vast output of 
research in recent years. However, despite (or possibly because of) such an 
intensity of investigation, there remains much that is either not fully understood 
or is hotly disputed. Reviewing the field in 2007, Bickerton concludes that there 
are only four things that people generally agree upon: firstly, language emerged 
somewhere between 3.5 million years ago (mya) and 50 thousand years ago 
(kya); secondly, the earliest form of language was a much simpler 
‘protolanguage’ than the complex systems of today (though there is much 
disagreement concerning its nature); thirdly, there was some selective pressure 
that enabled language to spread – probably social intelligence of some form; 
and finally there is some relationship between the evolution of language and of 
cognition more generally. As broad as these tenets are, there is not even 
acceptance by all researchers of these – Bickerton himself, for example, is 
adamant that social intelligence was not the adaptive factor in language 
evolution. 
 
The reasons why there is so much disagreement in the field are not difficult to 
fathom since they arise from the cross-disciplinary nature of the investigation as 
well as the paucity of palaeontological evidence and the total absence of any 
linguistic evidence per se from the periods at the heart of the question. Spoken 
language leaves no fossil trace, and the earliest known writing systems at 
approximately 6 thousand years old are far too recent to shed light on the 
origins of language. Furthermore, even the scant fossil record of our ancestors 
that we do have contains no direct fossils of vital organs involved in speech and 
language: the brain, the respiratory organs and the vocal apparatus. In addition 
to this, the study of language evolution involves contributions from disciplines as 
diverse as evolutionary biology, palaeontology and its subgroup palaeobiology, 
anthropology, physiology, neuroscience, genetics, primatology and computer 
science, as well as linguistics. There are disagreements in each of these fields 
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and breakthroughs and discoveries in any one discipline can have a significant 
knock on effect in the study of language evolution. Consequently, theories of 
language evolution can best be judged against the criteria of the most plausible 
‘abduction’ (C. S. Pierce), that can be made about the nature of the FL which is 
commensurate with the scarce evolutionary data available. This, then, is the 
task at hand, and my steps towards dealing with it are outlined in the next 
section. 
 
 
1.4 Outline of the Thesis 
 
Chapter 2 reviews the development of CGG from the earliest days through to 
the most recent developments in the MP. The purpose of this is to identify any 
conflicts in the theories that motivated their revision. The status of ‘meaning’ is 
given particular analysis and I conclude by focusing on a number of areas that 
remain particularly problematic. In chapter 3 I address 3 areas: firstly, theories 
of evolution; secondly, what is known (or hypothesised) about the nature of 
hominin evolution; and finally I propose 4 classifications of theories of language 
evolution and consider each of these 4 in turn. Chapter 4 is concerned with the 
application of the comparative method to the study of human and nonhuman 
cognition, including a focus on the structure and evolution of the human brain 
with particular reference to brain size and what these might mean for a theory of 
language evolution. In the next chapter I consider the relationship of language 
and thought, what aspects of cognition are necessary for language and 
introduce a theory of the FL that best accounts for all the data previously 
examined. Finally, in chapter 6, I restate more explicitly the conclusions I have 
drawn and briefly consider further areas for investigation. 
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 Chapter 2. The development of Chomskyan Generative 
Grammar 
 
 
2.0 Introduction 
 
In this section I consider the various stages that CGG has passed through in its 
changing conception of the nature of the language faculty in order to identify 
tensions that have characterised the enterprise from the start. I begin with 
Chomsky’s earliest publications on language and how, and why, these have 
metamorphosed into the subsequent models, up to and including the current 
proposals in the Minimalist Program (MP). Finally, a number of unresolved 
issues in the MP are highlighted.  
 
 
2.1 The beginning of transformational generative grammar 
  
The position of meaning has always been problematic in CGG, and was, for the 
various reasons discussed below, absolutely peripheral to the earliest 
generative expositions on language: 
‘a great deal of effort has been expanded in attempting to answer the 
question: ‘How can you construct a grammar without an appeal to 
meaning?’ The question itself however, is wrongly put, since the 
implication that obviously one can construct a grammar with appeal to 
meaning is totally unsupported. One might with equal justification ask how 
you can construct a grammar with no knowledge of the hair color of the 
speaker’ (Chomsky, 1957: 93)  
While there is general agreement that Chomsky’s work has constituted a 
‘revolution’ in the field of linguistics (e.g. Greene, 1972), there are many aspects 
in which early CGG was rooted in the then current linguistic practices of North 
America (Kibbee, 2010). Although Chomsky subsequently preferred to see his 
work as embedded within the tradition of the universal grammarians of the 
seventeenth century and later writers such as von Humboldt, in fact the work, at 
least around Syntactic Structures (1957), relies far more on aspects of 
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information processing theory and main stream structuralism. From the former 
of these, Chomsky approaches language as a consideration of an algorithmic 
generation and distribution of linguistic structures, though he identifies the 
inadequacy of investigating these in terms of finite state grammars. While the 
earlier structuralists had almost completely neglected sentential syntax focusing 
rather on categorisation of phonemes and morphemes, Leonard Bloomfield had 
already initiated a change of overt emphasis towards sentence structure and 
this was to be central to Chomsky’s endeavour. 
 
One feature that at this stage was inherited from the structuralists was a 
scepticism towards any investigation of meaning – ‘rather pointless’ (Chomsky, 
ibid: 100) – the result of the then still dominant paradigm of behaviourist 
psychology and suspicion of all treatment of meaning as unscientific. For the 
pre-cognitive (or at least proto-cognitive) Chomsky, the task was to understand 
language as an independent formalism (not just the development of discovery 
procedures which had been the focus of many structuralists). Yet, unlike the 
structuralists, Chomsky was of the view that at the sentence level, the 
observable data alone was insufficient for the basis of a comprehensive formal 
theory of syntax. The (potentially infinite) creativity of language could not be 
accounted for through context free phrase structure rules alone and, developing 
a notion proposed by Zelig Harris, Chomsky took transformations to be central 
to his theory.  
 
One further early influence, and one that has had a profound impact on the 
evolution of CGG, is the concern with simplicity and economy principles (see 
discussion below). This is often suggested to be the result of Chomsky’s 
encounter with philosophers of mathematics and logicians such as Nelson 
Goodman and Richard Milton Martin, and, as Newmeyer points out, by the early 
1950s ‘many logicians simply ASSUMED that a natural language was defined 
by a set of recursive rules’, though unlike Chomsky, ‘they shrank from the 
enormity of the task of trying to state them’ (1980: 36, emphasis in the original). 
So while structuralists generally were concerned with developing a theory that 
could best describe the data, Chomsky introduced a new desideratum, that of 
explanatory adequacy, whereby grammars which fulfilled the principles of 
descriptive adequacy were evaluated against the criteria of economy. 
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These influences coalesced in the first account of transformational generative 
grammar in which three sets of rules were proposed. Terminal strings were 
generated by formal phrase structure rules for a specific language, not 
qualitatively different from the immediate constituent analyses of the 
structuralists. The output of these were subjected to two types of 
transformations. Firstly, obligatory transformations generate the uniclausal, 
declarative, affirmative kernel sentences of a language. These may then be 
subjected to further optional singular transformations to generate negatives, 
interrogatives, imperatives, passives etc., or two or more kernel sentences may 
be coordinated or embedded through generalised transformations which are the 
source of recursion. The final set of rules were the morphophonemics of the 
language. 
 
 
2.2 The Standard Theory 
 
Syntactic Structures was largely an outline of work from earlier in the 1950s 
(later published as The Logical Structure of Linguistic Theory, 1975), and by the 
end of the decade Chomsky’s ‘cognitive turn’ (Swiggers, 2010) was well 
established. The concern with psychology and epistemology (specifically 
Cartesian) ensued from early collaborative work with the psychologist George 
Miller in 1957 and is most famously noted in the 1959 review of Skinner (1957) 
which fatally undermined the hold of behaviourism in psychology. Chomsky’s 
argument that children could not acquire their language on the basis of the input 
alone (see discussion in introduction) led him to posit the existence of purely 
linguistic, innate, mental structures. So by the appearance of Chomsky’s next 
monograph, Aspects of the Theory of Syntax (1965), there is a new focus on 
mental reality and the cognitive processes underlying language, made explicit in 
the competence /  performance distinction. At the same time, the innateness 
hypothesis gave rise to the question of shared mental content and the term 
universal grammar makes its first appearance. 
 
The 1965 model of CGG became known as the Standard Theory which is 
represented in figure 2.1 and summarised by Chomsky as follows: 
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‘A grammar contains a syntactic component, a semantic component and 
a phonological component. The latter two are purely interpretive; they 
play no part in the recursive generation of sentence structures. The 
syntactic component consists of a base and a transformational 
component. The base, in turn, consists of a categorial sub-component 
and a lexicon. The base generates deep structures. A deep structure 
enters the semantic component and receives a semantic interpretation; it 
is mapped by the transformational rules into a surface structure, which is 
then given a phonetic interpretation by the rules of the phonological 
component.’ (1965: 141)      
 
  BASE   
  Lexicon   
  Phrase structure rules   
     
  Deep Structure  Semantic  
    interpretation 
  TRANSFORMATIONS   
     
Phonetic  Surface Structure   
interpretation     
 
figure 2.1 The Standard Theory 
 
The most striking changes to the 1957 proposal are the acknowledgement of 
the need for a lexicon, altered roles for transformations and the consideration of 
a semantic component. Obligatory transformations are replaced with recursive 
phrase structure rules acting on lexical items which generate the material which 
is given a semantic interpretation, with transformations only contributing to the 
surface structure which is only subject to a phonetic interpretation.    
 
The discussion of what a semantic component might look like in a generative 
theory of grammar had been initiated by Katz and Fodor (1963) but it was the 
development by Katz and Postal (1964) that is assumed in the Standard 
Theory. There were two very significant elements adopted from Katz and 
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Postal’s hypothesis. Firstly, transformations are presumed not to affect meaning 
– all semantic interpretation taking place prior to transformations – so, for 
example, actives and passives share a common Deep Structure. Secondly, as a 
consequence of this, nothing that contributes to meaning can be introduced by 
transformations, only movement and deletion were possible, so Deep Structure 
had to have a representation of abstract properties such as Imperative, 
Interrogative, Negative and so on. Thus Chomsky defines the interpretive 
semantic component in terms of Fregean compositionality as consisting of rules 
which ‘apply cyclically, determining the semantic interpretation of a phrase X of 
the deep structure from the semantic interpretations of the immediate 
constituents of X and the grammatical relation represented in this configuration 
of X and its parts’ (2006/1965: 123)       
 
So while in Syntactic Structures the sentence ‘Colorless green ideas sleep 
furiously’ was taken as evidence of the autonomy of syntax (1957: 15), by 1965 
Chomsky wanted his grammar to generate (his 14 (1)): 
1) ‘sincerity may frighten the boy’ 
but not (his 13 (1)): 
2) ‘the boy may frighten sincerity’  
on the basis that the latter was in some way ‘deviant’, though it is not made 
clear in exactly what way, and Chomsky concludes that in examples like these 
(as opposed to uncontroversially ‘ungrammatical’ sentences such as his 15 (1): 
‘sincerity frighten may boy the’) ‘it is much less clear how their aberrant status is 
to be explained’ (1965: 77). The capacity in the generative grammar to avoid 
generating these ‘deviant’ sentences was explained through the notion of binary 
semantic features, similar in many respects to the binary phonetic features that 
would be presented in Chomsky and Halle (1968). It was posited that items in 
the lexicon had strict subcategorisation features, such as transitivity on verbs, 
but also selectional features such as e.g. animate, human and so on which 
were factors in the syntactic computation: ‘no matter how selectional rules are 
treated, there is no doubt that such features as [Human] play a role in purely 
syntactic rules’ (1965: 150). However, as animate, human etc. are clearly 
semantic rather than syntactic properties, the autonomy of syntax appears to be 
violated, despite Chomsky’s latter protestation in an endnote that there is ‘no 
way to show that semantic features…play a role in the syntactic or phonological 
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rules’ (ibid: 226 n15). Thus Newmeyer concludes that the remarks on the 
relationship of syntax and semantics in Aspects is ‘vague enough’ to be 
interpreted in any way that you wished to choose (1980: 92) and Chomsky 
tacitly acknowledges, ‘the syntactic and semantic structure of natural languages 
evidently offers many mysteries, both of fact and principle, and that any attempt 
to delimit the boundaries of these domains must certainly be quite tentative’ 
(1965: 163). 
 
 
2.3 The generative semanticists 
 
The consequence of the model of language proposed in the Standard Theory 
was that the innate, universal aspect of language was in deep structure with 
individual transformations being language specific. Chomsky argues that the  
point of departure for modern linguistics should be the insights of the 
seventeenth and eighteenth century ‘universal grammarians’ such as the belief 
that:  
‘The deep structure of a sentence is the abstract underlying form which 
determines the meaning of the sentence; it is present in the mind but not 
necessarily represented directly in the signal…The fundamental 
assumption of the universal grammarians was that languages scarcely 
differ at the level of deep structure – which reflects the properties of 
thought and conception – but that they may vary widely at the much less 
interesting level of surface structure’ (1966: 588) 
Not surprisingly, this line of thought led many linguists to greater abstraction in 
considering the nature of deep structure and ultimately to the movement known 
as ‘generative semantics’ (henceforth GS) whose acrimonious relationship with 
mainstream CCG has been discussed at length (e.g. Harris, 1993; Huck and 
Goldsmith, 1995) 
 
The basic premise of the adherents of GS was that if transformations and 
surface structure made no contribution to meaning, then all differences and 
similarities of meaning are differences and similarities of deep structure. In other 
words deep structure was synonymous with semantic representation. From this 
it was concluded that two sentences which shared the same truth conditions, 
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such as those below (from Fodor J.D., 1977: 70), had the same deep structure 
regardless of how much they differed in surface structure, even in terms of 
number of clauses: 
3) Rain may be good for the hair 
4) It is possible that rain is good for the hair 
it being assumed that the underlying deep structure was closer to a language of 
logical predicate calculus than surface structure natural language. Such a 
model was, as Seuren puts it, ‘A mediational production grammar (which) is not 
a sentence generator but a sentence transformer’ (2004: 158, italics in the 
original) For many psycholinguists and psychologists, the immense attraction of 
GS was ‘the greater plausibility of supposing that a speaker begins by 
generating the basic semantic component of “what he wants to say”, only then 
going on to cast it in an appropriate syntactic form’ (Greene, 1972).  
 
Chomsky dismissed this final argument on the grounds that it mistakenly 
attributes temporal processing properties to the model of generative grammar  
(see discussion below of the implications of this for the notion of psychological 
reality in CCG). That aside, GS ran into a number of problems, particularly in 
aspects of lexical decomposition (e.g. see Fodor,J. A., 1970) and deep structure 
became more abstract and complex, as the task of identifying underlying 
semantic representation was bound to do. 
 
 
2.4 The Standard Theory revised and extended 
 
Faced with a very popular movement that was taking generative grammar in a 
direction in conflict with his own goals, Chomsky responded by reverting to the 
earlier Katz and Fodor hypothesis on the semantic component which did allow 
for meaning to be changed through transformations.1 So by the 1967 Beckman 
lectures at Berkeley, Chomsky was explicitly committed to a position whereby it 
is a fact ‘that surface structure also plays a role in determining semantic 
interpretation’ (2006: 95). At this stage the principal grammatical relations were 
                                               
1 To be fair, Chomsky had always retained a degree a scepticism regarding the claim that all 
semantic interpretation occurred at deep structure as ‘somewhat too strong’ (1965: 224 n.9) 
though these reservations are relegated to an endnote.                
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still presumed to be interpreted at deep structure, but at least some other 
aspects of meaning were judged to be determined by surface structure. These 
included pronominal reference; quantifier scope; presupposition and focus; and 
topic and comment. With the exception of the first two, these are today 
understood in CGG to be matters not of syntax and semantics, but of 
pragmatics and discourse structure. 
 
A further disagreement with the followers of GS that emerged was Chomsky’s 
explanation of some phenomena in non-transformational terms. So while in the 
standard theory there is a discussion of the treatment of nominalization 
transformations, and it is thought ‘not at all clear that destruction or refusal 
should be regarded as Nouns’ (1965: 184), Chomsky later (1970) adopts a 
lexicalist analysis of derived nominals whereby nominals such as happiness or 
construction are not syntactically derived from underlying adjectives or verbs. 
The basis for this was that the relationship between (morphologically) derived 
nominals and their underlying verbs or adjectives was highly irregular and the 
resulting nominals behaved in all respects like nouns and not at all like verbs or 
adjectives. On the other hand gerundive nominals have a regular relationship to 
the underlying verb (from which they are assumed to be syntactically derived) 
and behave like verbs in that they occur with aspectual verbs, and they are 
modified by adverbs.  
 
Together, these new developments became known as the Extended Standard 
Theory (EST) and throughout the 1970s and into the 1980s there were many 
further developments in the theory (which eventually obtained a further title as 
the Revised Extended Standard Theory – REST) motivated by universalist 
concerns and the need to constrain the theory, developing the notion introduced 
in Syntactic Structures that only the grammatical structures of any language 
were generated, and not the ungrammatical ones. This resulted in Principles 
and Parameters theory in which all languages were assumed to share common 
principles and a number of binary parameters that needed to be set by the child 
in the process of acquisition. The most far reaching technical modifications to 
the syntax were the introduction of X-bar Theory and very precise constraints 
on transformations, which were ultimately reduced to constrained movement: 
Move . The clearest and most exhaustive state of the art account (Chomsky, 
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1981) included several sub-components or modules: 1) Bounding theory 2) 
Government theory 3) Theta theory 4) Binding theory 5) Case theory 6) Control 
theory and 7) X` theory. The consequences for the place of meaning in the 
grammar were most profound in the addition of the notion of traces. If 
phonetically covert traces of items at the position where they were initially 
generated were present in the S-Structure (a renaming of surface structure; 
deep structure becoming D-Structure), then this could be the location of all 
semantic interpretation including basic grammatical relations, as shown in figure 
2.2 below. Surface structure then split, at a point in the derivation called ‘spell 
out’ into a component consisting of a set of phonetic instructions (phonetic form 
or PF) that could be read by the articulatory perceptual (AP) system, and 
another consisting of semantic content (logical form or LF) – including 
phonetically empty categories such as traces – that could be read by the 
conceptual intentional (CI) system. On economy grounds, this was preferable to 
semantic content being interpreted at different stages in the derivation.  
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Lexicon    X` Rules 
     
  D-Structure   
     
  OVERT MOVEMENT   
     
  S-Structure   
Spell Out 
 
    
COVERT MOVEMENT 
 
PF    LF 
 
figure 2.2 The Revised Extended Standard Theory  
 
           
 
 
2.5 The Minimalist Program  
 
Economy principles had never been removed from the concerns of CGG, it was 
just that they seemed to be at best peripheral and at times the direction of 
research gave the impression of being tangential to stated aims of simplicity; 
however, as Greene noted early on, ‘despite all appearances to the contrary, 
the purpose of these theoretical revisions is to make grammars simpler’ (1972: 
33). The problem, then, with the way that CGG had developed is that the REST 
model now consisted of at least four different levels – S-Structure, D-Structure, 
LF and PF) as well as the numerous sub-components referred to above, it had 
in effect acquired what Grohmann referred to as the ‘humungous apparatus of 
Government and Binding’ (2005). Consequently, there was a significant change 
of direction with the launch of what was described as a ‘research program’ 
rather than a coherent, fully elaborated theory of language: the Minimalist 
Program (MP) (Chomsky, 1995). 
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As with all stages of CGG, the MP is fluid and has evolved substantially from 
the initial proposals in the early 1990s. What remains more or less constant is a 
notion of computational efficiency whereby the syntactic component is 
understood as consisting of operations for linking sound with meaning in the 
simplest way possible. Mainstream MP (see e.g. Hornstein et al., 2005) 
assumes that lexical items are specified with a number of phonological, 
semantic, and formal (categorial, Case and Phi) features. A number of lexical 
items are selected to constitute a numeration or lexical array. Two of these 
items are merged to form a third object which is in turn merged with another 
item from the numeration and so on until a phase is complete and the content of 
the numeration exhausted (e.g. Chomsky, 2008). Uninterpretable (i.e. formal) 
features are checked (eliminated) during the derivation in a probe~goal 
agreement relationship between the two items being merged. If any 
uninterpretable features remain, then this triggers further internal merge (also 
known as move) in which a copy is made of the object undergoing movement 
(the copy remains in the initial position in which it was merged). The Principle of 
Full Interpretation (PFI) stipulates that no features should be sent to either of 
the AP or CI interfaces which are not interpretable at that interface. As a result 
the operation spell out is retained from the REST, and the phonetic (/phon/) 
features alone are sent as PF to the AP interface and the semantic ([SEM]) 
features to the CI interface as LF. In order to capture certain scope relationships 
in LF, there may be further covert movement post spell out, i.e. on objects with 
only [SEM] features. In theory, the sub-component modules of the syntax have 
been purged and simplicity restored – the overall architecture of the MP may be 
seen in figure 2.3 below: 
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Lexicon  Lexical Array   
     
  MERGE   
     
  Spell out   
 
 
    
COVERT MOVEMENT 
 
PF    LF 
     
figure 2.3 Derivation in the Minimalist Program 
 
Derivational operations are reduced to a ‘virtual conceptual necessity’ 
(Chomsky, 1995: 168f) for linking sound with a meaning, and something that is 
innate and that has evolved to be universal in the species. In the MP it is 
assumed that ‘parameters of UG relate, not to the computational system, but 
only to the lexicon…there is only one human language, apart from the lexicon’ 
(Chomsky, 1995: 131). 
 
What, then, is the status of meaning in the MP? Chomsky in 1995 states that LF 
is an ‘interface level’ (p.168) though later he claims that the REST postulated 
‘three internal linguistic levels in addition to the interface levels: D-Structure, S-
Structure, and LF’ (2005:11, my emphasis).2 It appears clear that LF is not 
semantic representation itself (and certainly not the predicate calculus type 
envisioned by GS), but its exact nature remains unclear. Seuren concludes that:  
‘the notion of LF is left without any empirical or formal criteria and without 
anything approaching a definition…the targets of the movements are 
determined by what has to be considered a vacuous notion of “logical 
form”. (2004: 39-40) 
 
 
                                               
2 LF is presumably accorded a ‘linguistic’ status here beyond that of PF, as it is the level 
generated through covert syntax.  
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2.6 Issues in the current state of CGG 
 
A number of problematic issues that are particularly important for a theory of 
language evolution and the status of CGG as a real cognitive object arise, or at 
least become more prominent, in the MP. Four issues are considered below. 
 
2.6.1 Economy principles 
Simplicity had been a major concern for Chomsky from the earliest days: 
‘Notice that simplicity is a systematic measure; the only ultimate criterion in 
evaluation is the simplicity of the whole system’ (1957: 55-56). Though as 
Newmeyer notes, ‘since no concrete examples were given in Syntactic 
Structures of how adequacy correlates with formal simplicity, it was easy for 
many commentators to draw the conclusion that the simplicity metric was little 
more than an aesthetic – a matter of personal taste’ (1980: 22) 
 
Within the MP such matters are elevated to play a central role whereby the aim 
in the description of a theory of language is to go ‘beyond explanatory 
adequacy’ (Chomsky: 2004) and to understand why features of UG are like they 
are. This is understood to be the result of non-linguistic, ‘third factors’ 
(Chomsky, 2005) which are part of the biological or even physical/atomic make-
up of the world and constitute a ‘perfect’ system. Thus the subjacency principle, 
for example, ‘follows from some principle of efficient computation…it’s because 
that’s the way the world works’ (Chomsky, 2012: 61). Fodor and Piatelli-
Palmarini similarly argue that much that occurs in nature is not the result of 
adaptive evolution but rather what they term ‘the laws of form’ which are 
constraints from above which adhere to abstract ‘mathematical and physico-
chemical laws’ (2010: 72). Among the many examples they offer are 
occurrences of Fibonacci spirals in populations as diverse as droplets in viscous 
liquid, seashells, leaf alternations and seeds in a sunflower. Further evidence 
comes from studies such as Hoyt and Taylor (1981) who showed that the gait 
employed by horses – the changes from walk to trot to gallop – were 
developmentally acquired energy saving efficiency strategies. Blumberg 
concludes that land mammals use a diversity of gaits ‘to satisfy the demands of 
physics and efficiency…These gaits represent universal organisational 
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principles of behaviour. Understand the rules and the behaviour follows 
naturally’ (2009: 118). 
 
Whether spirals in nature or developmental plasticity in animals in such areas 
as locomotion options (see discussion in the following chapter) are appropriate 
analogies to an internal, hardwired language faculty is not obvious. Certainly not 
everyone is convinced by this, and Seuren dismisses discussion of perfection in 
CGG as ‘nothing but the vague idea that it is difficult to imagine that things 
could be different’ (2004: 134). Kinsella discusses the notion of ‘perfection’ in 
nature at length and concludes, on the basis of MP architecture, that ‘The 
minimalist is not justified in claiming simplicity and economy for the human 
language faculty’ (2009: 183). The discussion of the role of simplicity in the 
evolution of the language faculty is taken up below in chapter 3.         
 
 
2.6.2 The numeration/lexical array 
One of the premises of the MP is that a number of lexical items enter a 
numeration (later called a lexical array for reasons that are not of concern here). 
The No Tampering Condition (NTC) states that no other items may be chosen 
from the lexicon during a derivation, and that the derivation continues until the 
numeration is exhausted; this constraint is posited on the grounds of 
computational efficiency with a claim to extralinguistic generality whereby 
‘operations forming complex expressions should consist of no more than a 
rearrangement of the objects to which they apply, not modifying them internally 
by deletion or insertion of new elements’ (Chomsky, 2005:11). The numeration 
ensures that the syntactic component knows when the derivation is complete, 
without it a derivation would presumably be concluded every time any fully 
interpretable linguistic expression was generated. 
     
Two questions arise from the notion of the numeration. First, on what basis are 
lexical items chosen? Why one particular group of lexical items rather than 
another? Hornstein et al. (2005) declare that the selection of lexical items is a 
performance issue and outside of the remit of the formally linguistic, while 
Chomsky claims that ‘there is no meaningful question as to why one numeration 
is formed rather than another – rather than none, so that we have silence… The 
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problem of choice of action is real, and largely mysterious, but does not arise 
within the narrow study of mechanisms’ (1995: 227). But whatever the nature of 
this ‘mysterious’ action, it is presumably, as an expression of meaning through 
sound, a function of the Conceptual-Intentional system. How such an action is 
possible without an already accessible Logical Form is not clear. Furthermore, if 
the CI system does play a role then how is it possible that lexical items lacking 
[SEM] features (such as expletives and complementizers) are chosen when 
they cannot be ‘read’ by the system at work in their selection? (see also, for 
discussion of problems in pronominal selection, Sigursson and Maling, 2010: 
68, discussed in Chapter 5 below)  
  
The second question is on what basis does the operation ‘select’ function? That 
is, why is any particular lexical item to be merged at a particular point in the 
derivation chosen from the numeration, rather than any other item? Hornstein et 
al. simply say that with a given numeration containing, among other items, car 
and that, then ‘the computational system may select car and then that’ (ibid: 70) 
but give no indication of on what basis such selection occurs. The selectional 
features that in the Standard Theory were able to filter out ‘the boy may frighten 
sincerity’ have been eliminated so presumably this sentence is just as likely to 
be generated as ‘sincerity may frighten the boy’. Indeed, any and all 
grammatical structures that can be generated out of a given numeration should 
be generated. However, given that the numeration was chosen in the first place 
to generate a specific sound~meaning pairing, this does not seem to be 
computationally efficient.           
 
 
2.6.3 Crash-proof grammar versus unbounded merge 
Problems become even greater when, on evolutionary grounds, the syntactic 
component is reduced to recursive, unbounded merge (e.g. Hauser et al., 
2002). The earlier writings in the MP had eliminated the sub-components of the 
REST, but still presumed that their constraining effects were achieved in some 
other way in the syntax. This was understood as being feature driven, and the 
multitude of operations (see Hornstein et al., 2005) insured that non-
grammatical derivations were avoided – so called ‘crash-proof’ grammars 
(Putnam, 2010; Boeckx, 2010). However, in recent years, Chomsky has 
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proposed a Strong Minimalist Thesis (SMT) (e.g. 2004, 2007) which takes 
‘unbounded’ merge (including internal merge or move) as the sole operation in 
the syntactic component, and that deviant derivations are filtered out by the 
interface conditions. In this model there is only a single syntactic feature, an 
edge feature which indicates mergability. The problem for minimalists is that 
both models bring unwanted consequences. The crash-proof approach requires 
enormous complexity in the lexicon and numerous feature-driven operations 
that are entirely unminimalist in character – and highly implausible on 
evolutionary grounds. As one proponent of the Merge only (M) side of the 
debate notes, ‘”crash-proof” systems…employ massive stipulations to ensure 
the ‘right’ outcome, ending up with an elaborate redescription of the facts (the 
spectre of GB theory)’ (Ott, 2010: 103). On the other hand the M approach 
reduces the syntactic component to what critics may claim is a trivial operation. 
In addition to there is the less clearly defined operation resulting in 
projection/labelling which involves the provision of some form of information 
about the type of syntactic objects being generated, as Chomsky explains, ‘we 
assume, then, that there is a fixed labelling algorithm LA that licenses SOs so 
that they can be interpreted at the interfaces’ (2013: 43). The generation of all 
possible derivations from a single numeration, all but one of which are then 
eliminated on legibility grounds is inefficient – 10 lexical items could be merged 
in 3.6 million different ways (Putnam and Stroik, 2010) – and strips CGG of any 
pretence at explaining psychologically real processes (see next section). The 
eradication of theories from earlier CGG that seemed elegant and explanatorily 
useful, are a classic example of what has been called a ‘Kuhn loss’ (Ludlow, 
2011: 29). It is not even clear on what grounds two competing derivations – 
both grammatically well-formed but semantically distinct – would be evaluated, 
the interface conditions not being explicitly stipulated in any way. The 
development of the MP in the direction of M does seem to vindicate Seuren’s 
fierce criticism of the model as ‘a “random-generator” view of language’ 
(2004:3)  
 
 
2.6.4 CGG and the status of psychological reality  
The focus on the cognitive aspects of linguistics that emerged in the late 50s 
promoted the field to what Jackendoff recalls as ‘the toast of the intellectual 
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world [as] everyone wanted to know about deep structure and what it showed 
us about the mind’ (2002: xii). It certainly seemed at the time that CGG was 
concerned with explaining real cognitive processes or ‘discovering a mental 
reality underlying actual behavior’ (Chomsky, 1965: 4) and transformational 
generative grammar was upheld as a necessary contribution to a fully 
explanatory understanding of speech production and perception (e.g. Chomsky, 
1964, 1965). Early psychological experiments were conducted on the basis that 
the greater the number and complexity of transformations that were involved in 
any expression would equate to greater processing time – the Derivational 
Theory of Complexity (DTC). And indeed these first experiments appeared to 
support this hypothesis, which Chomsky is reported to have taken as a 
vindication of the theory of transformations within generative grammar (Smith, 
2004: 111). However, these investigations were based purely on formal 
manipulations and once experimenters began to look at meaning-based tasks 
evidence for DTC proved elusive (for a discussion of these experiments see 
Greene, 1972 and references therein). As noted above, in the debate with the 
Generative Semanticists, Chomsky was later adamant that the theory of 
transformational grammar could not be understood as a temporal cognitive 
process and that remains the stated position: ‘the system implies no temporal 
dimension. In this respect, generation of expressions is similar to other 
recursive processes such as construction of formal proofs’ (Chomsky, 2007: 6). 
 
This leaves the status of CGG undetermined as to whether it explains a 
psychologically real process or not. Certainly contemporary advocates of CGG 
such as Hornstein maintain unequivocally that the ‘inventory of rules and 
principles [in the MP] describe real mechanisms of the mind/brain’ (2009: 
45f10). And Chomsky states that ‘the generative system is something real, as 
real as the liver’ (2002: 110) – and livers, of course, operate in real time. Smith 
makes the distinction between performance and competence in that the former 
employs the latter in that ‘a parser maps sounds into thoughts by using the 
grammar’ (2004: 112). And presumably a parser is used to map thoughts into 
sounds which, if it involves movement (internal move), must be temporal, 
otherwise CGG is simply instrumentalist rather than realist. The distinction is 
between a weak notion of competence than is purely descriptive of the surface 
order of language, and a fully explanatory, strong competence than accounts for 
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psychologically real processes. Seuren refers to this as ‘Chomsky’s ambiguous 
realism’ (2004: 61) which he claims is not realism at all and that all CGG is 
analogous to Fibonacci numbers which can predict natural occurrences such as 
the number of petals on a flower, but have no ‘reality’ (i.e. are not hard wired) in 
plants. This might seem to accord with the current emphasis on 3rd factors, but 
leaves little room for the innate aspects that accounted for language acquisition 
and were the motivation for CGG in the first place. The nature of the 
psychological reality of CGG is taken up again in chapter 5.  
 
 
2.7 Conclusion 
 
The relationship between semantics, syntax and phonology in CGG has been 
constantly shifting. In its current form, with post computational semantic 
interpretation, the MP is forced to choose between a crash-proof system that is 
attached to a complex set of operations, dubious on psychological grounds and, 
as we will see in the next chapter, implausible on evolutionary grounds. 
Alternatively, the Move  approach reduces syntax to what is arguably a trivial 
operation, merge, which operates in conjunction with labelling, and 
fundamentally undermines any claim to being psychologically realist3. In chapter 
5 I will claim that these problems arise from an inherent property of syntax in 
CGG: that it is required to simultaneously serve the two masters – LF and PF. 
The fact that one of these is  purely hierarchical, and the other purely linear 
means that no system is going to be able to operate as this dual function.       
 
                                               
3 It should be noted that most proponents of CGG, including those who subscribe to the SMT, also 
assume that there is Agree by which grammatical relations are established through c-command.  
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Chapter 3. Evolution, hominin phylogeny and the emergence of 
language 
 
 
3.0 Introduction 
 
With the exception of those who attribute the existence of the world in its current 
form to faith-based interventions, evolution by natural selection is one of the 
most universally accepted theories in science: a point succinctly made by 
Dobzhansky in the title of his 1973 article, ‘[n]othing in biology makes sense 
except in the light of evolution’ (p.125). When Darwin published On the origin of 
species in 1859, it had already been noted for many years that living creatures, 
if not necessarily humans, evolved. Darwin’s great contribution was to fuse the 
notion of evolution with the mechanism of natural selection, a proposal so 
simple and convincing that the biologist Thomas Huxley felt obliged to reproach 
himself, reputedly exclaiming "[h]ow stupid of me not to have thought of that". 
The final part of the theory that is now known as neo-Darwinism or the ‘modern 
synthesis’ came with developments in the ensuing 150 years in biological and 
molecular genetics that provided an explanation of precisely how natural 
selection operated (for a history see e.g. Ridley, 2004). 
 
This chapter comprises three sections. The first begins with an examination of 
the nature of neo-Darwinian evolution and the mechanics of the processes 
which underpin it. This is followed with a consideration of alternative hypotheses 
for genetic and epigenetic evolution. The second section looks at the evolution 
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of the human species and seeks to identify stages in the physiological, cognitive 
and cultural history that may aid an understanding of the origins of language. 
Finally, we look specifically at differences in theoretical perspectives that seek 
to provide an explanation for language evolution.    
 
 
3.1 The nature of evolution 
 
Essentially evolution requires imperfect heredity, which leads to variation in a 
species. This variation enables members of a species to compete for resources 
and ultimately facilitates the opportunity to replicate themselves. This is the 
process of natural selection which ensures that those who are more finely 
adapted to their given environment are more likely to reproduce and 
consequently the phylogenetic feature that bestowed that advantage will spread 
through that interbreeding group of the species. Eventually these features 
become fixed in the species as a homologous adaptation. On the basis that 
major changes would be deleterious (an often used analogy is making large, 
random changes to a car engine) and possibly lethal to the individual, they 
would not spread, so evolution is presumed to be gradual and incremental. 
Indeed, many writers, especially in inter-disciplinary fields such as language 
evolution, seem to assume that neo-Darwinian gradualism constitutes the 
entirety of evolutionary theory. However, while no-one doubts the role of 
evolution by incremental, advantageous changes, it is by no means the whole 
picture. Before considering the wider view of evolution, it will be useful to look 
briefly at the most salient details of the precise mechanics of genetic change 
prior to further discussion later in this chapter and subsequent ones.      
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3.1.1 Genes and adaptive evolution 
The phenotypic features of any individual are said to be an expression of the 
genotype of that same individual. Genes are composed of the chemical polymer 
DNA which itself consists of four bases, (adenine, thymine, cytosine and 
guanine – often referred to by their initials alone) the first two and last two of 
which combine against a double helix, sugar-phosphate backbone to form 
chromosomes which are contained in cell nuclei. Humans have 23 pairs of 
chromosomes, including a pair of sex chromosomes one of which combines 
with another parental chromosome in the formation of offspring. In the process 
of generating new material, the DNA contained in the chromosomes undergoes 
transcription into mRNA which leaves the nucleus and is transported to another 
element, or organelle, of the cell, the ribosome, where, through the process of 
translation, its own unique code determines a particular amino acid sequence in 
the production of proteins. In the case of the 22 non-sex chromosomes, these 
proteins constitute the phenotypic traits of the individual.  
 
The human genome consists of approximately 25,600 genes comprising 
roughly 40% of the 3,200 million pairs of bases contained in the chromosomes. 
Of the genes themselves, only stretches known as exons are translated into 
proteins (i.e. are coding)  while other stretches, introns, are deleted after 
transcription. The function of the remaining non-coding DNA is not clearly 
understood, but it contains vestigial pseudogenes which were once, but are no 
longer, coding (and could be susceptible to reactivation) and is certainly 
functional in some way as damage to non-coding material can be just as 
28 
 
harmful to cells as that to coding material, hence the abandonment of the 
previously common term ‘junk DNA’ (Ecker et. al., 2012).       
 
In reproduction of diploid organisms such as humans, in which each cell has 
two copies of a chromosome, only one, randomly constituted from each of the 
two in the progenitor stem cell – a process called recombination –  appears in 
the gamete or sex cell. One gamete from each parent fuse to form the 
embryonic cell (zygote) with a full pair of chromosomes. In humans, given our 
number of genes, this means that a single act of reproduction could produce 
any one of 64 million possible offspring (Nettle, 2009). Another source of novel 
traits in a species is gene mutation, in which DNA sequences are altered. Cells 
reproduce by making copies of the chromosomes and then dividing into two 
new cells. There are several ways in which mutations can occur, including 
inserting, deleting and changing base sequences during the copying process, 
producing an altered gene or allele. Mutations in gamete cells may be passed 
on and, if advantageous, become fixed in the species.  
 
In addition to that contained in the nucleus, there is also a small amount of non-
coding DNA that is located in other organelles of the cells known as 
mitochondria. This mitochondrial DNA (mtDNA) is passed almost exclusively 
down the female line and, because it is non-coding, mutations have no 
deleterious effects and are consequently much more tolerated and preserved. 
As a result, mtDNA is very useful in tracing back lineage in a species. 
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3.1.2 Genes and non-adaptive evolution  
A number of mechanisms, complementary to natural selection, are generally 
recognised. These include random genetic drift, where alleles that offer no 
competitive advantage are still likely to be distributed among the population, 
particularly smaller populations. Furthermore, alleles generally have pleiotropic 
effects, that is they produce several distinct phenotypic traits. Consequently a 
particular neutral trait could ‘hitch hike’ alongside an advantageous trait with 
which it is correlated. There is even the possibility of a ‘trade off’ whereby a 
negative trait can survive if it is correlated with a sufficiently positive one. Where 
such a negative trait cannot be easily accommodated, its effect may be 
modified or eliminated by developments in other genes (modifier genes), a 
process known as canalizing selection.     
 
Gould and Vrba (1982) emphasise the need to divorce current utility from the 
initial reasons of origin. Thus features that emerged under one adaptive 
pressure that may no longer bestow an advantage could be exapted for another 
purpose. Alternatively, traits that were never functional themselves but rather 
are the side effects of ones that were – for which Gould and Lewontin (1979) 
adopted the term ‘spandrels’ – could become utilised.      
 
Saltations – the process whereby a macromutation gives rise to a major 
phenotypic alteration that is beneficial – are not considered plausible in  
mainstream evolutionary models. Theories based on sudden great leaps such 
as  Richard Goldschmidt’s ‘hopeful monsters’ hypothesis from the 1940s have 
not survived (but see Blumberg, 2009, for a sympathetic review), and nor have 
the genes of Slipjer’s two-legged goat discussed below!  
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3.1.3 Epigenetic evolution 
Fodor and Piattelli-Palmarini (2010) received a large number of very critical 
reviews for emphasising the internal, endogenous constraints on genotypic and 
phenotypic variability at the (complete?) expense of exogenous factors. 
However it is the case that a particular gene does not, on the whole, 
deterministically correlate with any given phenotypic trait (with the exception of 
monogenetic conditions such as cystic fibrosis). Numerous epigenetic factors 
influence the way in which a gene is expressed in the phenotype and one of the 
most significant characteristics of phenotypic development is its plasticity. 
Development is not pre-determined but rather the direction it takes and the 
stage at which it ceases are heavily influenced by factors outside of narrow 
genetic structure. This interaction of development and genetics is sometimes 
referred to as evolutionary developmental biology, or EvoDevo. 
 
West-Eberhard (2005) argues that contrary to a strong selfish gene hypothesis, 
evolution operates on phenotypes which are the product of far more than just 
their genotypes. Indeed, the most successful life forms on earth in terms of an 
ability to replicate their genes and survive in the greatest variety of 
environments are non-nucleic, single celled bacteria and archea. Presuming all 
other life forms evolved from common ancestors with one of these, it is not clear 
why evolution, if purely propelled by the replication of genes, was ever kick-
started in the first place. However, if it is phenotypes that are selected for, and 
development plays a major role in determining a specific phenotype, then 
‘selection can proceed for generations without genetic variation and without an 
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evolutionary effect….Should genetic variation affecting those traits arise, e.g. 
due to mutation or genetic recombination, it would immediately have an 
evolutionary effect’ (West-Eberhard, ibid: 6544). In other words, genes may 
record adaptive change rather than promote it. She gives the example of the 
two-legged goat reported by Slipjer of ‘phenotypic accommodation’. This animal 
was born without any forelimbs and yet through anatomical and behavioural 
developments it was able to move with remarkable agility and speed. It was 
recorded that the goat had developed the necessary muscular manipulation to 
enable locomotion in the manner of a kangaroo. It had also developed the 
necessary bone and tendon shape required for bipedalism. The only two 
explanations for this phenomena are either due to the reactivation of dormant 
pseudogenes from an earlier time when the ancestor of goats was bipedal, or, 
the far more plausible account, that it was the result of developmental 
adjustment to how the genes were expressed. Being two-legged, however, 
conferred no adaptive advantage on the goat and it failed to reproduce.   
   
Blumberg (2009) gives numerous other examples of how developmental factors 
influence phenotypes, and locomotive gait in particular. In the case of rabbits, 
he reports that locomotion by hopping, far from being genetically determined, is 
purely a developmental response to the environment. In fact, by severing the 
spinal cord and subsequently stimulating the appropriate muscles, it was shown 
that rabbits are hard wired to walk rather than hop. Similarly, a study by 
Robinson (2005) showed that prenatal experience by a rat foetus had a 
significant influence on the development of coordinated motor behaviour. 
Blumberg’s conclusion, like that of Hoyt and Taylor (1981) referred to in the 
previous chapter, is that to ‘satisfy the demands of physics and efficiency, land 
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mammals use a diversity of gaits. These gaits represent ‘universal 
organizational principles of behaviour’ (ibid.: 118).  
 
As well as such examples of developmental induction, many species also pass 
through a sensitive period when they undergo imprinting. For example, Spencer 
et al. (2009) refer to ducklings which, immediately after hatching, will follow and 
form an attachment to the first moving object of the right size that they 
encounter, whether that is their mother or a red wooden box on wheels. 
However, ducklings reared in darkness with no appropriate stimuli do not 
develop such a predisposition. Imprinting, they argue, is not part of an innate, 
genetically specified endowment, but rather a developmental response to the 
environment.      
 
 
3.1.4 Environment and genetic change 
While the role of the environment on genetic expression is gaining increasing 
recognition, it is commonly accepted that development does not impact directly 
on the genes themselves. However, there are two challenges to this position. 
Firstly, rather similar to the scenario described by West-Eberhard above, is the 
process known as the Baldwin effect. In this case, a genetic change that 
confers an advantage only if conspecifics are able to respond in an appropriate 
manner, say to a novel warning call, will benefit only those members of the 
species who can learn the correct reaction. If sufficient numbers do respond 
correctly and acquire an advantage, then the allele responsible for the 
behaviour will spread among that group. In time, either the reaction itself or the 
learning ability may become fixed in the genes through the process of genetic 
33 
 
assimilation (Nettle, 2009). This clearly has major implications for possible 
theories of language evolution (see below).  
 
More controversial are hypotheses that appeal to the long discredited 
Lamarckian evolutionary theory of soft (acquired) inheritance. However, Spector 
(2012) discusses the process of ‘methylation’ whereby methyl groups that are 
free floating in cells attach themselves to points in the DNA (usually c bases) 
and switch off the gene so that it is no longer coding. Examples of methylated 
genes that have been passed down generations have been recorded in toadflax 
plants, water fleas, chickens and mice. There is even evidence that events can 
change genes and that these changes are inherited by future generations in 
humans. Spector (ibid.) refers to a study of a small, isolated  community in 
Sweden whose ancestors in the 19th century had alternatively gorged 
themselves in times of good harvests and starved during famines. Those whose 
parents were born to grandparents during the feasting years had statistically 
significant increased cardiac disease and diabetes rates indicating that 
behaviour (in the 19th century) appeared to have had an impact on the third 
generation nearly a century later. However, the rehabilitation of Lamarck is 
neither accomplished nor likely to be so and there is only scant evidence 
available for developments such as these4.            
 
Even were the existence of acquired inheritance and its mechanisms to be 
established and given a role in evolution alongside developmental plasticity, the 
role of genetic change would remain undiminished, particularly in the 
investigation of different species which is considered in the next section. 
                                               
4 Though see recent research on mice and olfactory memories linked to electric shocks – New Scientist 
6/12/13  
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3.1.5 Speciation 
Species is not a straight forward category and depends to some extent on one’s 
philosophical perspective. The two factors usually invoked as criteria for 
distinguishing between different species are the inability to interbreed, and 
sufficient morphological dissimilarity. For neo-Darwinists, species has, to some 
extent, to be a methodological construct as the two criteria are a matter of 
degree in a gradually changing population. A complementary hypothesis is that 
of ‘punctuated equilibrium’ (e.g. Gould and Eldredge, 1993) which the authors 
describe as ‘a novel interpretation for the oldest and most robust of 
palaeontological observations: the geologically instantaneous origination and 
subsequent stability (often for millions of years) of paleontological 
“morphospecies”’ (p.223). Punctuated equilibrium is a peripatric theory of 
speciation, that is, new species are said to appear in geographically isolated, 
small sub-populations. There are periods of rapid change (adaptive radiations) 
as the new species emerges and then much longer periods of stasis when there 
is relatively little significant evolutionary development.   
 
Certainly it is known that sudden and dramatic changes to the environment can 
have significant effects on genetic expression. The removal of homeostatic 
constraints on development can lead to many different phenotypes in a 
population. Blumberg (2009) discusses the example of British grass snakes 
whose eggs, if incubated above 40 degrees centigrade, tend not to hatch, but 
those that do invariably form dicephalic (two-headed) snakes. There are various 
reasons why these creatures are not likely to survive, but, as Blumberg points 
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out ‘if an animal were ever to find itself in an environment that, for whatever 
reason, did favour the possession of two heads, a dicephalic species could 
arise very rapidly for one simple reason: The embryo’s potential to produce two 
heads is no less ancient, and no less fundamental, than its potential to produce 
just one’ (ibid.: 95 – italics in original). The gradual evolution and speciation 
events that have ultimately resulted in modern humans are the subject of the 
next section.  
 
 
3.2 Hominin evolution 
 
Of all the disciplines that contribute to the study at hand it is perhaps the field of 
palaeontology that is most afflicted with controversies, and in which single fossil 
discoveries can have a significant impact on an understanding of the story of 
the human species. This is due firstly to the nature of fossilization, in which only 
hard tissues such as bones and teeth undergo diagenesis, the process by 
which true fossils are formed, and in pre-burial times the chances of even these 
materials surviving is extremely small. A second problem is that of dating, of 
which there are several, rapidly developing techniques, with varying degrees of 
reliability, and which do not always lead to the same conclusion. The problem of 
reaching a consensus while utilising multiple methods is further compounded 
now that it is possible to extract DNA material from fossils for comparative 
analysis with other fossils as well as the human (and Neanderthal) genomes. 
Consequently, the outline below, though as close to an orthodoxy as exists, is 
tentative and several variants on this scenario are possible and have been 
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proposed by researchers in the field; however, for the sake of brevity these will 
not be addressed in full. 
 
Before looking in more detail at the origin of the species Homo sapiens, there 
are two theoretical points to be clarified. First, as discussed in 3.1.4 above, 
researchers differ on how they distinguish between different species. Those 
who tend towards a ‘splitting’ taxonomy will recognise an individuated species 
on the basis of comparatively fewer unique characteristics, whereas those who 
favour a ‘lumping’ approach are inclined to demand larger differences before 
conceding the establishment of a new species. My own position lies midway 
between both ends of such a continuum as we shall see (despite problems in 
determining exactly how much variation is ‘normal’ in any give species). 
Secondly, for most of the twentieth century, it was presumed that modern 
humans evolved from different ancestors depending on the geographical area 
they now occupied: the strong multiregional hypothesis. This position is now 
largely rejected and has been replaced by two competing proposals. Firstly, a 
weak multiregionalism that still presumes a variety of ancestors but emphasises 
the sharing of features throughout the human species through interbreeding. 
Alternatively, examination of mtDNA has suggested a recent out of Africa 
hypothesis that assumes a single common ancestral group in Africa around 200 
kya (Cann et al. 1987). As will become clear, I assume a recent African origins 
for modern humans (for discussion see Mann, 2012). 
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3.2.1 Possible and probable earliest hominins. 
In terms of genes, the closest existing relatives to humans in the animal 
kingdom are the two members of the Pan genus, Pan troglodytes (common 
chimpanzees) and Pan paniscus (pygmy chimpanzees, or bonobos). In recent 
years the estimated date at which hominins shared a last common ancestor 
(LCA) with chimpanzees has been extended further and further back. Raaum et 
al. (2005) review a variety of evidence and assume a point approximately 6 
mya, while Endicott et al. (2010) used two methods which produced dates of 6.5 
mya and 7 mya, both within a margin of error of plus or minus 0.5 million years. 
More recently, based on revised rates for de novo mutations in humans, Sun et 
al. (2012) have estimated an average date of 7.49 mya.      
Research on soil samples (Cerling et al. 2011) suggests that environmental 
changes resulted in deforestation and the beginning of the encroachment of the 
savannah in East Africa by at least 6 mya, which would seem to confirm the 
paleaoanthropological and genetic evidence for a speciation event initiated by a 
change of environment. 
 
The very earliest contenders for membership of the hominin clade include 
Sahelanthropus tchadensis (fossils dated to 6–7 mya) and Orrorin tugenensis (6 
mya) whose fossils were found in West Central Africa and Kenya respectively. 
Two possibly better candidates belong to the Ardipithicus genus which lived 
4.5–5.8 mya in the area of modern Ethiopia. However, while all four specimens 
show divergence from the assumed morphology of our LCA, especially in terms 
of increased bipedalism and modifications for a different diet, the changes are 
too slight and the quantity of fossils discovered too small to confidently classify 
any of them as hominins ( Wood and Bauernfeind, 2012).        
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The earliest category for which there is a general consensus for classification as 
hominins are the australopithecines. These archaic hominins include several 
species that have been found the length of the African continent and whose 
fossils date from 2.4 to 4.5 mya (though there are claims for a more recent 
species, Australopithecus sediba, Berger et al. 2010). They were omnivores 
who were a little larger than modern chimpanzees, but whose brains remained 
proportionately the same, varying between 400 – 500 cc. The most significant 
change was a clear modification for bipedalism, which according to Wheeler 
(1991) conferred a thermoregulatory advantage for life on the savannah. This 
view is supported by evidence from the evolution of pubic lice, which took a 
unique form in hominins some 3 – 4 mya, indicating that some body fur loss 
would have occurred by this time if the lice were to have a niche to occupy 
distinct from more general body lice (Reed et al., 2007). Whatever the actual 
advantage was, and regardless of whether it was initially a genetic modification 
or developmental response, upright walking resulted in a narrowing of the pelvis 
and accordingly the birth canal in females as well as changes to the thorax and 
oral tract that were almost certainly beneficial to vocalisation as a subsequent 
exaptation. It also released the forelimbs from much of the responsibility for 
locomotion, and this may be related to a greater use of tools. Scarred animal 
bones found in Ethiopia and dated from 2.5 mya show evidence of having been 
stripped of meat using ‘Oldowan industry’ (early lower palaeolithic) stone flakes 
found nearby, and have been associated with Australopithecus garhi (de 
Heinzelin et al. 1999; though see Braun, 2010, who suggests an even earlier 
appearance of stone tools). 
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3.2.2 Transitional and pre-modern Homo 
The first specimen to be generally classified as part of the Homo genus and 
considered by most as a transitional hominin, sharing modern and archaic 
features, is Homo habilis, though some researchers prefer to distinguish a 
separate transitional, though contemporary species, H. rudolfensis, which lived 
in some of the same locations (e.g. Wood and Bauernfeind, 2012.; Leakey et al. 
2012). The earliest fossils, dating from approximately 2.4 mya, were discovered 
in the Olduvai Gorge in modern day Tanzania and indicate complete 
bipedalism, though otherwise show little change from the australopithecines. 
Some researchers remain skeptical of the status of a new species and Reader 
cautions that ‘Homo habilis remains more of an evolutionary idea than an 
example of anatomical fact linking one species to another’ (2011: 332).  
 
Leaving aside the many side branches of the hominin clade (in particular the 
genera Kenyanthropus and Paranthropus which some have posited as hominin 
ancestors), the next major step in a probable human lineage was the 
appearance of Homo erectus. A further species, Homo ergaster, is sometimes 
posited in a strong splitting taxonomy as a stage between the habilines and pre-
modern Homo, existing between 2 and 1.5 mya. However, it is H. erectus sensu 
stricto that is of most interest in the evolution of modern humans. This species 
is believed to have first appeared around 1.9 mya in Africa and to have had 
body morphology very close to modern humans, including smaller teeth and jaw 
bones that may indicate a diet of cooked food. Brain sizes in the species have 
been estimated at between 650 cc and 1250 cc with an average of a little under 
1000 cc or roughly 60% of that of modern humans. It is generally accepted that 
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Homo erectus initiated the first migration out of Africa certainly by 1.7 mya and 
early fossils from this period have been found in China and Indonesia (Mann, 
2012; Stringer, 2011).  
 
One puzzle in this scenario was the discovery announced in 2004 of Homo 
floresiensis on a remote Indonesian island. Dubbed ‘the Hobbit’, the species 
which had survived until only 18 kya was approximately 1 metre tall and had a 
brain only one third of the size proportionate to modern humans (Reader, 2011). 
A first account suggested that these were descendants of H. erectus who had 
undergone the generally accepted process of island dwarfing. However, when it 
emerged that the species shared more characteristics with australopithecines 
and habilines than more modern hominins, the only explanation seemed to be 
an earlier migration from Africa, prior to that of H. erectus. Alternative theories 
have been suggested based on pathological conditions affecting a modern 
human and resulting in microcephaly, but for the moment the debate remains 
unresolved (for discussion see Aiello, 2010).  
 
As noted earlier, the first evidence of hominin stone and bone tools appears by 
at least 2.5 mya with the use of unmodified flakes for cutting meat and 
vegetation. While behaviour of this type may be indicative of a greater manual 
dexterity, these Mode1 category industries are not substantially different from 
the employment of available materials by present day chimpanzees, such as 
stripping tree bark for use as tools for extracting termites from their nests as a 
food source (though early hominins, unlike chimpanzees, appear to have 
transported their tools and materials). It is rather the advent of Mode 2, 
Acheulean (mid-lower palaeolithic) hand-axes at approximately 1.5 mya in 
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Africa, and subsequently in other parts of the world, that indicates a cognitive 
breakthrough (Davidson, 2002). These tools, produced by knapping pieces of 
flint, were mainly of a uniform size and differ in a qualitative sense from 
preceding hominin and contemporary non-hominin tools (Wynn, 2012). It is no 
coincidence that the first indication of the use, and possibly creation, of fire is 
also found at this time, even if not necessarily highly controlled use (Lynch and 
Granger, 2008).    
 
H. erectus survived probably until 150 kya, but during this time a new species 
had evolved. Named Homo heidelbergensis, the oldest fossils have been found 
in Zambia and Ethiopia and dated to 600 - 700 kya, with records of the species 
in areas outside of Africa shortly after this (Mounier et al. 2009) H. 
heidelbergensis had an average brain size of 1200cc and demonstrated 
significant cultural advancement in areas such as shelter, hunting (including the 
use of wooden spears discovered in Schoningen, Europe and dating from 300 - 
400 kya), and the development of full mode 3 type composite tools such as 
those from 260 kya found at Twin Rivers in Zambia (Stringer, 2011).  
 
 
3.2.3 Homo neanderthalensis and Homo sapiens 
H. heidelbergensis’ reign on earth appears to have been relatively short lived 
and within 500 thousand years the species had probably disappeared. In a 
‘recent out of Africa’ account, H. heibelbergensis gives rise to Homo sapiens in 
Africa while the descendants in Europe and surrounding areas were a different 
species: Homo neanderthalensis (Harvati et al. 2004)5. Endicott et al. (2010) 
                                               
5 Further complexity in recently posited species Denisovans will not concern us here 
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estimate the most recent common ancestor of both neanderthals and humans 
to be between 410-440 kya, while the oldest fossils generally recognized as 
those of Neanderthals have been discovered across Europe and dated to 300-
400 kya. Although Neanderthals had large brains (larger even than modern 
humans) and displayed considerable cultural achievements, e.g. use of 
Mousterian (middle paleolithic) tool technology (Wynn, 2012), these never 
reached the stature of that of H. sapiens. There is evidence that Neanderthals 
only ever acquired limited hunting skills, never exceeded ad hoc, low 
temperature hearths (Wynn and Coolidge, 2012) and were generally far less 
able than contemporary H. sapiens at exploiting their environment for nutrients 
(Stringer, 2011). In terms of symbolic capacity, later Neanderthals engaged in 
some systematic burial of the dead (d’Errico and Henshilwood, 2011), and while 
there is some evidence of use of pigments (though it is not clear whether this 
was for ornamentation or purely utilitarian use e.g. as an adhesive, or a 
protector from a strong sun), there is certainly no evidence of Neanderthal art 
(Wynn and Coolidge, ibid.).  
 
Meanwhile in Africa, fossils from the Omo and Herto regions of Ethiopia indicate 
that anatomically fully modern humans were evolving nearly 200 kya (Fleagle et 
al. 2008) with an average brain size of 1350 cc. All modern humans appear to 
be from one of four major mitochondrial lineages that exist in Africa, yet of these 
four extant mtDNA haplogroups only one, L3, is found in non-African 
populations. There appears to have been a population explosion within the L3 
group in East Africa around 86 kya and while there may have  been several 
migration events out of Africa (e.g. Templeton, 2002), there is evidence that 
they were ultimately unsuccessful until an exodus of L3 some time shortly after 
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65 kya (Mellars, 2006; Atkinson et al. 2008). Within 35 thousand years all other 
members of the Homo genus, including Neanderthals, had been replaced. As 
some 1 – 4% of the genome of everyone not of recent sub-Saharan descent is 
shared with Neanderthals, it is often assumed that there must have been some 
degree of interbreeding (Green et al. 2010). An alternative explanation (Erikson 
and Manica, 2012) is that this part of the genome was already in place in the 
group that constituted the last migration from Africa, and had been inherited 
from a common ancestor with Neanderthals. This position appears to be 
confirmed by the examination of mtDNA (Cann, 2012). Whichever is correct, the 
arrival of humans seems to have been fatal for H. neanderthalensis, who were 
either directly exterminated or simply lost out in the battle for resources and 
disappeared from the fossil record 30 kya.    
 
 
3.2.4 Cognitive developments in the hominin lineage 
In addition to purely functional tools such as those discussed above, there are 
other indicators of cognitive developments in recent hominin evolution, including 
burial, the use of pigment  and the appearance of ornamentation and abstract 
designs. Overall, these advances seem to imply the early stages of a symbolic 
capacity in hominins. 
 
Pettitt speculates that the fossilized remains of 13 individuals from the species 
Australopithecus afarensis found at Hadar in Ethiopia and dated 3 – 3.5 mya 
indicate deliberate arrangement of the dead individuals and thus ‘one might see 
this as relatively simple symbolism’ (2011: 151). A more generally recognized 
earliest form of mortuary ritual is based on the 400-600 kya H. heidelbergensis 
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bodies found at the Sima de los Huesos site in Atapuerca, Spain (Bischoff et al. 
2003). However, Stringer (2012) has argued that these are in fact early 
Neanderthals (sometimes classed as a separate species, Homo antecessor), 
actually dating from a much more recent period than initially claimed, and that 
the status of the site as an intentional mortuary is not confirmed. Endicott et al. 
(2010) have also questioned the dating and suggest 200-400 kya is more likely. 
The earliest identified human burial sites upon which a majority of researchers 
agree are the 100-130 kya site at Skhul near modern day Haifa, while the 
earliest widely recognized in Africa is only 60-76 thousand years old (d’Errico 
and Henshilwood, 2011).    
 
Evidence for the first use of pigment appears in Kenya at the Twin Rivers site in 
Zambia 230 kya (McBrearty and Brooks, 2000). However, Pettitt (2011) points 
out that the simple presence of pigment does not automatically denote symbolic 
(as opposed to purely functional) use. A stronger case for assuming symbolism 
is made with the selective use of the most saturated red ochre at Pinnacle Point 
in South Africa 165 kya (Marean et al. 2007). Finally, unambiguous symbolic 
use is first evident 70-100 kya in the complex geometric patterns painted in 
ochre at the Blombos Cave also in South Africa (Henshilwood and d’Errico, 
2011).   
 
Among the earliest contenders for lithic symbolism are the pierres figures from 
350-500 kya found in Israel and Morocco. These consist of small cobbles which 
bear a natural resemblance to a torso and head but appear to have been 
engraved with a number of grooves (Pettitt, 2011). However, their extreme rarity 
and unclear status mean they are not good candidates for absolute evidence of 
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symbolic behaviour. More robust assumptions about early symbolism can be 
made on the basis of marine shells used as beads, some decorated with red 
ochre, that have been found over North Africa and the Near East, far inland, 
and dated to 70-100 kya (d’Errico and Vanhearen, 2012). As well as extensive 
use of ochre decorated marine and ostrich egg shells,  there is evidence of 
sophisticated heat treated stone tools in Southern Africa, at Still Bay by 72 kya 
(Stringer, 2011) and later, 58-66 kya, at Howieson’s Poort Shelter (Jacobs et al. 
2008). 
 
The previous sections have discussed the appearance of several aspects of 
behaviour that characterise humans today including complex tools, formal 
artefacts, art, structures for living, transportation of valued materials over 
distances, rituals, migration and adaptation to new environments, and more 
complex food gathering and processing (Stringer, 2011). Taking all the 
evidence together, McBrearty and Brooks assume ‘a gradual assembling of the 
package of modern human behaviors in Africa’ between 250-300 kya (2000: 
453) while d’Errico and Henshilwood conclude that there was likely to have 
been ‘the presence of symbolic material culture in Africa by at least 150 ky[a]’ 
(2011: 58). Discontinuities in the development of tools and symbolic behaviour 
(their appearance, disappearance and reappearance) suggest a major role for 
local conditions, but also one or more significant cognitive breakthroughs for 
hominins at some points in their history. The nature and likely timing of these 
are addressed in chapter 4. However, notably absent from this list is language. 
The evidence for when and why language arose forms the subject of the next 
section.   
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3.3 Language evolution  
 
As we will see in the next chapter, even our closest relatives in the animal 
kingdom do not have anything approximate to language in their natural 
environment and are unable to acquire it, in any real sense, in artificial settings. 
Language appears to be a unique, human endowment. Given this lack of 
continuity with any other known system, the first task of researchers in language 
evolution is to determine exactly what evolved. In other words, what is the 
nature of the human FL? Two broad positions can be identified. Firstly, those 
who propose a view of language that is based on a genetically endowed system 
of domain-specific linguistic mechanisms, along the lines of a module of the 
mind as proposed by Fodor (1983). Secondly,  even those who reject an 
explanation of language rooted in modularity of mind still need to account for 
the evolution of a set of general cognitive capacities that enable the processing 
of language. As O’Grady acknowledges ‘there is general agreement that the 
acquisition of language is innately guided – this much has been widely 
acknowledged even by those opposed to the idea of an innate Universal 
Grammar’ (2008: 620). Within each camp there are contrasting views on the 
initial ‘function’ of language and how it came to emerge in the species. 
Consequently, the discussion below will involve a consideration of a number of 
possible explanations of language evolution. Bickerton (2012) identifies three 
distinct approaches: language as cultural invention, catastrophic accounts, and 
adaptive accounts. The discussion below will largely mirror these categories, 
though with an additional distinction between modular and non-modular 
catastrophic hypotheses. I suggest that the possible major classifications of 
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theories of language evolution are as outlined in figure 1. The first two, often 
referred to as ‘nativist’, are: A) a module of the mind/brain for language evolved 
in a classical neo-Darwinian manner, corresponding to Bickerton’s third 
category; B) a module of the mind/brain for language emerged suddenly (in 
evolutionary terms) – a catastrophist account. A range of non-nativist 
hypotheses are included in the third option: C) language itself evolved as a 
domain general, socio-cultural system, Bickerton’s first category. The final 
option D), which has scant support, is another catastrophist account: that 
language appeared suddenly with no domain specific modification to the brain.  
   
  Gradual  Sudden 
  
Module of the Mind   
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Socio-Cultural System 
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figure 3.1: possible accounts of language evolution 
 
Before beginning this discussion I will briefly review the genetic evidence that 
may throw some light on language origins and evolution. 
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3.3.1 The contribution of genetics 
Although humans share around 99% of their genes with chimpanzees, the 
expression of these genes is radically different and an estimated 80% of 
proteins are dissimilar in the two species (Glazko et al., 2005). Consequently, 
even very small changes in the human genome can potentially be useful 
sources of information in understanding aspects of hominin, and language, 
evolution.  
 
The gene most widely discussed in terms of a relation to the evolution of 
language is FOXP2. The gene was first reported in 1990 in which a single 
nucleotide change in the gene sequence was identified as responsible for a 
condition in some members of the KE family in London (Hurst et al., 1990), a 
condition later characterised as ‘orofacial dyspraxia’ resulting in problems of 
motor control and language comprehension, though not non-verbal IQ (Vargha-
Khadem et al., 1995). FOXP2 is generally a very stable gene, for example there 
have been no changes in the chimpanzee line since their LCA with rodents 
some 90 mya. However, two changes have arisen in the hominin line in only the 
last 7.5 million years. In humans the gene is involved in regulating over 100 
other genes – a function lacking in the ancestral form – and Diller and Cann 
(2012) have suggested that the significant mutations occurred between 1.8 and 
1.9 mya shortly after the first Homo speciation event (though see Marcus and 
Fisher, 2003, who had suggested a more recent date). However, sensational 
press speculation aside, it is generally agreed that while FOXP2 undoubtedly 
plays a significant role in our ability to speak a language, attempts to 
characterise this or any other single gene as the ‘language gene’ are hugely 
wide of the mark. 
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Even if searching for a gene ‘for language’ is ruled out, other areas of study 
have been fruitful, and brain size and structure have been a particular focus of 
gene research. Several writers have highlighted the correlation between a 
defect in the genes ASPM and microcephalin and the condition microcephaly in 
which there is severely reduced brain growth (e.g. Zhang, 2003). There have 
been substantially accelerated mutations in ASPM, some 15 since the 
divergence of humans and the LCA with chimpanzees, and Evans et al. 
conclude that ‘ASPM underwent strong adaptive evolution in the descent of 
Homo sapiens, which is consistent with its putative role in the evolutionary 
enlargement of the human brain’ (2004: 489). However, there is considerable 
disagreement over this conclusion and the status of ASPM remains unclear 
(see Diller and Cann, 2012). Other researchers have looked for genetic 
mutations that might be associated with altered brain structure rather than size 
per se. Eighteen mutations to genes (which in other species are highly 
conserved) in the Human Accelerated Region (HAR), in particular region 1, 
appear to be related to greater complexity in cerebral cortex structure and 
connections (Stringer, 2011).  
 
The period 2-2.8 mya seems to be especially interesting in terms of genetic 
changes with potential implications for human cognition. Chou et al. (2002) 
identified a mutation occurring 2.7 mya to the gene CMAH, preventing 
production of a protein that inhibited brain cell growth. While Charrier et al. 
(2012) claim that a duplication of the SRGAP2 gene, variant C, resulted in 
greater brain connectivity through more compact cellular dendritic spines, and 
Dennis et al. (2012) date this mutation to 2.4 mya. Functional cerebral 
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asymmetry, which is far greater in hominins than other species, compensates 
for the accompanying reduced degree of redundancy by enabling a 
concentration of neurons in functional areas and locating areas with inter-
related functions adjacent to each other, thus diminishing the ‘connection 
problem’ of larger brains. Crow (2002) discusses ProtocadherinXY as a gene 
for lateralisation of function and argues that the significant mutation in the 
hominin line arose between 2 and 3 mya, and that there was evidence of 
significant asymmetry in Homo erectus. Changes to body morphology, and in 
particular hominin masticatory muscles, provides further possible evidence for 
the significance of this period. Stedman et al. associate a correlation between 
smaller jaw muscles as a result of a mutation to MYH16 around 2.4 mya and 
greater cranial size, concluding that their findings ‘raise the intriguing possibility 
that the decrement in masticatory muscle size removed an evolutionary 
constraint on encephalization’ (2004: 418).  
 
A discussion of the role of genetic and developmental factors in the evolution of 
hominin cognitive abilities will be continued in the next two chapters. Now I will 
return to the topic of the origins of language per se. 
 
 
3.3.2 Gradualist accounts of language evolution 
Gradualists, both nativist and non-nativist, need to provide an explanation for 
the adaptive pressure that drove language evolution, and the interaction of the 
composite elements of language, in particular phonology and syntax 
(‘semantics’ will be considered in the following chapter). 
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3.3.2.1 Adaptive pressures for language    
Positing reasons for why language emerged and the immediate benefit that its 
users were endowed with is among the most speculative aspect of serious 
research on language evolution. Although adherents to Chomskyan generative 
grammar have a tendency to dismiss the various hypotheses as ‘just-so’ stories 
(e.g. Chomsky and McGilvary, 2012) there are nevertheless a large number of 
claims made for a dominant adaptive pressure (see Szamado and Szathmary, 
2006, for an analysis of the explanatory credibility of 11 competing theories of 
language evolution). A major distinction can be made between proposals that 
see the origin of language as a result of purely social pressures and those that 
emphasize the instrumental. One strongly social hypothesis that has received 
considerable attention is that language emerged as a method of maintaining 
social relations in large groups. Dunbar (1996, 2012) points out that the 
dominant mode of sustaining social bonds in primate groups is through mutual 
grooming. The other requirements of daily survival limit the maximum time that 
may be devoted to such activity to 20% of the total time available and this figure 
is adequate in groups that number up to around 50 – the norm among primates. 
However, the emergence and evolution of language as a social replacement for 
manual grooming enabled early hominins to interact with more than one other 
member of the group at a time, and also to simultaneously engage in other 
useful activities. As a consequence, the 20% ceiling could be broken and 
hominin groups could expand to a more efficient size, terminating at around 150 
at the time of Homo heidelbergensis. Alternative theories emphasizing social 
interaction include the suggestion that language was initially employed in child 
rearing. Falk (2012), for example, notes that as hominin forelimbs evolved, 
babies lost their ancestral ability to cling to their mothers, as a consequence 
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they would have to be put down during foraging. Language, she suggests, could 
have acted as a soothing influence when physical contact was absent. More 
instrumentalist perspectives have suggested, amongst others, tool making 
(Faisal et al., 2010), foraging (Gibson, 2012a) and group scavenging for 
megafauna (Bickerton, 2009), as the initial adaptive pressures. Many 
researchers though, eschew a single function and adopt the intuitively attractive 
position that language emerged for the communication of thoughts and would 
be employed for a range of purposes, as Hurford concludes, ‘(n)o one theory on 
its own, such as Kin Selection, Reciprocal Altruism, or Sexual Selection, can 
adequately explain the unique human characteristic of freely giving information 
in such structurally complex ways as we do every day with language’ (2007, 
333).  
 
3.3.2.2 Prerequisites for the evolution of phonology 
For non-nativists language is simply another function of the hominin brain and 
largely inseparable from its externalisation. However, even gradualist nativists 
must postulate the co-evolution of the mind-internal module and the ability to 
externalize through some modality (generally agreed as primarily spoken).  
 
Although vocalisations are a common feature of many species including all the 
primates, the human ability to vocalise is particularly flexible and unique in 
many respects (see discussion in the following chapter). However, as 
MacNeilage (2012) emphasises, there is little or no support for an innate 
concept of a phonological module – there is, for example, no poverty of the 
stimulus argument in phonology. The limits of human phonological systems are 
not, he argues, hard-wired as generativists claim is the case with syntax, but 
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rather are a consequence of physiological constraints on the articulatory and 
perceptual capacities. However, Pinker (e.g. 1994) and Jackendoff (2002) point 
out the dissimilarity between speech perception and that of sounds more 
generally and appear to be advocating innateness beyond syntax alone (see 
discussion below).     
 
In the case of vocalisation there is a clear continuity with other hominids and 
examination of unique hominin evolutionary adaptations and their estimated 
dates may enlighten our understanding of the evolution of the capacity for 
speech. In particular, the anatomy of the human nasopharynx and oropharynx 
have a significant impact on the range of phonetic phenomena that may be 
produced. Certain aspects of this physiological form are undoubtedly the 
consequence of bipedalism and possibly reconfiguration in response to 
changes in brain morphology, an example of an exaptation, but others may be 
adaptations specifically for speech. The larynx is particularly interesting in this 
respect. All other mammals, as a consequence of having a higher larynx, have 
a two tube aerodigestive tract where the front of the larynx can overlap the soft 
palate. The advantage of this system is that these species are spared the 
possibility of choking whereby material intended for the oesophagus becomes 
blocked in the trachea. This is a potentially fatal condition that results in the 
death of approximately 300 individuals per year in England and Wales alone.6 
Australopithecines appear to have shared the safer system of other primates 
and it has been suggested that the larynx descended in early Homo to enable 
an increased air intake which was required to sustain larger brains (Laitman, 
                                               
6 Figures from Office for National Statistics 2008-2010 
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2010)7. Exactly when the descent was complete and whether use in speech 
was an additional adaptive pressure remain unresolved. While the larynx itself 
does not fossilize, it is attached to the small hyoid bone but unfortunately this is 
a free floating bone that does not remain in situ after death. Laitman claims that 
Neanderthals show some evidence of a descended larynx but that they also 
developed larger nasal passages and sinuses that may have been utilised in 
warming air. He concludes that on balance if Neanderthals were capable of 
speech, they were less articulate than modern H. sapiens.      
 
Fitch (2002, 2009, 2010) argues that the descended larynx is not unique to 
hominins and that a permanent descent, approximately half way to the human 
position, is found in two species of deer, and possibly also koalas. Furthermore, 
many species, in particular big cats, are capable of a temporary lowering which 
is exploited in the production of lower formant frequencies to give an 
exaggerated impression of size for purposes of attracting a mate and defending 
territory. Fitch maintains that this was the initial adaptive press that resulted in 
hominin larynx lowering and is still seen in the secondary descent in modern 
male humans at puberty, although the primary descent is acknowledged to be 
‘either an adaptation to speech…or a by-product of some unspecified cranial 
rearrangements of the face and brainstem’ (2009: 119). However, Tallerman 
(2013) points out that unlike polygamous deer and territorial cats, there is no 
obvious advantage for size exaggeration in hominins, and in fact the reduction 
in sexual dimorphism in the hominin line further undermines the hypothesis.   
 
                                               
7 Alternative hypotheses include adaptations for endurance running, and cooked food processing (see 
MacLarnon, 2012) 
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Two other anatomical traits feature prominently in discussions of hominin 
adaptations for speech: more sophisticated movement of the articulators and 
greater control over breathing. The first of these depends on the hypoglossal 
nerve which innervates the tongue and which was claimed by Kay et al. (1998) 
to  be considerably larger in H. sapiens and Neanderthals than other primates. 
More recently however, two of the same authors have recognised that the 
relative size of both the hypoglossal canal and the nerve itself are not actually 
larger in humans compared to other primates (Jungers et al., 2003). The 
second modification, enhanced breathing control, is a result of changes to the 
thoracic region of the spinal cord. Evidence suggests that this adjustment, 
which is seen in Neanderthals, was not present as far back as 1.6 mya, and it 
seems likely that it was an evolutionary adaptation that began in Homo erectus 
(Endicott et al., 2010; MacLarnon and Hewitt, 2004; Meyer, 2005). 
 
One final modification in the hominin lineage that may be relevant to 
vocalisation involves the loss of air sacs, small cavities above the vocal folds 
which are found in all other primates. As these sacs are susceptible to infection 
it is presumed that they are not purely vestigial but are functional in some 
sense. While it is not clear whether their primary function is related to breathing 
or vocalisation (or both) they are known to be capable of being used to give 
greater resonance to sound. However, it has been argued that the presence of 
air sacs ‘reduce[s] the perceptual distance between articulations’ (de Boer, 
2012) resulting in less clear and distinct vowel patterns. The loss of air sacs 
may thus be compensated for by greater clarity of vocalisation and possibly 
enhanced communication. While A. afarensis appears to have possessed these 
sacs, they seem to be absent by the time of H. heidelbergensis.    
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3.3.2.3 Evolution of the lexicon and syntax 
Both Burling (2012) and Tallerman (2009) emphasise the unique abilities that 
are involved in acquiring a massive lexicon (an average of approximately 
50,000 items) based on hierarchical ‘semantic’ networks, as opposed to more 
general memory processing. It is claimed that this ability is the result of 
phylogenetic learning biases that rely on capacities such as joint attention, 
imitation and pattern finding that are either lacking or much weaker in other 
primates. However, as rule-governed vocalisations (such as bird song) and 
meaningful, if rudimentary, communication are both attested in the animal 
kingdom, the one unambiguously unique feature of human language is syntax 
(Tallerman, 2012a8) and this is the focus of most work in the study of language 
evolution. Exactly what is understood by the term ‘syntax’ is largely dependent 
on one’s theory of language (and indeed language evolution) but there is 
widespread agreement that language is not mere concatenation of items into 
linear strings but involves the production of units such as phrases and clauses 
from items in the lexicon (mainly ‘words’ but also morphemes, larger 
compounds and formulaic chunks) that are encoded into hierarchical 
relationships. It is by the parsing of syntax and identifying different hierarchical 
structures that we are able to disambiguate two sentences with the same linear 
string: 
(1) a. He saw [the man [with the telescope]] 
b. He saw [the man] [with the telescope]       
In (1a.) the object is the noun phrase ‘the man with the telescope’ while in (1b.) 
the prepositional phrase ‘with the telescope’ is outside the noun phrase and 
                                               
8 Though Tallerman argues that the uniqueness of the lexicon still stands 
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modifies the verb as the instrument through which ‘the man’ was seen. 
Bickerton’s (2012) insistence that syntax must also account for phenomena in  
terms of CGG, including empty categories, e.g. PRO, and operations such as 
‘move’, is not shared by non-nativists, and it is the distinction between these two 
groups that is the subject of later sections.  
 
First, in all proposals for a gradualist account of language evolution, there is a 
need to explain how the earliest linguistic vocalisations (presuming they 
existed), non-combinatory units such as ‘ouch’, ‘shh’ and so on (what 
Jackendoff calls ‘linguistic fossils’, 2002: 240), were replaced by units that could 
be combined in linear strings and later hierarchical structures, in other words 
how to account for the development of complex, linguistic syntax from simpler 
non-hierarchical protolanguage.    
 
A number of writers (e.g. Wray, 1998) have argued that early protolanguage 
was holistic, consisting of fully propositional, non-compositional calls. Over time 
these are ‘fractionated’ until arbitrary patterns become established as 
compositional units. Wray (ibid. 55 ) gives the hypothetical examples of ‘mebita’ 
and ‘kamebi’ which may correspond to ‘give her the food’ and ‘give her the 
stone’ respectively. There is a purely coincidental occurrence of the sounds ‘me’ 
and the meaning ‘give her’ in both, but on this basis the two become associated 
as sound~meaning pairings. Tallerman (2007, 2012b) identifies several flaws in 
this proposal, including the fact that the trained bonobo Kanzi (see below) 
appeared to use discrete units (that may be construed to correspond to verbs 
and nouns). On the basis of this and other arguments presented by Tallerman I 
will assume that protolanguage was a compositional system. 
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The earliest protolanguage would be at least as complex as symbolic 
communication systems that primates are able to acquire. While there is 
disagreement over the extent to which trained primates are engaging in genuine 
ostensive intentional communication, rather than conditioned behavioural 
responses such as the ‘Clever Hans’ effect, the work of Savage-Rumbaugh and 
others (e.g. Savage-Rumbaugh and Lewin, 1994) with the bonobo Kanzi seems 
to put beyond doubt the ability of some chimpanzees to acquire and use a fairly 
large set of symbols (in Kanzi’s case around 250) and display significant 
comprehension (see full discussion in the next chapter). Crucially, there is 
(almost) no suggestion that Kanzi nor any other primate subject displayed any 
aspect of hierarchical syntax.  Bickerton (2012) suggests that in addition to 
trained chimpanzees we have a number of extant human ‘windows’ that may 
reveal the nature of early protolanguage, such as pidgins and the two word 
stage in child language, again lacking the features of complex, linguistic syntax. 
Most writers agree with Jackendoff that the earliest protolanguage consisted of 
‘associations of pieces of thought to vocal or gestural expression, without a 
syntactic component at all’ (1999: 70).   
 
A common claim (e.g. Hurford, 2012) is that a shared lexicon and two word 
stage gradually evolves into full language by the exaptation of content words for 
function words that are utilised to represent hierarchical grammatical relations, a 
process known as grammaticalization (e.g. Heine and Narog, 2010). Bybee 
argues that: 
‘The fact that grammaticalization occurs in all languages and at all stages 
indicates that grammaticalization is the main process by which grammar 
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evolves….there is good reason to suppose that whatever the ‘original’ 
grammar of  human language was, it evolved in the same way’ (2012: 
533)9 
 
The basis of grammaticalization is that a sociolinguistic choice by a group of 
language users extends the context in which a particular lexical item may be 
used. This is followed by desemanticization whereby aspects of the meaning of 
the item that do not fit the new context are semantically bleached. Then the item 
loses its inflectional and derivational morphology (for example being able to 
take a plural –s or nominal suffix like –ness) and ultimately its syntactic 
autonomy (this is known as decategorization). Finally there is the process of 
phonetic erosion whereby single phonemes and complete syllables may be lost 
or simplified. An example is the English indefinite article ‘a/an’ as 
grammaticalization of the numeral ‘one’. There has been semantic bleaching of 
the numeral meaning, decategorization such that ‘a/an’ is no longer able to 
function as a pronoun without a head noun (*there is a /there is a book), and 
phonetic erosion such that the vowel is reduced to the most neutral vowel 
sound in English, schwa [ə], in rapid speech.  
 
For all gradualists, the nature of how and when a protolanguage first emerged 
and then evolved into fully complex language varies depending on whether the 
FL is considered innate or not, and these two theoretical perspectives are the 
subject of the next two sections. 
     
                                               
9 For an extensive account of how a simple protolanguage of purely content words could have given rise 
to a complex syntax see Heine and Kuteva, 2007. 
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3.3.2.4 Option C: Gradual non-nativism 
These approaches treat language as domain general and thus consider it as 
part of the overall cognitive machinery. As discussed in the introduction, it is 
common in such explanations of FL and evolution to treat language as simply 
another aspect of culture and appeal to the notion of ‘memes’ as the vehicle for 
the evolution of language. Memetics (e.g. Dawkins, 1976; Blackmore, 1999) is 
the theory that cultural artefacts are analogous to genes in that they mutate into 
competing forms and are selected for under adaptive pressures. Blackmore 
argues that ‘a spoken grammatical language resulted from the success of 
copyable sounds that were high in [fidelity, fecundity, and longevity]’ (ibid.: 107), 
and that ‘the function of language is to spread memes’ (93). There are at least 
two fundamental problems with this as a basis for an explanation of language 
evolution. Firstly, either the term ‘meme’ is a trivial metaphor or it needs to be 
clearly defined. Yet as Johansson (2005), who is sympathetic to memetics, 
acknowledges, the genetic analogy is difficult to sustain given the rapid rate of 
cultural change, resulting partially from the low fidelity of reproduction compared 
to genes, and the role of human agency. A second difficulty arises from the fact 
that a memetic account of language is predicated on imitative behaviourism, as 
Dawkins explicitly acknowledges, ‘[i]mitation is how a child learns a particular 
language’ (1999, vii). Yet as Sperber (2000), among many others, points out the 
acquisition of language is above all concerned with inference and the deduction 
of ‘rules’ (however defined) rather than simple imitation.  
 
The evidence so far discussed appears to demand an explanation for language 
evolution that includes abilities unique to humans that have arisen specifically 
for the acquisition and processing of language. I will return in chapter 5 to 
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theories that account for these capacities in domain general terms, but will next 
consider the possibility that we have gradually evolved a module of the mind 
that is exclusively devoted to linguistic matters. 
 
3.3.2.5 Option A: Gradual nativism 
Pinker (1994) points out that the chances of 1010 neurons which form the 
average brain being randomly connected and yet generating the properties of 
UG are vanishingly small. Rather, from the perspective of gradual nativists, 
language is a complex adaptive system constituting a module of the mind, 
comparable to other biological systems (the example often given is the human 
visual system, for example Pinker and Bloom, 1990) that can only be explained 
in terms of adaptation and natural selection. However, the actual degree of 
evolutionary change to neural structure since the LCA appears remarkably 
slight, as Fodor points out: 
‘our brains are, by any gross measure, very like those of apes. So it 
looks as though relatively small alterations of brain structure must have 
produced very large behavioural discontinuities in the transition from the 
ancestral apes to us. If that’s right, then you don’t have to assume that 
cognitive complexity is shaped by the gradual action of Darwinian 
selection on prehuman behavioural phenotypes’ (1998: 4) 
 
As in all gradualist accounts (nativist and non-nativist) there needs to be one or 
more adaptive pressures that have driven the evolution of the FL. Pinker and 
Jackendoff argue that the selective advantage that a communication system 
would bestow is manifest and that in fact ‘the design of language – a mapping 
between meaning and sound – is precisely what one would expect in a system 
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that evolved for the communication of propositions’ (2005: 218). The ability to 
transmit complex cultural constructions beyond immediate kin constitutes a 
‘cognitive niche’ (Pinker, 2003) in which speakers are able to convey 
information beneficial to survival – and reciprocate – without the speaker losing 
that information in the act of transmission.  
 
However, like the argument for the evolution of the FL by neo-Darwinian 
adaptationism, the notion of communication as the driving pressure is not 
unproblematic. The benefits to an individual member of a species of a gradually 
evolving visual system are easy to imagine: greater sensitivity to light could help 
an organism avoid predators or direct the individual to an area where there 
were greater resources. The problem with language is that it requires an 
interlocutor if information is going to be communicated, but evolutionary theory 
stipulates that coincidental evolution of the same trait in multiple individuals is 
not feasible. It is not clear what advantages, in terms of communication, an 
individual with a more highly evolved FL would have. Thus Pinker and Bloom’s 
argument that features of language evolved because they ‘defined parts of a 
standardized communicative code in the brains of some critical mass of 
speakers’ (1990: 718) is explanatorily inadequate. The problem is how any 
feature could enter the minds of a ‘critical mass’: traits do not spread unless 
they bestow an advantage but in terms of the FL it is not clear how they could 
do this until they had already spread. As an analogy, one could improve inter-
connectors between information technology devices by, for example, adding an 
additional point to a SCART lead enabling it to carry more information. 
However, if the sockets on the devices remain unchanged then the new lead is 
of no improved value.    
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In terms of an actual scenario for gradual nativist evolution of the FL, 
Jackendoff (1999, 2002) describes in detail one proposed path which bears 
some similarity to standard grammaticalization processes. It begins with the 
ability to use symbols (whether initially vocal or gestural) in the absence of their 
referent. From this we get a dual process with the development of an open set 
of symbols and the refined phonology (sound patterns) necessary for their 
discrimination. At the same time occurs the development of the ability to 
concatenate symbols first randomly and then to represent basic semantic 
relations such as ‘Agent first’. This protolanguage then evolves to include the 
syntactic relations of grammatical categories ordered in hierarchical phrase 
structure, and a method of showing abstract semantic relations, such as 
through inflectional morphology. This process continues as gradual, incremental 
parallel evolution of semantic, syntactic and phonological components until we 
arrive at modern language. 
 
One immediate problem with this picture of a gradual evolution of a modular FL 
is the question of the time scales. Pinker (1994) estimates that there have been 
something in the order of 350,000 generations since our LCA with 
chimpanzees. While at first sight this seems an impressive figure, Worden 
(1995: 147) examined possible speed rates of evolution and concludes that in 
the time available the amount of change is ‘certainly not enough to design a 
complete facility for language learning and use’ (1995:147). Certainly other 
complex biological systems, such as vision, have evolved over dozens or 
hundreds of million years rather than the 7.5 maximum available for language.  
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Christiansen and Chater (2008) and Chater et al. (2009) emphasise that not 
only is the time factor anomalous, but something which changes as rapidly as a 
language does (what they describe as ‘a moving target’), does not provide the 
necessary form of an environment for the coevolution of a biological 
endowment. They argue that Darwinian evolution requires a relatively stable 
environment and languages change just too fast for adaptive biological 
advantages to be selected for. The authors may be confusing individual 
languages with the ‘language faculty’, however, even if such evolutionary 
development had occurred in the short period of time available, it is surprising 
that it ceased at the time of the last migration from Africa. If this were not the 
case then there would be no Universal Grammar (UG) as nativists assume, but 
rather the FL would have continued to evolve in different directions in the 
dispersed population of the species. The common response to this charge is 
that the amount of time that has passed since the African exodus is not 
sufficient for evolutionary change to be observable, but this simply brings the 
argument back to the lack of time for language to have emerged in the first 
place.  
 
3.3.3 Non-Darwinian accounts   
Both nativists and non-nativists have argued for explanations for the origins of 
language without recourse to neo-Darwinian adaptationism. The most 
substantial of these is from the nativist camp and these proposals are examined 
first.  
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3.3.3.1 Option B: Sudden nativism 
If a gradual adaptationist theory of the evolution of a nativist FL is rejected, then 
an alternative is an appeal to a saltation –  an abrupt change resulting from a 
macromutation in an organism with significant consequences. As a general rule 
in evolutionary theory, such explanations are excluded when an alternative 
adaptationist narrative can account for the same phenomena, and both nativist 
and non-nativist gradualists are quick to argue that the abstract and highly 
intricate nature of language excludes any such saltationist origins. Pinker likens 
such explanations to ‘the proverbial hurricane that blows through a junkyard and 
assembles a Boeing 747’ (1994: 361). However, even Dawkins (1986) contrasts 
example of an implausible event  an such as the creation of an accidental 747, 
with a significant leap resulting from a single change to an existing organism, 
and extends the aeronautical analogy in terms of the creation of the Stretched 
DC-8 as a modification of the standard DC-8: it is in this latter sense that one 
can talk of saltationist origins of the FL. Hornstein defends this approach to 
language origins in terms of random mutation, arguing that such a position ‘is 
not outlandish if what we are talking about is the emergence of one new circuit 
rather than a highly structured internally modular FL’ (2009: 10fn19).     
 
Chomsky is reputed to have been scornful for most of his career of any 
discussion of language evolution and he maintains that until recently knowledge 
of the nature of the FL ‘made the problem of studying the evolution of language 
completely hopeless’ (2012: 83). This position has now changed somewhat, 
and in two papers (2002 and 2005, henceforth HCF and FHC respectively) 
Hauser, Chomsky and Fitch argue that it is the mistake of ‘treating “language” 
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as a monolithic whole…[which] confuses discussion of its evolution and blocks 
the consideration of useful sources of comparative data’ (FHC: 181).  
 
Language, these authors argue, needs to be considered in terms a general 
system (Faculty of Language Broad: FLB) which now includes three 
components (but see discussion below): first, the conceptual-intentional (CI) 
system where meaning as logical form (LF) is interpretable  and  second the 
sensory-motor (articulatory-perceptual – AP) system where sound or phonetic 
form (PF) is interpretable. The general conclusion that HCF draw is that all the 
apparatus of FLB have homologous or analogous counterparts in the animal 
world. The third component however, is considered to be without any 
counterpart outside of the human species. This is the narrow syntactic 
computational module that in HCF is labelled Faculty of Language Narrow 
(FLN). In both of the papers referred to above, and as often restated by 
Chomsky, the operations of the computation are considered to consist only of 
recursive merge, whereby two objects are selected and merged to form a third 
which can then itself be merged with another object ad infinitum. ‘Recursion’ is 
not easily defined and there is not universal agreement on what exactly 
recursive properties consist of (for discussion see Kinsella, 2009). However, 
there are two generally accepted characteristics. Firstly, that the output of one 
stage constitutes the input to the next, such as the Fibonacci series and 
possessives in (3) as opposed to the unordered iterative concatenations in (2): 
(2) a) 3 + 5 + 8 + 4 + 6 = 16 
      b) Karl and his brother and his friend and his uncle  
(3) a)  1, 2, 3, 5, 8, 13, 21, 34 
 b) Karl’s brother’s friend’s uncle 
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Secondly, and particularly pertinent to linguistics, is the requirement that a 
recursive operation should enable the embedding of any object of type X into 
another object of the same type, so that an NP may be embedded in an NP, a 
clause inside a clause and so on. Merge may conform to the first of these 
definitions but it does not appear to do so to the second. Tallerman concludes 
that ‘HCF are not using ‘recursion’ to mean self-embedding, but rather, to refer 
to the formation of hierarchical structure generally: the phrase-building capacity’ 
(2012a: 451, emphasis in original).     
 
The authors, in both these papers and elsewhere (e.g. Chomsky, 2002) stress 
that they do not consider language (if it includes FLN) to be ‘for’ communication 
and that it is in fact poorly equipped for the job, for example in terms of the 
amount of redundancy, ambiguity and the like inherent in language (see also 
Carstairs-McCarthy, 2008). FHC argue that communication is only one current 
use of language (so are private thoughts, problem solving and other functions) 
and anyway current utility is no indication of ‘why’ a trait initially emerged or 
what immediate benefit it bestowed. Furthermore, as FLN is uniquely human, 
then the comparative approach is redundant in this situation. For Chomsky, FLN 
appeared as ‘a rewiring of the brain’ (2010: 59) that provided hierarchical 
structure and potential infinity to thought through its interface with the CI system 
in one individual ‘who was instantly endowed with intellectual capacities far 
superior to those of others, transmitted to offspring and coming to predominate’ 
(2006: 184). According to Berwick and Chomsky, only later did the interface 
with the AP system emerge: ‘all recent relevant biological research leads to the 
conclusion that the process of externalization is secondary’ (2011: 32)    
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FLN, in this view then, could not have evolved through adaptive selection but 
rather appeared as a single mutation in (evolutionary) recent time as a perfect, 
optimally designed feature for interfacing with components of FLB which had 
evolved independently for other reasons. It is clear that HCF are not suggesting 
a scenario based on punctuated equilibrium and adaptive radiations. Despite an 
earlier assertion that ‘[p]lainly, the faculty of language was not instantaneously 
inserted into a mind/brain with the rest of its architecture fully intact’ (1998) this 
in fact now seems to be Chomsky’s position something that he has reaffirmed, 
commenting that ‘there is no empirical or serious conceptual argument’ (2006: 
184) for positing a gradual evolution of language, but rather the appearance of 
FLN was a ‘great leap’ and that ‘a more parsimonious speculation is…that the 
Great Leap was effectively instantaneous, in a single individual (2006: 184). 
  
As discussed in the last chapter, Chomsky frequently expresses the belief that 
the evolutionary leap that resulted in language (i.e. FLN) produced a ‘perfect’ 
system. This raises the question of how perfection should be evaluated. 
Kinsella (2009) devotes considerable time to arguing that evolution does not 
favour ‘perfect’ solutions, preferring the back-up resources made available by 
redundancy, and constantly being burdened with the vestiges of previous 
adaptations. However, as Chomsky has made it clear that he does not favour 
an adaptationist evolutionary account of language, then such criticism is 
immaterial. For Chomsky, perfection arises from the non-linguistic, ‘third factors’ 
which quite simply could not be any other way, as Berwick and Chomsky put it: 
‘Language is something like a snowflake, assuming its particular form by virtue 
of laws of nature – in this case principles of computational efficiency’ (2011: 30).    
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The viability of this scenario depends on the degree of mutational change 
necessary, regardless of the magnitude of the consequence of that change. Any 
posited modification must be sufficiently minor to be plausible – a stretched 
fuselage rather than the assembly of a fully operational aircraft from random 
components. FHC may argue that their proposals regarding the evolution of 
language are in no way dependent on the  explanation of the nature of 
language inherent in the MP, but this simply will not do. Unless FLN is reducible 
to absolute minimal operations, e.g. recursive syntax, then their explanation of 
the origin of FL falls at the first fence, and it is precisely this reduction that the 
MP seeks to portray (and indeed Chomsky appears at times to imply this e.g. 
2005). As Kinsella points out ‘the choice appears to be this: show that 
minimalism is correct, and rule out the gradual adaptationist evolutionary 
account, or show that gradual adaptationism is correct, and rule out the MP’ 
(2009: 66). As I argue in chapter in 5, these are not in fact the only choices 
available.  
 
How convincing is it that the theory of language (FLN) as envisioned in the MP 
arose from a single macromutation, or ‘one or two evolutionary innovations’ in 
Boeckx’s words (2012: 495)? As discussed in the previous chapter, the MP has 
to posit either a multitude of features and operations that license  merge (see 
Hornstein et al., 2005) to insure that non-grammatical derivations are avoided – 
the ‘crash-proof’ grammars, which fail the test of simplicity and economy 
demanded by an evolutionary explanation based on saltation. Alternatively, the 
Strong Minimalist Thesis (SMT), which proposes ‘unbounded’ merge as the sole 
operation in the syntactic component, with deviant or unwanted derivations 
filtered out at the interfaces, reduces the computation to a trivial operation with 
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no psychological grounding. Neither conjecture provides a satisfactory account 
of the FL evaluated against the criteria of evolutionary plausibility.  
 
An alternative explanation for the emergence of language as a sudden 
phenomenon makes no appeal to macromutations or indeed any genetic 
change and is very briefly surveyed in the next section.    
 
3.3.3.2 Option D: Sudden non-nativism 
Like HCF,  Fauconnier and Turner reject an understanding of the emergence of 
language based on neo-Darwinian adaptationism, arguing that ‘we do not see 
any gradual path in mammalian history for the development over many 
generations of ever more complex grammars’ (2008a: 136). They maintain that 
there is no current variation in complexity in the world’s languages and indeed 
that it is a conceptual error to posit intermediate stages in language evolution: 
‘Language is like flight: an all or nothing behaviour’ (ibid.: 146). They also share 
with HCF a belief that minor causes can have exceptional effects, what they 
term a cause-effect isomorphism fallacy. 
 
Where they diverge from nativists is in also denying any specific genetic basis 
in the origins of language. According to Fauconnier and Turner, a uniquely 
complex cognitive apparatus developed in hominins reaching its apex in 
humans as double-scope conceptual blending (see Fauconnier and Turner, 
2003). They argue that there was nothing like protolanguage, but rather that 
when humans’ cognitive capacity had reached a critical level, language arose 
spontaneously as a natural consequence: ‘Once the stage of double-scope 
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blending is achieved, fully complex language comes on like a flood, in cultural 
rather than in biological time’ (2008b: 521).  
 
Clearly their account of language depends partly upon the extent to which the 
notion of double-scope blending is found convincing, a full discussion is beyond 
the scope of this chapter but it basically involves partial input from two existing 
conceptual structures which are then blended to produce a new structure. The 
theory appears to rely heavily on metaphor theory. However, there is a more 
obvious flaw in their argument. The evidence the authors present for a rapid 
materialisation of such a complex system as language is what they claim is the 
concurrent appearance of art in Europe 50 kya. But as we have seen above, 
this is a fallacy. There had been  a gradual development of cognitive ability and 
intricate behaviour in Africa over many thousands of years as McBrearty and 
Brooks demonstrated as far back as 2000.      
 
 
3.4 Conclusion 
 
We have seen that in addition to the undeniable role of neo-Darwinian 
adaptation in evolution there are also alternative hypotheses with both genetic 
and epigenetic foundations. Hominin phylogeny, though the exact path is 
unsure, appears to show a gradual accumulation of anatomical and cognitive 
changes resulting in a set of modern abilities and behaviours between 150 and 
300 kya. The role of the FL in this picture has been portrayed as an innate 
module of the mind and also alternatively as an aspect of domain-general 
cognition. The two answers to the question of whether language emerged 
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slowly as a gradual adaptation or suddenly, have attracted supporters from both 
sides of the nativist debate. As I have argued all four possible explanations are 
flawed. The reason for this, I maintain, is identical to the conclusion in the 
previous chapter: that the lack of a convincing, comprehensive account of the 
emergence and evolution of language, like the source of the irresolvable 
problems with ‘meaning’ in CGG, are based on a fundamental 
misunderstanding of what FL is, a topic I will return to in chapter 5.      
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Chapter 4. The evolution of the hominin brain and human 
cognition 
 
 
4.0 Introduction  
 
In the previous chapter I evaluated four perspectives on language evolution in 
the light of the most up to date evidence available, focusing primarily on the 
emergence of linguistic syntax and phonology. Missing from this picture is the 
third element assumed to be of fundamental importance in most post-
behaviourist accounts of language: that of ‘meaning’ or ‘semantics’, however 
defined. As noted in chapter 2, a generally accepted view of language, in CGG 
in particular, made explicit by Saussure (1916/1983), is that syntax in some way 
mediates between the two interface levels of PF and LF. In Chomsky’s own 
words, ‘[t]his “double interface’ property is one way to express the traditional 
description of language as sound with a meaning, traceable at least back to 
Aristotle’ (1995: 2). As will already be apparent (and also see discussion in the 
next chapter), I believe that there are severe problems with the vague, 
inconsistent and confused definitions/uses of ‘semantics’ and ‘meaning’ in 
linguistics (and more widely in the study of language evolution). However, for 
the purposes here I shall assume that these terms relate to mental content of 
some sort, whether independent of the mode of its expression or not. This 
chapter seeks to begin to examine the nature of that mental content or 
cognition, identify in what ways it differs from that of other species, and 
understand how and when it evolved – a task that will be continued in the next 
chapter.  
 
Defining what exactly is meant by mental content or thought is not 
straightforward. There is, however, a clear distinction between percepts, which 
are the result of psychological processing of brute causal stimuli from the 
immediate environment, and thoughts. Thoughts involve concepts. The concept 
of concept is itself highly problematic, and will be considered further in the next 
chapter, but for now the definition offered by Medin and Rips will suffice: ‘a 
concept is a mental representation that picks out a set of entities, or a 
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category….[c]ategory membership is not arbitrary but rather a principled matter’ 
(2005: 37). This non-arbitrary, principled membership depends on an ability to 
systematically discriminate between two or more potential candidates. It is well 
established that even simple animals are able to differentiate between different 
stimuli on the basis of contrasting features (Spence, 1937) and more recently it 
has become apparent that many animals are able to make sophisticated 
category judgements, such as pigeons’ ability to discriminate between different 
classes of trees (Herrnstein et al., 1976).      
 
Clearly, like percepts, entertaining a concept  may have causal effects in that 
one concept may give rise to another in an individual’s mind. The establishment 
and strengthening of such relationships between concepts is the essence of 
associative learning. While both humans and other animals are capable of such 
learning, the question of whether any nonhuman species has the capacity for 
higher order thinking is far less clear and is considered in the first section below. 
It is in this area that the comparative method is especially useful, though for the 
purposes at hand, and the sake of brevity, it is not possible to review all of the 
vast literature on animal intelligence, and so I focus almost entirely on those 
species most relevant to an immediate hominin lineage. The first section looks 
at nonhuman primate thinking in general, before considering in more detail the 
communicative capacities of these species, both in the wild and in captivity. The 
subsequent section looks at the structure and function of the human brain, with 
a particular emphasis on the evolution of brain size. I conclude the chapter with 
a consideration of gestural and vocal continuity with other hominids, and an 
examination of two theories of language evolution, both predicated on more 
general cognitive or neural evolution.   
 
 
4.1 Comparative approaches to human and nonhuman animal cognition 
and communication 
 
4.1.1 Nonhuman cognitive capacities 
Approaches to explaining nonhuman cognition fall within a broad continuum of 
traditions. At one end lie anthropomorphic interpretations, more common in the 
early nineteenth century, which favoured accounts of nonhuman animal 
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behaviour in terms of human-like reasoning. As the field became more 
scientifically rigorous, writers began to caution against assuming human type 
cognitive capacities in other animals. Darwin, for example, while stressing the 
evolutionary continuity of minds in all animal species, insists that ‘[t]here is no 
doubt that the difference between the mind of the lowest man and that of the 
highest animal is immense’ (1871/2008: 254). Later, another scientist working 
early in the field of ethology gave his name to the principle of Morgan’s Canon 
which stipulates that: 
“in no case is an animal activity to be interpreted as the outcome of the 
exercise of a higher Psychical faculty, if it can be fairly interpreted as the 
outcome of the exercise of one which stands lower in the psychological 
scale.” (1894: 59) 
At its most extreme, this position may be interpreted as constituting a null 
hypothesis in which all nonhuman vertebrates are presumed to share the same 
level of intelligence (e.g. Macphail and Bolhuis, 200110). The advent of 
behaviourism as the dominant paradigm in psychology in the early twentieth 
century in a sense left the question of comparative cognition in humans and 
other species redundant, as operative conditioning and associative learning 
were used to account for all behaviour. However, with the emergence of 
cognitive science since the 1960s, the debate has reignited, with some 
ethologists (e.g. Pearce, 2008) claiming that all nonhuman animals are 
incapable of abstract thought, that is entertaining abstract concepts, displaced 
thought, imagining, counterfactual reasoning and so on.  Other researchers 
(e.g. Shuttleworth, 2012) are more optimistic about discovering mental 
processes, beyond associative learning, in other species. 
 
Assuming we accept that nonhuman animals are capable of thought of some 
interesting kind, we face the substantial problem of how to test comparative 
cognitive abilities, given the impossibility of say a chimpanzee and dolphin 
performing a similar task; furthermore, unlike humans, no other species can 
give verbal accounts of their thinking and reasoning. Nevertheless, there have 
been fruitful areas of enquiry including communication, tool use, social relations, 
theory of mind and displacement (temporal and spatial) and these will be 
considered in the following sections. First, though, we will try to consider in 
                                               
10 The writers make a possible exception for rudimentary theory of mind in great apes 
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more detail that which characterises uniquely human, as opposed to more 
general animal, cognition. 
 
 
4.1.1.2 Continuity (and discontinuity) between human and nonhuman cognition. 
Penn et al. (2008) in a comprehensive review of the literature on mental 
continuity identify a number of aspects of human cognition that have been 
subject to comparison with capacities in other species. They conclude that the 
‘profound biological continuity between human and nonhuman animals masks 
an equally profound functional discontinuity…between human and nonhuman 
minds [which] pervades nearly every domain of cognition’ (110). Thus they 
argue that, while other animals have the perceptual capacity to distinguish 
physical similarity, only humans are able to categorise on the basis of logical, 
functional or structural similarity. Furthermore, only humans are able to deduce 
rules and apply them in novel situations, reason about higher-order spatial and 
hierarchical relations, make transitive inferences and understand the difference 
between real and spurious causal relations. In respect of each of these, the 
authors are insistent that ‘[t]here is not simply a consistent absence of evidence 
for any of these higher-order relational operations in nonhuman animals; there 
is compelling evidence of an absence’ (110). In accounting for these 
discontinuities, although Penn et al. acknowledge that not all animal cognition 
can be explained through associative learning alone, they reject any notion that 
nonhuman animals are capable of abstract, systematic thought (we will return to 
this hypothesis in the discussion of a language of thought in the following 
chapter). In the next section we will look at other primates to see to what extent 
Penn et al.’s hypothesis stands up.  
 
 
4.1.1.3 Evidence for intelligent thought in other primates. 
Arguments have been made for evidence of sophisticated intelligence in other 
species including cetaceans (see Janik, 2012) and various species of birds, 
including some quite remarkable claims for the mental abilities of Grey parrots 
(Gibson, 2012b; Pepperberg, 2012). However, as we are interested in the 
evolution of specifically hominin, and ultimately human, cognition (and 
language) since our LCA, it is the current capacities of other primates, and 
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chimpanzees in particular, that offer the most informative evidence to indicate 
what the starting point of that evolutionary process was.  
 
It is well documented that great apes, more so than other species, are able to 
fashion and manipulate basic tools such as branches for digging out termites, 
rocks for smashing nuts and so on (Carvalho et al., 2009; Sanz et al., 2010). 
However, Penn et al. maintain that all nonhuman animals ‘solve tool-use 
problems based on evolved, domain-specific expectations about what 
perceptual features are likely to be most salient in a given context’ (2008: 119) 
coupled with a general ability to reason about concrete, observable causal 
relations. It is generally claimed that nonhuman animal tool use, including that 
by all primates, is contingency based and that these animals do not save and 
transport tools with them in the expectation of later use, indicating a lack of a 
capacity for planning (though see Mulcahy and Call, 2006, who claim 
otherwise).   
 
Perhaps the greatest amount of attention in the study of primate thinking has 
been to social and cultural intelligence with claims of complex social cognition in 
old world monkeys as well as great apes (Seyfarth and Cheney, 2012). One 
type of behaviour that has been proposed as evidence of this type of advanced 
social intelligence is organised multi-participant activity such as that involved in 
hunting by chimpanzees (Boesch, 2005). However, Tomasello et al. (2005) 
argue that chimpanzees are not taking socially determined roles, but rather 
spatially placing themselves in the most advantageous position they can occupy 
in order to catch the object of the hunt, and that this is essentially no different 
from the hunting strategies of great cats and wolves. As a general rule, many 
ethologists (e.g. Cheney and Seyfarth, 2005; Wynne and Bolhuis, 2008) caution 
against the trap of assuming that apparent behavioural similarities across 
species must imply similarity of cognition (though for a rare alternative view see 
de Waal e.g. 2012).  Tomasello concludes that ‘human-like collaborative activity 
– group activity with an intentional structure comprising both a joint goal and 
complementary roles – is something in which great apes do not participate’ 
(2008: 176) and that even simple tasks such as carrying an item together or 
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working together to fashion a tool is unknown11. Confirming this argument, 
Reader et al. (2011) reviewed the research of primate behaviour in the wild, 
focusing on eight categories of behaviour, and found no evidence of a faculty 
for social or cultural intelligence distinct from cognition in general.   
 
While there is no doubt that primates have a rich conceptual system and a basic 
ability to reason based on observable cause and effect relations, the existence 
has traditionally been assumed of a ‘mental gap’ between humans and 
chimpanzees, often described as ‘intentionality’, ‘theory of mind’ (Baron-Cohen, 
1995) or ‘mentalizing’ (Frith and Frith, 2006). Theory of Mind (ToM) is discussed 
in detail in the next chapter, and while it is an extremely difficult capacity to 
identify in non-verbal creatures (Shuttleworth, 2012), at this stage we should 
note that the theory of complete absence of ToM in chimpanzees has recently 
been challenged, largely through ingenious experiments typically involving 
hidden food sources. For example, Schmetz et al. (2011) demonstrated that 
chimpanzees know that conspecifics make inferences, while Burling (2005) 
reports studies of subordinate chimpanzees who would avoid hidden food in the 
presence of more dominant ones; similarly Hare et al. (2001) showed that 
chimpanzees acted in accordance with the knowledge they had of what other, 
more dominant, conspecifics were able to see. Finally, Byrne and Corp (2005) 
in a study of relative brain size (see section 4.2.3 below) identified occurrences 
of tactical deception by chimpanzees in the wild, that is, deliberate behaviour 
which a conspecific is likely to misinterpret to the benefit of the agent.  
 
Nevertheless, the evidence so far reviewed appears to support Penn et al.’s 
view: 
‘Although there is a profound similarity between human and nonhuman 
animals’ to learn about and act on the perceptual relations between 
events, properties and objects in the world, only humans appear capable 
of reinterpreting the higher-order relation between these perceptual 
relations in a structurally systematic and inferentially productive fashion’ 
(2008: 110) 
                                               
11 Though see Gibson (2012c) for discussion of the captive chimpanzees Austin and Sherman and 
possible examples of cooperation to achieve common goals 
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However, one aspect of behaviour that has not been considered here yet is 
communication, both in the wild and in the laboratory, and these topics are 
addressed in the following sections. 
 
 
4.1.2 Nonhuman communication 
 
 
4.1.2.1 Animal communication in the wild 
All animals communicate. Even single celled protozoa influence the behaviour 
of other organisms through chemical secretions, while other modalities for 
communication include changes of colour, movement, olfactory signals and, as 
in speech, sound. The content of the message communicated may function to 
indicate aggression or other mood, sexual attraction, marking territory, and 
indicating the presence of predators or prey (Pearce, 2008).  
 
Communication may be purely innate – as in the honey bee dance – or learned, 
like human speech. Hurford claims that ‘[w]ithout learning, a semantically 
compositional system cannot evolve beyond the narrowest limits we see in a 
few insects’ (2012: 7). And it would indeed appear that many communication 
systems are a combination of both inheritance and acquisition, for example bird 
song (Slater, 2012), dolphin calls (Janik, 2012), and some primate calls such as 
those of the vervet monkey (Seyfarth and Cheney, 2003). Nevertheless, even in 
the case of those wild animals who acquire part of their communication system, 
Hurford maintains that they have no semantically compositional syntax. For 
example, various bird species may have combinatorial songs consisting of two 
or more parts, but in no cases do these parts compose to produce a third with a 
different message: ‘whatever syntax can be found in bird repertoires, they do 
not take advantage of its combinatorial possibilities’ (Hurford: 21). Certain 
nonhuman animal species may acquire the equivalent of the ‘vocabulary’ of 
their communicative systems but these systems are limited to the size of that 
repertoire.        
 
A second factor in classifying communicative systems is to distinguish between 
displays which clearly lack any intent – such as inherent physical size – and 
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signals which may be intentional. Opinion differs over the degree of 
intentionality in regard to ape communication. In addition to the evidence cited 
in the previous section for a basic ToM, Tomasello (2008), who earlier in his 
career was sceptical about claims that great apes were able to appreciate that 
others have mental states (e.g. Call and Tomasello, 1999), now ascribes the 
ability for intentional communication to chimps on the basis of laboratory 
evidence of their attempts to help humans and conspecifics reach objects out of 
their grasp, and their ability to differentiate  between a refusal and an inability to 
perform an act such as offering food. As discussed above, Penn et al. (2008) 
are more cautious in assigning human-type intentional behaviour to other 
species (see also Povinelli and Vonk, 2004; Vonk and Povinelli, 2006).  
 
There is, however, a greater degree of accord in the view that great apes’ most 
sophisticated communicative abilities are not manifest in vocalisations. Seyfarth 
and Cheney (2012) point out that while there is evidence of some support for 
the notion that primates are able to learn to respond to new vocal calls 
(including those of other species), their own production and usage is inflexible, 
innate and unproductive (see also Zuberbuhler, 2012). Call and Tomasello 
(2006) contrast ape vocalisation with gestural signals, in which they include 
bodily posture, facial expression and manual gestures, all of which show 
significant individual variance within species groups. Gestures are used flexibly; 
the same one may be utilised for different ends, the same end sought with 
different gestures, and a new gesture may be employed when a given end has 
not been achieved. This degree of variety also emphasises the fact that 
gestures rely to a large extent on iconicity and there is a lack of conventionality 
and thus symbolic representation in ape gestural communication. 
 
Given that there appears to be a degree of intentional communication among 
primates in the wild, at least in a gestural if not vocal modality, how complex are 
the systems employed? Zuberbuler et al. (2011) claim that examples such as 
the pyow-hack combinations in Campbell’s monkeys, and also song 
combinations of Lar gibbons are evidence of morpho-syntax in primate calls. 
However, such calls can be explained as simple concatenations, and Hurford 
(2012) specifically argues that Campbell’s monkeys’ ability to combine the five 
meaningful calls that they possess does not amount to a compositional syntax, 
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and the calls resulting from their combinations are not functions of their parts. 
Tomasello (2008) acknowledges that ape gesture sequences are equally 
lacking in compositionality. 
 
The topic of a gestural origin for human language is taken up below in section 
4.3.2, but for the moment we can conclude that, although primate gestures in 
the wild demonstrate a degree of flexibility and productivity, neither they nor 
vocalisations are truly compositional, and there is no evidence for any apparent 
hierarchical or recursive structure in either. However, far greater claims have 
been made for communication with trained apes in captivity and this forms the 
subject of the next section.      
 
 
4.1.2.2 Primate communication in captivity     
Early modern attempts to train primates to communicate relied on replicating 
human speech, and these continued as late as the 1950s with the chimp Vicki. 
Inevitably these enterprises resulted in failure (Vicki only mastered three words 
‘mama’, ‘papa’ and ‘cup’), the reason being that despite Vicki’s trainers 
assertion that there was ‘no doubt that her vocal mechanisms were adequate 
for producing satisfactory approximations of most of the elements of human 
speech’ (Hayes and Hayes, 1951: 107), this was simply not the case and 
primates’ vocal tracts are just too distinct from those of humans (in addition 
primates lack the degree of neural control over the articulators that humans 
have, Fitch, 2010) for the production of even a small set of recognizable 
phones. 
 
Having realised that training in a vocal modality was not going to succeed, 
researchers began to focus on gestures which, as noted above, are common 
among primates in the wild. Gardner and Gardner (1969) began training the 
female chimpanzee Washoe in 1966 in American Sign Language (ASL) and 
within 22 months reported that she had acquired, and was reliably and 
consistently able to use, in excess of 30 signs including strings of up to three. 
Later it was claimed that she mastered in the region of 250 signs and was able 
to produce strings of up to 5 signs long, with some evidence of novel 
combinations (see Gibson, 2012c). Project Nim (Terrace, 1979) was a 
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subsequent attempt to replicate the Washoe experiment with the young, male 
chimpanzee Nim Chimpsky. The stated aim of the project was to collect more 
rigorous data than the anecdotal evidence which characterised the Gardners’ 
research. Over four years Nim was recorded using 125 signs in more than 
20,000 combinations. Although these results are superficially impressive, 
Terrace, the chief researcher on the project, warns against interpreting them as 
indicative of complex cognition, and certainly not an indicator of the 
manifestation of language (see discussion below). Several further signing 
experiments have been undertaken including, amongst others, those involving a 
chimp (Lucy), a gorilla (Koko) and an orang-utan (Chantek). Although the data 
remains controversial, at best these great apes have been reported to use up to 
1000 signs, occasionally in spontaneous and novel strings, and possibly to 
employ signs for deception and displaced reference (for review see Gibson, 
2012c).  
 
Alternatives to using sign language have involved training primates with tokens 
and lexigrams. Premack (1983) trained the mature female chimpanzee Sarah to 
use tokens, reporting a vocabulary of over 130, with usage that was sensitive to 
word order and so enabled her to comprehend conditionals. Early attempts had 
been made to train a chimpanzee, Lana, with lexigrams in the early 1970s, but it 
was while researchers were attempting to train the adult bonobo Matata that the 
most famous breakthrough occurred. Although Matata showed no inclination to 
interact with lexigrams, her adopted male infant who had been present during 
training sessions, Kanzi, began to spontaneously use them (Savage-Rumbaugh 
and Lewin, 1994). Kanzi was able to quickly master the initial 256 lexigrams that 
had been programmed into a computer and went on to respond to spoken 
English. It is claimed by the authors that he reacted correctly to 445 spoken 
commands out of a total of 660 consisting of three to five words, including 
prepositions and alternating agent/theme word order. Training on lexigrams has 
continued with other bonobos (e.g. Panbanisha) and common chimpanzees 
(e.g. Panzee) but Kanzi’s achievements do not yet appear to have been 
surpassed.  
 
The data in many early projects is not always reliable, Ristau (1983), for 
example, notes some researchers’ selective reporting of interactions. 
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Nevertheless, it seems undeniable in later studies, such as Kanzi’s, that, 
regardless of communicative modality, some great apes are able to respond to 
symbols, both individual and in strings, in a relatively consistent manner. 
However, there are several problems related to the criteria for judging 
comprehension; for example, many of these apes required a great deal of 
training and, where claims of novel interpretation are being made, we should 
give consideration to the possibility of explanation in terms of simple associative 
learning. Furthermore, Tomasello (2008) reports a study with chimpanzees 
which, although they were able to look in the direction in which a human points, 
appeared unable to understand the purpose behind the pointing – something 
human children are able to do from age 14 months onwards. As far as 
production is concerned, even the best performing apes never progressed 
beyond a mean length of utterance (MLU) of 1.5 (Pearce, 2008), a stage 
generally achieved by English speaking infants before 22 months. Production is 
acknowledged to be largely, if not entirely, limited to requests. The evidence for 
spontaneity and novel utterances remains extremely slight and controversial. 
Terrace (2005) for example, in a close analysis of the interactions with Nim, 
suggests that nearly all the signs the chimpanzee produced were 
nonspontaneous and imitative attempts to obtain rewards that were being 
withheld by his trainers. Much of what was claimed to be ostensible intentional 
communication by the chimpanzee could be explained as conditioned 
behavioural responses, as in the ‘Clever Hans’ effect where the horse that 
appeared to be counting was in fact reacting to changes in body language from 
its trainer. Terrace notes Skinner’s (1957) distinction between two types of 
language use by infants: ‘mands’ which were demands and requests, and ‘tacts’ 
which involved drawing attention to something for no immediate reward. While 
apes are clearly capable of the former of these in situations in which there is 
expectation of the reward – perhaps a protoimperative – there is far less 
evidence of behaviour corresponding to the latter, a protodeclarative (see also 
Meguerditchian et al. [2011] who identify ape pointing as exclusively imperative 
rather than declarative communication).  
 
There are also grounds for doubting apes’ ability to understand combinations of 
symbols in the sense that we comprehend language. Nim’s production of the 
signs for ‘water bird’ to identify a swan, for example, was not, maintains Terrace 
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(2005), the equivalent of a modifier acting on a head item as in language, but 
rather two signs that Nim associated with the scene and which were employed 
to achieve a specified end, the result of memory and associative learning.  
 
To account for this, Terrace (ibid.) reports a study involving arbitrary, 
meaningless chains of stimuli (in this case photographs) in which seven items 
appeared in random order in any one of 16 positions and the subjects 
(monkeys) were required to repeat the correct order to receive a reward. It was 
evident that primates had a remarkable ability for memorising and repeating 
such lists, including relative internal position. While this may be a necessary 
capacity for language, it is clearly not sufficient. Terrace, while acknowledging 
that the abilities of an ape such as Kanzi are impressive, concludes that all of 
the tasks he completed ‘can be construed as conditional discrimination 
problems whose solution is devoid of any intentional meaning’ (ibid.:100) and 
there is no basis for ascribing a capacity for language to Kanzi. Finally, it is 
worth noting that many of these trainers spend several years working with their 
subjects and undoubtedly form emotional attachments. The potential influence 
of these relationships on interpretation of data must be significant, as one 
researcher who worked with Panzee commented: 
‘As to what exactly makes some people believe that Panzee has the 
same kind of autonoetic, self-knowing consciousness that humans do, 
and why others will remain sceptical or even scornful of that possibility, 
one prime variable is assuredly firsthand personal experience: with 
animals, with Panzee herself’ (Menzel, 2005: 219) 
 
In conclusion then, it appears on the basis of studies of animal intelligence, 
animal communication in the wild, and laboratory based experiments, that 
chimpanzees have a rich conceptual system, the ability to learn a limited 
number of symbols for these concepts, and the basic perceptual sensory-motor 
system necessary to discriminate among these symbols. It is highly likely that 
these attributes were also shared by our LCA and thus the earliest hominins. 
However, evidence for cognitive abilities beyond these in other primates is 
much less conclusive and it is these more complex abilities that are 
fundamental for language. If we assume little change in the 7-8 million years 
since our LCA, then in the words of HCF, given the fact that ‘animal 
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communication systems lack the rich expressive and open-ended power of 
human language [...]. The evolutionary puzzle lies in working out how we got 
from there to here, given this apparent discontinuity’ (2002: 1570). While the 
last chapter looked at aspects of hominin cultural development and touched on 
the issue of changes to brain size and structure, it is this latter topic which is 
addressed more fully in the next section 
 
 
4.2 The human brain 
 
Despite all the modifications to body morphology that have occurred since the 
hominin line split from the LCA (see previous chapter), it is changes to the brain 
that are central to our behavioural differences from other primates. As 
discussed below, the human brain is a very expensive organ, constituting only 
around 2% of body mass but consuming a massively disproportionate 20 – 25% 
of all nutrients. In the absence of modern scanning technologies, our early 
modern knowledge of this organ was sometimes discerned through observation 
of living individuals such as Phineas Gage who, through accident, lost a large 
part of his brain, resulting in selective changes in behaviour. However, for the 
most part, knowledge was largely gained through autopsies, such as those 
carried out by Broca and Wernicke, when the site of brain damage could be 
located and examined in individuals who had undergone behavioural changes 
in their lifetime. In the twentieth century, technology has progressed at such a 
rate that there are now several varieties of non-invasive techniques for 
analysing the brain in living beings, and actually observing the brain at work. 
This section begins with an examination of the overall structure of the human 
brain, followed by a focus on the evolutionary history of the hominin brain, with 
particular attention to the issue of brain size.  
 
4.2.1 Human brain structure 
Vertebrate brains in general are hugely complex (for an overview see 
Gazzaniga et al., 2013). The human brain at birth consists of 100 billion (1011) 
nerve cells or neurons of three main functional types: afferent or sensory cells 
that transmit perceptual information to the brain, efferent or motor cells which 
transmit commands from the brain to other parts of the body, and interneurons 
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which enable different parts of the nervous system to communicate with each 
other. Neurons vary in their structure but all possess  a cell body (or soma) 
which contains the nucleus and genome. Information passes through neurons 
by electro-chemical signals which travel down the cell through the axon, which 
is attached to the axonal terminals and which, in turn, connect at locations 
called synapses with the dendrites of other cells (see figure 4.1).  
 
 
figure 4.1 Diagram of a neuron (from Google Images)  
 
A typical neuron has in the region of 1000 connections so the total number of 
connections in the human brain is approximately 1014. 
 
The overall structure of the brain consists of two hemispheres with a base of a 
brain stem and cerebellum. On top of the base sits the cerebrum which is made 
up of the basal ganglia, limbic system and the cerebral cortex. The cerebral 
cortex itself is divided into four lobes on the basis of protruding surfaces (gyri) 
and creases (sulci): the occipital, temporal, parietal and frontal lobes (see figure 
4.2).  
   
figure 4.2 The structure of the brain (from Google Images) 
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This cortex is often referred to as grey matter, in contrast to the white matter 
below, and consists of up to six layers. Areas are functionally specialised, with 
the regions responsible for the higher functions – primary sensory, motor and 
association – constituting the six layered neocortex. In mammals, visual 
processing is associated with the occipital lobe, while the temporal lobe 
processes auditory information (including speech in humans) and memory. 
Voluntary movement and spatial orientation are under the control of the parietal 
lobe, and the anterior parts of the frontal lobes consist of the prefrontal cortex 
(PFC) which is associated with selective and executive systems (DeSalle and 
Tattersall, 2012). In terms of Brodmann’s cytoarchitectonic map of the brain, 
based on differences in cell morphology and density, the PFC is usually 
considered to include parts of  Brodmann’s areas (BA) 8,9,10,11, 44, 45, 46 and 
47 (see figure 4.3) 
 
figure 4.3 Brodmann’s areas (from Google Images) 
 
Although the two hemispheres share a similar structure, under normal 
conditions the brain is lateralised for different functions, including language. As 
discussed in the last chapter (section 3.3.1) there is greater hemispherical 
asymmetry in the hominin brain, one of the consequences of which is 
handedness, much less apparent in chimpanzees (Hopkins and Cantelupo, 
2003; Hopkins and Vauclair, 2012) and this appears to have begun its 
evolutionary development between 2 and 3 mya. In the majority of right-handed 
people, the language functions of the right hemisphere appear to be limited to 
interpretation of such aspects as voice tone, sarcasm, metaphor and so on 
(DeSalle and Tattersall, ibid.). It is in the left hemisphere that the substantial 
tasks of language processing are undertaken. 
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In cases of severe epilepsy a procedure known as a commissurotomy is 
employed in which the corpus callosum, which joins the two hemispheres 
together, is severed. Gazzaniga (1983) showed that split-brain patients who 
were exposed to an image only available to the right hemisphere, and asked to 
point to an associated image from a selection available, were subsequently 
unable to explain their choice based on the initial image alone, and relied on the 
left hemisphere to invent a plausible, though spurious, reason. He concludes 
that in most right-handed people, the left hemisphere is the locus of language 
processing and problem solving. However, language processing is not 
generalised throughout the hemisphere; rather, specific aspects of both speech 
and language have been associated with specific brain regions. Price (2010) 
reviewed 100 published papers on functional magnetic resonance imaging 
(fMRI) studies of language and found that there were around 20 different areas 
of the left hemisphere involved in speech and language. Grodzinsky agrees, 
arguing that the data, though complex, is ‘stable and clear, parsing the linguistic 
brain into functionally and anatomically coherent pieces’ (2010: 605).  The most 
discussed areas associated with language include Broca’s (roughly 
corresponding to BA 44 and 45) and Wernicke’s (around the anterior superior 
temporal gyrus, or the posterior of BA 22). Certainly, under normal conditions, it 
seems that Broca’s area is involved in the grammatical assembly of words, and 
increased complexity of sentence structure appears to correlate with greater 
activity in this region (Caplan et al., 2000). Meanwhile, Wernicke’s area has 
traditionally been associated with grammatical comprehension (see Mazoyer et 
al., 1993; Dronkers et al., 1994). Brain scans of the KE family referred to in the 
last chapter indicate that an area of the basal ganglia, the caudate nucleus, may 
also be involved in language comprehension. Additional regions connected to 
the production and processing of speech include the auditory cortex for the 
interpretation of sounds and the motor cortex for the control of the articulators. 
 
 
The lack of language in our closest relatives among the primate species gives 
rise to the question of when and why these neural changes evolved. It is this 
which forms the topic for the next part of this section.  
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4.2.2 The evolution of the human brain 
It has been orthodoxy since the 1960s that human rationality is not the same as 
logicism, but rather the consequence of a brain that has evolved in a particular 
direction and brought with it certain non-random biases in deductive reasoning. 
An example often given is that of the Wason selection task (see figure 4.4) 
which only 10% of university students are able to solve at first attempt (Evans, 
2005). The task involves choosing which cards to turn over in order to verify the 
truth of a premise such as ‘if the card has an odd number on one side then it will 
have an X on the other’.  
 
 
figure 4.4 Wason selection task (adapted from: 
http://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Wason_selection_task_cards.png ) 
 
The task requires the participant to identify the premise as being of the form ‘if p  
then q’,  and the cards in the example above as constituting, from left to right, 
‘p’, ‘not p’, ‘q’, and ‘not q’. Instead of choosing ‘p’ and ‘not q’, the tendency is to 
choose ‘p’ and ‘q’, thus making the error of ‘affirming the consequent’. 
   
Cosmides (1989) and Cosmides and Tooby (1992) point out that if the task is 
framed in terms of social exchange, then the success rate rises to 75%, and this 
is often used as an argument in evolutionary psychology for ‘massive 
modularity’ (Frankenhuis and Ploeger, 2007) in which a large number of 
domain-specific modules are presumed to have evolved to deal with a range of 
social situations. However, Evans (2005) points out that attaching social roles to 
the items in the task changes its nature to one of deontic selection, and that the 
particular participants relations to the roles in the task has a significant impact 
 
X 
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on the success rate. Evans concludes that the notion of reasoning biases 
remains valid. This topic will be resumed in the next chapter, but first I will 
consider some of the physical changes that the hominin brain has undergone in 
the time since the LCA.      
 
 
4.2.2.1 Structural evolution of the hominin brain 
The most obvious change in hominin brains is their massively increased size 
(see section 4.2.3), but there has also been some reorganisation in the cerebral 
cortex, and the neocortex in particular. For example, Enard et al. (2002) showed 
that while, as a result of genetic similarity, chimpanzees and humans had 
anatomically more similar organs generally (e.g. livers) than chimpanzees and 
macaques, the differences in gene expressions resulted in a human PFC that 
was significantly more distinct from the chimpanzees’ than the chimpanzees’ 
was from the macaques’. The exact nature of this difference is disputed: 
Deacon (1997) claims that the human PFC is on average twice the volume of 
that expected in a brain of our size, while Semendeferi et al. (2002) argue that it 
is relative sizes of parts that are different, for example human BA 10 is much 
larger and other areas smaller, and Sherwood et al. (2009) suggest the 
difference lies in greater gyrification in humans12. In addition to an increased 
PFC, other reorganisations include a reduction in the relative size of the primary 
visual and motor cortices (dated to 3.5 mya), a widening of Broca’s area 
(complete by 1.8 mya) and increased anterior cingulate gyrus (ACC), an area 
below the frontal cortex (BA 24, 32 and 33) that moderates emotional input into 
decision making and has been linked with ToM (Holloway et al., 2009). 
Associated with a reduced brain area devoted to visual processing is an 
increase in the posterior parietal cortex.  Wynn et al. (2009) have dated this 
increase to between 700 and 200 kya and claim it plays a vital role in human 
abstract, conceptual thought (see discussion in the following chapter).  
 
                                               
12 To a large extent these are methodological differences and depend on which areas are classed as part of 
the PFC 
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4.2.2.2 Reasons for changes in the hominin brain 
In the last chapter we noted suggestions that genetic changes around 2.4 mya 
had resulted in reduced jaw muscles, and changes to diet are often suggested 
as causes for a change in brain size (e.g. Striedter, 2006; Lynch and Granger, 
2008; Wrangham, 2009;). As noted above, the basal metabolic rate (BMR) at 
resting for human brains is 20 – 25%, some 16 times greater than that of 
muscle tissue and far exceeding the corresponding rate in primates (8 – 13%) 
and other mammals (3 – 5%) (Leonard et al., 2007). Aiello and Wheeler (1995) 
note that increased brain size has been accompanied with a reduction in the 
human gastrointestinal tract, which also requires intensive nutrition, to 
approximately 60% of the expected size. According to their ‘expensive tissue 
hypothesis’ the introduction of more animal products into the hominin diet 
resulted in a more efficient processing of food, which enabled the brain to claim 
a greater proportion of nutrients and increase its size (though see also Warren 
and Iglesias, 2012, who argue against the hypothesis).  Alternative proposals 
have suggested genetic changes that facilitated the digestion of tubers, the 
change to a diet high in fish and shellfish, and the discovery of controlled fire in 
food preparation (for a discussion see Ragir, 2000). 
 
In the previous chapter there was a brief discussion of genetic changes that 
have been proposed as linked to brain reorganisation and growth (for a more 
comprehensive review see Somel et al., 2013); however, as earlier noted, 
epigenetic factors also play a vital role in these processes and it is known that 
there has been a modest accelerated evolution of brain gene expression on the 
human lineage, generally assumed to be the result of positive selection, some 
of which may be as recent as 200 kya (Preuss et al., 2004; Khaitovich et al., 
2006). Whatever the precise combination of genetic and epigenetic factors are, 
one of the most profound results has been the growth in the volume of hominin 
brains. 
 
 
4.2.3 The size of the hominin brain          
There is no universal agreement on the significance of brain size in general, 
and several studies involving bird species have produced conflicting results. 
Studies on the effect of relative size of the hippocampus in the memory abilities 
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of different bird species proved inconclusive (Hampton and Shuttleworth, 1996), 
while Spencer et al. (2005) showed that overall brain size in canaries, including 
those with restricted growth as a result of parasitic infestation, did not correlate 
with song complexity, although simpler songs were associated with a reduced 
area of the brain labelled the high vocal centre. On the other hand Sol et al. 
(2010), while emphasising the evolutionary selection for smaller brain sizes in 
migratory bird species, acknowledge that larger brains appear to be related to a 
better ability to adapt to novel environments. However, I argue below that when 
it comes to primates, Reader et al. are correct that a ‘volumetric stance’ is 
warranted, and that ‘brain component volumes are related to functionally 
relevant cognitive capacities’ (2011: 1024). 
 
 
4.2.3.1 The evolutionary history of hominin brain size 
As would be expected, larger animals tend to have larger gross brain volumes. 
In order for valid cross-species comparisons to be made, Jerison (1973) 
proposed the encephalization quotient (EQ) as an allometric measure of brain 
to body size. EQ can be expressed in a number of ways, but I shall adhere to a 
homocentric system in which the average human brain is taken as the figure 
89.9 (see Holloway et al., 2009). Among the mammals, the great apes stand out 
by virtue of having larger than expected brains, gorillas having an EQ of around 
24.7 and chimpanzees 37.5. But the human brain is proportionally, on average, 
a massive 2.4 times that of chimpanzees (Allen, 2009). It is logical to conclude 
that this differential has occurred in the process of hominin evolution rather than 
a loss of brain size in the chimpanzee line, and certainly there is no fossil 
evidence for this latter explanation. So when and why did this growth ensue? 
 
Comparative data from hominin ancestor species is obtained from endocasts of 
surviving skull fossils. Relying on such evidence is not unproblematic; there is 
no absolute correlation between cranial capacity and actual brain volume, and, 
unfortunately, there are only approximately 160 endocasts of pre H. sapiens in 
existence (Holloway et al., 2009). Nevertheless, some clear patterns do 
emerge. There is no indication of any changes to brain size in any of the 
candidates for the earliest members of the hominin clade, and, as noted in the 
previous chapter, little or no evidence of any cultural behaviour to distinguish 
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early hominins from the LCA.  The first very minor increases in allometric brain 
volume, including a gross increase from 400 cc to 500 cc, may have occurred 
between 3 and 2.5 mya in members of the Australopithecus genus, resulting in 
an EQ of approximately 45.  However, major brain growth, both allometric and 
non-allometric, is first evident in the emergence of the genus Homo 
approximately 2.5 mya, and, rather than having a uniform rate of development 
over the succeeding two and half million years, occurred predominantly in two 
rapid spurts in distinct, relatively short periods of time. The consequence of this 
initial increase was a near doubling in size of the hominin brain to over 800 cc13, 
with an EQ in the mid 60s by at least 1.74 mya (Holloway et al. ibid.)14, as Allen 
observes, ‘[a] substantial increase in EQ is seen in early Homo, but no 
substantial subsequent increase is observed in H. erectus’ (2009: 71).  This 
period of relative stability is followed by the final jump beginning roughly 500 
kya with the appearance of Homo heidelbergensis which, as suggested in the 
last chapter, ultimately split into two species. By at least 200 kya, modern 
humans in Africa had evolved brains of an average 1350cc (range 1250 – 1730 
cc) (Lynch and Granger, 2008), while Europe saw the evolution of the 
Neanderthals to which Holloway et al. (ibid.) attribute a gross brain capacity of 
up to 1700 cc and an average EQ of 99.14. These figures contrast with those of 
Kappelman (1996) who assumes a larger body mass for H. neanderthalensis 
and consequently a much smaller EQ than humans. Whichever is the case, 
there are significant differences in brain morphology between humans and 
Neanderthals, in particular a larger visual cortex in the latter and a less 
developed PFC (see e.g. Bookstein, 1999; Lieberman et al., 2002). 
 
In conclusion it appears that, despite Allen’s preference to eschew the term 
‘stasis’ (see discussion of Gould and Eldredge, 1993, in the previous chapter), 
there were two periods in the evolution of the modern brain that correspond to 
classic cases of punctuated equilibrium. These involved a significant increase in 
gross volume and EQ, contemporaneous with the first Homo speciation event, 
followed by, as Allen notes, ‘a modest increase for the first million years – so 
modest that its signal is obscured by variation across both time and space – 
                                               
13 At the beginning of the 20th century the anthropologist Arthur Keith proposed the figure of 750cc as the 
‘cerebral rubicon’ for the genus Homo.  
14 Though some very late H. erectus appear to have brain volumes over 1000cc but with an EQ around 67, 
a normal figure for the species (Holloway et al., 2009; Allen, 2009)  
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followed by rapid expansion in the transition from H. erectus to H. 
heidelbergensis. The transition from heidelbergensis to modern humans is 
marked less by an increase in cranial capacity but more by a change in cranial 
(and brain) form’ (2009: 64-65).  
 
 
As noted above, it is well established that as an organ the brain is metabolically 
disproportionately expensive and, additionally, is vulnerable to, and not 
efficiently regenerative after, trauma. Increased brain size comes with 
considerable cost and must have been accompanied by major evolutionary 
advantages, thus explanations based on diet alone cannot explain the 
significant increase in size; why, for example, would additional nutrition not be 
devoted to greater muscular material to enable more effective flight from 
predators? As an explanation for an adaptive pressure, the ‘social brain 
hypothesis’ (e.g. Dunbar, 1998), which links increased EQ to sociability, had 
been widely held in the field. More recently, however, researchers reviewing the 
hypothesis have found no evidence for this and rejected such an account in 
favour of an explanation based on general cognitive capacities (Seyfarth and 
Cheney, 2002; Finarelli and Flynn, 2009; Reader et al., 2011). As Allen 
concludes, although some studies ‘shed doubt on the direct correlation of brain 
size with cognitive abilities, one group in which this trend is pretty clear is the 
group to which we humans belong: the primates’ (ibid.: 212). I will propose in 
detail in the next chapter one hypothesis to account for this increase in volume 
in brain size in the hominin lineage, but first we need to consider why, if large 
brains brought such advantage, there has been no growth for at least 200 
thousand years.   
 
Large brains have two negative impacts on survival rates. Firstly, a bigger brain 
needs a bigger head. As noted above, as a result of body changes necessary 
for bipedal walking, there was narrowing of the human pelvis (by the time of H. 
erectus) which, along with large headed offspring, entails extended and 
dangerous childbirth for mothers. In addition, as a result to changes in body 
morphology, the hominin birth canal had twisted requiring the infant to be 
partially rotated during birth, increasing the chances of suffocation as a result of 
becoming entwined with the umbilical cord (Trevathan, 1999). Secondly, the 
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limited size of the birth canal and the need for larger heads means that human 
babies are more altricial than those of other species, including chimpanzees, 
and more of the ontogenetic development of an infant takes place after birth, 
human neonatal brains expanding by a factor of 3.3 compared with 2.5 in 
chimpanzees (de Leon et al., 2008). Consequently, for a longer period, hominin 
infants are unable to contribute to the group and need substantial care and 
attention that could otherwise be expended on alternative useful social 
activities. Nevertheless, the second period of brain growth, unlike the first, 
continued, despite the concomitant dangers, until it was physically impossible to 
increase any further; as Allen comments ‘it appears that we have reached an 
evolutionary equilibrium between neonatal brain size and maternal pelvis size 
that leaves both mother and child at risk during the birthing process. Obviously 
the advantages of large brain size have outweighed the considerable costs 
associated with it at childbirth’ (ibid., 72). Thus Uriagereka’s claim, echoed by 
many others, that as an exaptation, language ‘can certainly emerge as a 
singular epiphenomenon of a brain that got large enough for some obscure 
and/or trivial reason’ (1998: 67, emphasis added) is not tenable: increased brain 
size must be the result of one or more selective adaptive pressures, and greater 
cognitive abilities, including language, appear to be prime candidates. The final 
section in this chapter looks at the main theories of language origins that are 
predicated on the evolution of a unique human cognition. 
   
 
4.3 Neural and cognitive theories of language evolution 
 
To summarise the discussion so far, I have suggested that approaches to the 
evolution of human language can be grouped into two broad classes: those 
which propose language as an entirely unique human capacity with no 
analogue or homologue in the nonhuman animal world, and those who 
emphasise evolutionary continuity with other animal communication systems. 
This latter group may be subdivided into vocal or gestural continuity. 
 
Those who adhere to a theory of language with no continuity with any animal 
system have been dealt with in the last chapter under the heading of ‘sudden’ or 
‘catastrophist’ accounts and will not be considered further here. The sections 
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below will look at, first, hypotheses based on vocal continuity, and then at two 
well-known theories of language evolution based on gestural continuity.  
  
 
4.3.1 Vocal continuity 
The principal group of theories that appeal to vocal continuity may be labelled 
the ‘singing Neanderthal’ hypotheses (e.g. Mithen, 2005; Fitch, 2005a) in which 
language arose out of a musical protolanguage. The idea is not new and Darwin 
proposed something similar in The Descent of Man: ‘primeval man, or rather 
some early progenitor of man, probably used his voice largely, as does one of 
the gibbon-apes at the present day, in producing true musical cadences, that is 
in singing’ (1871/2008: 239). The adaptive pressure for selection on the basis of 
singing ability is generally assumed to be sexual selection, with more complex 
songs engendering greater sexual attraction; though enhanced group cohesion 
and pair-bonding have also been proposed as potential candidates for selection 
(Fitch, 2005b). Aside from the gibbons referred to by Darwin, there is no 
evidence of complex song-like vocalisations among the primates, and 
researchers have tended to focus instead on birdsongs.  
MacNeilage, for example, argues that ‘in terms of its organisation in the time 
domain, speech is more like birdsong than it is like sign language’ (2011: 139)  
and the theory has some support from studies such as Jarvis (2007) who found 
homologous neural pathways for vocal learning in humans and songbirds. 
Nevertheless, the complete lack of semantic compositionality in any nonhuman 
call system as noted by Hurford (2011 – see section 4.1.2.1 above) and 
weaknesses identified by Tallerman (2013) are sufficient to severely  undermine 
theories of vocal continuity. I shall turn now to the more appealing proposal for a 
communicative continuity based on gesture. 
 
 
4.3.2 Gestural continuity      
As we saw in section 1 above, there is far stronger evidence for an origin of 
language in animal gestures which at least share flexibility and a degree of 
creativity. In this section we shall consider two hypotheses, one based on the 
evolution of neural structure, and the second focusing on the emergence of 
cooperation in hominin species. 
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4.3.2.1 Imitation, gestures and mirror neurons  
Tomasello (2008) differentiates between two types of animal gesture. The first 
are what he calls ‘intention movements’ and these may be purely instinctive 
(very common in the animal world) or learned. The degree of individual 
differences within groups suggest that those that are acquired are the result not 
of imitation but rather associative learning, an example being a chimp raising 
his arm in order to initiate play. The second, more interesting type, are 
‘attention-getters’ which may involve throwing objects, making noises, slapping 
the ground and so on, with the aim of focusing attention on the subject’s display 
of intention such as desire to be groomed or sexual arousal. These appear to 
be unique to great apes or at least the primates, and Tomasello claims that this 
two-part system (drawing attention and displaying intention) is ‘a genuine 
evolutionary novelty….and may be considered the closest thing we have to a 
“missing link” between nonhuman primate communication and…human 
referential communication’ (ibid.: 29). For Tomasello, there is a logical necessity 
for the coded aspects of language to be preceded by unconventionalised, 
uncoded communication for which the prime candidate is attention-getting 
gestures. But are these gestures copied from conspecifics or the result of 
innovation and association?  
 
Humans have a prodigious capacity for imitation which, as Boyd and Richerson 
(2002), point out, is a far better tool for dealing with a rapidly changing 
environment than either innovation or evolution. Pearce (2008) differentiates 
between mimicry, in which there is no reward, and true imitation for a parallel 
objective. There is some evidence of mimicry in the animal world, in particular 
various species of birds including the African grey parrot (see Pepperberg, 
2012); however, a capacity for even simple imitation appears to be absent in 
nonhuman animals, including most primates15. Nagall et al. looked for evidence 
of imitation as ‘population specific behavioural traditions’ (1993: 174) which 
must be acquired, transmitted through generations, and absent in other 
populations of the same species. They concluded that even chimpanzee tool 
                                               
15 It should be noted, however, that Pepperberg claims that one parrot in particular is capable of cognitive 
activity far in excess of basic mimicry 
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use for feeding strategies such as stripping bark and using it to dig for termites 
was not true imitative learning but rather stimulation enhancement and 
emulation learning, with the concomitant consequence of lower fidelity. Many 
other researchers are more inclined to grant simple imitative abilities to great 
apes (for discussion see Pearce, 2008).  
 
With regards to communication, Arbib (2013) identifies seven genetically 
inherited cognitive properties that must have evolved prior to fully complex 
language, the first of which is the recognition and imitation of complex action. 
Arbib argues that the type of complex imitation necessary for intentional 
communication requires, in addition to the requisite motor ability, the capacity to 
differentiate individual actions and to perceive these as combinatorial. Arbib 
claims that the source of an imitative capacity lies in ‘mirror neurons’.  Paukner 
et al. (2005) noted that macaques would give more attention to a human 
experimenter that was imitating the macaques’ actions than one who was not. It 
is claimed that ‘mirror neurons’ in these monkeys, who share a last common 
ancestor with humans approximately 25 mya,   fire in the performance and 
observation of grasping actions. These neurons are found in the region F5 
which is architectonically comparable to Brodmann’s area 44, part of Broca’s 
area, in humans (Rizzolatti et al. 1996; Arbib and Bonaiuto, 2008). It has also 
been shown that stimulation of this area elicits both hand and orofacial 
movements in the monkeys (Petrides et al. 2005) suggesting a relation between 
the two forms of action. It has been proposed (Corbalis, 2009; Arbib, 2013) that 
the mirror system is crucial to the evolution of human language. 
 
Arbib (ibid.) suggests that the early stages of language evolution involved iconic 
pantomiming representing objects, actions or situations. Over time these 
became conventionalised and formed a system of protosign, a communication 
system based on manual gestures but lacking hierarchical syntax, that was 
utilised by hominins from H. habilis through to the appearance of H. sapiens. 
The mirror system enabled this conventionalisation by ensuring the necessary 
‘parity’ or semanticity, whereby a particular gesture was associated with a 
specific meaning. This protosign acted as a scaffolding for the emergence of 
protospeech and the two coevolved with the eventual primacy of protospeech. 
By 200 kya the genetically specified cognitive properties necessary for 
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language were in place, and with the cultural developments of compositionality 
of signs, the expression of displacement (given special emphasis by Corballis, 
ibid.), and learnability, complex language materialised between 50 and 90 kya.  
 
There are two major problems with this scenario. First, Arbib’s conventionalised 
pantomiming relies on a notion of holophrastic signs with all the concomitant 
difficulties this implies, as noted in the previous chapter. Secondly, many writers 
assume that one of the benefits of bidpedalism was the availability of the hands 
for tool use, foraging, shelter construction and so on (see Allen, 2009), which 
would be severely reduced if communication was dependent on gestures. 
Furthermore, evidence from trained chimpanzees show that they are responsive 
to human vocalisation and it might be assumed that this modality would become 
predominant in the early stages given its obvious advantages of greater 
broadcast reception over distances and in the dark. 
 
We will turn now to an alternative theory that focuses on different changes in 
hominin cognition as factors in the evolution of language, while still stressing the 
continuity with gestures. 
 
 
4.3.2.2 Cooperation 
Tomasello (2008) argues that the important cognitive skill that appeared in the 
human lineage was an understanding of relevance: that is, an appreciation of 
what is most salient. This is not just in egocentric terms (which characterises 
behaviour in other primates) but also to sharing content with conspecifics. From 
this beginning there arose three processes involving cooperation, all of which 
have consequences for the need to communicate. First, our ancestors became 
more tolerant of, and generous to, others. There is some evidence of a latent 
cooperation in chimpanzees which, although rarely, if ever, displayed in the 
wild, is sometimes seen in interactions with humans, and possibly also each 
other (Gibson, 2012c). Second, there is indirect reciprocity whereby apparent 
altruistic behaviour could have helped to build reputation and generate its own 
rewards. Finally, there is cultural group selection in which imitation serves the 
social function of increased solidarity.   
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Like Arbib, Tomasello argues for initial holophrastic pantomimes. He maintains 
this position because single gesture pointing can have complex meanings, but it 
is not apparent that this is also true of non-combinatorial pantomiming. The ‘drift 
to the arbitrary’ (2008: 219)  arose, he claims, through the mis-analysis of 
complex iconic signs, which, once shared within the group, became 
conventionalised. Conventionality, being computationally efficient, soon comes 
to be the dominant form of communication. Again Tomasello shares with Arbib 
(and Corballis) a belief in the historical dominance of gestural communication 
with only a recent appearance of speech. However, on the evidence of extant, 
complex sign languages, Tomasello alone among these researchers insists that 
‘even when grammar is involved most of this story played out in the gestural 
modality’ (ibid.: 245); in other words gestural language evolved beyond proto-
sign before the switch to vocalisation.  
 
In Tomasello’s theory, of the three aspects of cooperative behaviour listed 
above, the first, mutualism, requires a relatively simple syntax for a grammar of 
requesting. This is not significantly beyond the communicative abilities of 
trained great apes, whose communicative repertoire consists almost entirely of 
requesting. A sensitivity to word order may be necessary, and, as discussed 
above, there is some evidence for this in trained apes, though the subject 
remains controversial. The second process, indirect reciprocity, involves a 
‘grammar of informing’. This entails a more complex syntax containing elements 
for the expression of spatial displacement and attitude. Tomasello associates 
this type of communication with early sapiens and likens it to the initial stages of 
a sign language, in contrast to the stage of communication corresponding to 
mutualism, which is closer to home sign. The final process of group selection 
necessitates a grammar for sharing and narrative with temporal displacement 
and complex reference. These gestural grammars may have become correlated 
with meaningless vocalisations that ‘piggybacked’ on the gestures and 
eventually came to replace them. Grammaticalization and the 
conventionalisation of all linguistic constructions finally resulted in fully complex, 
human language. 
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4.3.2.3 Cognitive or communicative continuity? 
The hypotheses considered in this section have sought the origin of human 
language in the continuity with other animals’ communications systems. 
Alternative theories recognise the uniqueness of human communication but 
seek to ground this in a development of aspects of animal cognition. Emonds 
(2011) for example, argues that the labelling of functional items in terms of 
discrete binary values, for example +/- ANIMATE, is inherited from the only discrete 
concepts in primate cognition, those connected to vision (see discussion in the 
next chapter). A more common explanation sees language as emerging from 
hominin development of simple tools, presuming those used by our LCA, are 
similar to that of modern great apes. In this scenario there is adaptive selection 
acting on neural substrates (many of these theories stressing in particular the 
role of hypertrophy of the left lateralised parietal lobe as discussed in 4.2.2.1 
above) that are functionally important in both tool use and language (Bruner, 
2004; Faisal et al., 2010; Stenning and von Lambalgan, 2012).  
 
 
4.4 Conclusion  
 
In this chapter I have argued that humans alone are capable of abstract, 
systematic thought, and only humans engage in communication through a 
system of semantically compositional symbols. These cognitive abilities are 
most likely the result of physical changes to the hominin brain during 7-8 million 
years of evolution. These changes include lateralisation, and reorganisation to 
areas such as the PFC and the posterior parietal cortex. However, the most 
striking change is the very great increase in brain size despite the 
accompanying drawbacks that possessing such a large, expensive organ 
brings. This growth seems to have occurred in a pattern that resembles classic 
punctuated equilibrium, with two rapid periods of growth, and relative stasis in 
between. The first of these periods is associated with the appearance of the 
Homo genus and was completed in the speciation event for Homo erectus. The 
end of the second of these periods, which was accompanied with some brain 
reorganisation, is contemporaneous with the speciation event of H. sapiens.  
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In terms of communication, primate gestures, and the intention behind them, 
appear to be far better candidates than vocalisations for an evolutionary 
precursor for language, and a system based on mirror neurons has been 
posited as an explanation for this. However, even in the laboratory after many 
years of training, the communicative abilities of chimpanzees remains slight. In 
particular they lack the features of human cooperation that enable complex, 
informative communication and they appear incapable of conveying anything 
much beyond requests and demands.  
 
In chapter five I consider in more detail those aspects of human cognition that 
enabled humans to possess language, and suggest an evolutionary scenario for 
their emergence. There is no doubt that language influences some aspects of 
thought in the sense that a kind of thinking is involved in how to express 
thoughts. However, in section 5.1 below, I argue that complex thought must 
have evolved prior to its external representation in language (whether gestural 
or spoken). This will involve rejecting the notion of language as a system that 
acts on double interface objects, an idea that characterises CGG and much 
contemporary linguistics; and also reconsidering what is understood by 
‘meaning’ or ‘semantics’ in relation to language.  
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Chapter 5. The evolutionary nature of language and thought 
 
 
5.0 Introduction  
 
In this chapter I intend to consider the most plausible relationship between the 
evolution of human thought and language, given the evidence discussed earlier. 
As I noted in the last chapter, chimpanzees, and thus we can assume, our LCA, 
have concepts and, under training, appear able to label those concepts in 
various modalities and to combine them into simple strings. However they do 
this only in very restricted circumstances , for the evidence strongly suggests 
that chimpanzees will engage in apparent communicative activity solely in order 
to obtain some form of immediate gratification. Blondin-Masse et al. note that 
‘what is striking is that they never really pick up the linguistic ball and run with it. 
They just don’t seem to be motivated to do so, even if they sometimes seem to 
“get it,” locally, for individual cases’ (in press, emphasis in original). The reason 
chimpanzees do not communicate beyond the rudimentary stage of gestures 
described earlier is, I suggest, because they do not actually have very much 
worth communicating. At some point in the evolution of hominins this situation 
changed, our ancestors began to have more interesting thoughts and were 
aware that their conspecifics had different, possibly also interesting, thoughts. 
The exact evolutionary relationship between language and thought is addressed 
in the first section below. The second section focuses on problems in CGG, in 
the MP in particular, and discusses an alternative view of language, including a 
reconsideration of the notions of ‘meaning’ and ‘semantics’, that resolves these 
issues. Next I consider the cognitive capacities that evolved to make language 
possible, before finally presenting a tentative hypothesis of the story of 
language evolution. 
 
 
5.1 Clarifying the nature and evolution of human thought 
 
5.1.1 The relationship of language and thought 
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The notion of linguistic relativity, associated with Whorf (1956), and in particular 
the stronger version of linguistic determinism, wherein it is believed that the 
manner in which someone perceives the world is conditioned by the language 
they speak, had long been discredited. Although controversial again, if there is 
an orthodox position now, it is that thought exists prior to its external 
expression, as Penn et al. note ‘the adaptive advantages of being able to 
reason in a relational fashion have a certain primacy over the communicative 
function of language’ (2008: 123). Moreover, as Schoenemann maintains 
‘[symbols] for things must logically be applied to things that in some sense 
already exist in our own cognitive world. From an evolutionary perspective, 
there would be no point to communication (and therefore language would not 
have evolved) if such cognitive categories did not already exist’ (1999: 319). 
Fodor (1998) points out that expressions in natural language may be 
ambiguous, including oft cited examples referred to in previous chapters as well 
as constructions involving quantifiers, such as the English sentence ‘everybody 
loves somebody’, which does not parse into alternative forms without positing 
covert move. Examples such as these with ambiguous quantifier scope do not 
appear be the sort of representations that could be vehicles of thought. In 
addition, there is the well-documented condition of anomic aphasia in which 
patients experience severe difficulty in recalling words, while being able to 
explain the concept itself – not unlike the ‘tip of the tongue’ phenomena that 
most people occasionally encounter. A similar, frequent occurrence is described 
by Chomsky in terms of a ‘a very common experience’ whereby one tries ‘to 
express something, to say it and to realise that is not what [one] meant’ (2000, 
76). Thus Saussure’s assertion that: ‘thought is like a swirling cloud, where no 
shape is intrinsically determinate. No ideas are established in advance, and 
nothing is distinct, before the introduction of linguistic structure’ (1916/83: 155), 
seems somewhat problematic. Indeed, only a few pages later (ibid.: 160) 
Saussure discusses differences in the lexicons of English and French and 
employs the example of the English distinction between sheep and mutton, in 
contrast to the single French lexeme mouton. Yet surely Saussure does not 
wish to suggest that, on the basis of having two symbols, speakers of English 
are able to make a cognitive distinction that French speakers lack? Nor, 
presumably, that English speakers are unable to differentiate between the 
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concept of chicken as a white meat and chicken as a domesticated, omnivorous 
member of the genus Gallus.  
 
The well-known case of Genie would appear to support the argument that 
thought/cognitive structure exists prior to the acquisition of a language. 
Although lacking all language when rescued from her abusive confinement at 
the age of 13, she was able to later recall and describe episodes from her 
younger life suggesting that she had, at the time, constructed and stored 
memories based on differentiated concepts (see Curtiss, 1977). Nevertheless, 
we need to be cautious as we do not understand exactly what Genie, nor those 
similarly lacking complex language in early life (e.g. Nicaraguan home signers, 
see Senghas, 2003), actually knew before the imposition of linguistic structure. 
Certainly there are testaments from individuals who have acquired language 
when previously it had been absent that emphasise the dramatic change in 
awareness. One such famous example is Helen Keller: 
‘Have you ever been at sea in a dense fog, when it seemed as if a 
tangible white darkness shut you in, and the great ship, tense and 
anxious, groped her way toward the shore with plummet and sounding-
line, and you waited with beating heart for something to happen? I was 
like that ship before my education began, only I was without compass or 
sounding-line, and had no way of knowing how near the harbour was. 
"Light! give me light!" was the wordless cry of my soul, and the light of 
love shone on me in that very hour’ (1903/2010: 11)      
   
Advocates of certain schools of linguistic thought, particularly in the broad field 
known as ‘cognitive linguistics’, remain committed to a form of (sometimes 
inverted) Whorfism. Pederson et al. (1998), for example, argue that the way in 
which members of a particular culture perceive the world will be reflected in the 
language they use, and give the example of variation in spatial 
conceptualization16. While rejecting explicit Whorfism, some nativist theories, 
emphasising the abstract nature of language, also blur the division between 
language and thought. Jackendoff’s (2002) tripartite parallel architecture for 
language proposes an informationally encapsulated semantic component, 
independent from syntax and phonology and he might therefore be expected to 
                                               
16 Li and Gleitman (2002) dispute their findings, based on a critique of the methodology used.  
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promote a theory of a non-linguistic system of thought. Indeed, he is explicit on 
occasions in stipulating that a precondition for the emergence of language is ‘a 
community of individuals who have thoughts worth communicating to each 
other’ (ibid.: 238). However his ‘Unconscious Meaning Hypothesis’ stipulates 
that ‘if we haven’t yet turned a thought into words, we’re only aware at best of 
thinking going on, not of exactly what the thought is’ (2012: 91, emphasis in 
original). He argues that we can only have unconscious, intuitive states until the 
substance of that state (which he calls ‘meaning’, see discussion below) is 
somehow linked to a pronunciation and that languages effectively operate as 
‘handles’ for thoughts (2012: 90). Even in mainstream CGG a clear distinction 
between language and thought is not always present, and it is to this that I turn 
next.          
  
5.1.1.2 Language and thought in CGG       
Chomsky largely avoids discussing the relationship between language and 
thought and, at least at the level of concepts, the two sometimes seem to be 
used interchangeably. Berwick and Chomsky, for example, refer to ‘the “atoms” 
of computation, lexical items/concepts’ (2011: 39), while Chomsky is, at times, 
even more explicit: ‘the core theory of language—Universal Grammar (UG)—
must provide, first, a structured inventory of possible lexical items that are 
related to or perhaps identical with the concepts that 
are the elements of the ‘‘cognoscitive powers,’’ ’ (2005: 4, emphasis added). 
Other adherents of CGG, such as Bickerton, are more openly committed to 
rejecting a system of thought separate from language. He has argued (1995) on 
parsimony grounds that, as language and thought share the features of being 
systematic and combinatorial, they should share the same neural resources and 
he later maintains that ‘without words we’d have never gotten into having 
concepts’ (2009: 208).  However the most explicit treatment of the issue is by 
Hinzen (2006, 2007, 2011, 2012). 
 
Like Bickerton, Hinzen appeals to the principle of Occam’s Razor for rejecting 
the concurrent existence of both language and an independent system of 
thought or mentalese, which, following Fodor (1975, 2008), we will call 
Language of Thought (LoT). Hinzen (2011), like Chomsky (e.g. 2005), sees the 
phonetic externalisation of language as a secondary phenomenon which was 
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preceded, in evolutionary terms, by a purely internal language, though not 
interfacing with the CI system, as in mainstream CGG, but actually constituting 
that system. Hinzen is a proponent of the ‘Great Leap’ hypothesis for the origins 
of language and he sees language as UG, emerging suddenly around 80 kya. 
For Hinzen, this occurred as ‘a neural reorganisation that puts a creative and 
structured mode of thought into place, and the most plausible cause of this 
reorganisation is language: what we might call the grammaticalisation of the 
brain’ (2012: 247). The evolution of the species H. sapiens corresponded with 
the appearance of a new type of mind that had a potential for creative thought 
that could not be realised until the emergence of grammar: early humans had a 
mind ‘of a new and spectacular kind; but they didn’t yet know it’ (Hinzen and 
Sheehan, 2013: 259). It should be noted that despite the argument that 
language is LoT, Hinzen is talking about syntactic computation in the form of 
UG and not explicitly suggesting any form of linguistic determinism, as he 
argues ‘it is a Whorfianism without the linguistic relativity bit. The structures that 
language co-opts are universal’ (2011: 522); Hinzen and Sheehan thus propose 
an Un-Cartesian ‘unified theory of language and thought’ (2013: 7). Hinzen 
maintains that the productive, generative, recursive, combinatorial nature of 
language matches precisely those properties that are posited in a LoT. 
Furthermore, if language was not LoT, then you would not expect to see the 
alignment of syntax and semantics that he claims is evidenced. Hinzen and 
Sheehan’s proposals involve a good deal of philosophical and technical detail, 
too much to consider here, and I offer only a brief sketch. Essentially, they 
argue that sentient beings filter the mass of perceptual data that they are 
exposed to and in doing so form symbolic mental representations that are 
common to all animals. Only humans though, deindexicalise these 
representations in the formation of concepts/lexical roots (lexemes) which enter 
the computation as grammatical atoms, the relations of which constitute 
grammatical semantics, including reference through reindexicalisation. Truth 
only exists as predication, a grammatical relation realised in the linguistic 
sentence: 
‘truth requires predication …, and thus the sentence (viewed as a 
grammatical object) …. Whatever a Chimpanzee might think, he doesn’t 
think about ‘the world’ as such, as philosophizing hominins tend to do. 
The arrival of the sentence, for these reasons, or the transition from a 
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perceptually and conceptually given world to one that is grammaticalized, 
is a truly momentous one. Only in such a world can there be such a thing 
as a metaphysics, or science’ (2013: 84).     
In other words, only by ‘realising’ thought through linguistic form is the nature of 
referential, truth conditional thought determined. These notions correspond to 
uniquely human concepts, ‘in this sense only where there are lexemes, there is 
grammar, and there is intentional and intensional reference’ (ibid.: 54). 
 
 
However, one major problem with the hypothesis that language equals LoT is 
the notion of translatable thoughts. If a thought is constituted by the language in 
which it is expressed then surely translation into another language is not 
possible. Alternatively, if the same thought can be expressed in two different 
languages (which appears to be the case) then it must surely be independent of 
either language. Hinzen and Sheehan explicitly state that the problem to be 
tackled is ‘what is grammar, so that it can be invariant?’ (ibid.: 76). Their 
response is that linguistic diversity does not amount to grammatical variation. 
The former is explained in terms of ‘the mapping between syntax and PF, … 
which must, then, be indirect, in order to capture the fact that languages differ 
from each other’ (p. 180). This suggests that diversity arises from different 
morphophonological systems while grammatical relations remain universal and 
invariant. However, it does not appear entirely clear to me how Hinzen and 
Sheehan see a purely syntactic/semantic derivation prior to the mapping to PF 
(for example, is it hierarchical, linear or both? See discussion below on the 
incompatibility of the two). The authors also accept that the lexical inventory of 
languages vary enormously and are the result of cultural diversity and historical 
accident. Hinzen and Sheehan acknowledge that differences in lexis will 
‘necessarily affect the exact thoughts that can be expressed in a given 
language (simply because the thoughts in question will contain different 
concepts)’ but claim that ‘they seem to have no obvious impact on the 
grammatical semantics available in a given language’ (p.180). But while we can 
be sympathetic with their critique of traditional compositional semantic theory as 
inadequate in accounting alone for the totality of meaning of a construction, 
thoughts containing different concepts are surely radically different thoughts. 
They conclude that ‘any human language can create the same kinds of 
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thoughts, and not the exact same set of thoughts’ (p.180, emphasis in original), 
which may be a weak form of, but nevertheless certainly looks like, Whorfianism 
of some sort.              
 
Even in mainstream CGG, in which the syntax is explicitly recognised as 
interacting with the CI system rather than constituting it, as in Hinzen and 
Sheehan’s hypothesis, the problem of the relation of language and thought 
remains apposite. Two approaches to dealing with the problem can be 
identified. Firstly, there is the suggestion that all variation arises as a result of 
externalisation while there remain universal LFs corresponding to individual 
propositions. A strong version of this proposal would be to posit an extreme 
version of ‘language as abstract’; there is only one language, with some form of 
‘late’ lexical insertion. A position similar to this appears to be adopted by 
Sigursson and Maling (2010). They note that in the two examples (their p.68 
(20)) 
1) a John said to me that he would vote for me  
b John said to me ‘I will vote for you’ 
the choice of pronouns in the second clause depends on the output of the 
syntax in the first and so could not be selected for a numeration/array17. On 
these grounds (and several others) they argue that the items entering the 
computation consist solely of features and abstract roots.  
 
Mainstream generative grammar adopts a weaker version of this hypothesis 
and assumes that lexical items are selected from the lexicon prior to merging in 
a derivation, yet still maintains that all variation is due to externalisation. As 
Holmberg and Roberts explain, the ‘traditional P&P position…is that there is 
syntax, deriving LF representations interpreted at the C-I interface, and there 
are post-syntactic systems deriving PF representations interpreted at the A-P 
interface’ (2014: 72) . Work of this nature represents a significant part of the 
opus of the generative enterprise, and, on the surface, there would appear to be 
significant success in divorcing the range of language specific externalisations 
from invariant LFs. However, there have, for many years, been criticisms for a 
tendency to Eurocentricism and consequently a focus on languages with 
                                               
17 Though a response could be that these are independent ‘phases’ with different arrays 
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relatively recent shared roots (e.g. Epps, 2010). It should be noted, though, that 
generativists would deny this charge. Chomsky (2013), for example, claims that 
it is in fact the methodology employed in the generativist or ‘biolinguistic’ 
framework that ‘allows study of Japanese or English to make use of discoveries 
about the nature of language unearthed in study of Italian or Mohawk, and of 
inquiries that go beyond linguistic data narrowly construed’ (2013: 35). 
 
Variation in morphophonology is clearly the least problematic aspect of 
language to account for purely in terms of externalisation. Even here, though, it 
is not obvious why the vast differences in, for example, isolating, agglutinating 
or polysynthetic morphological systems are attested, nor how sentences 
encoded in these systems could map to identical LFs (for example, embedding 
of clauses in isolating languages may be replaced with affixation of morphemes 
in polysyntheic ones – see Evans and Levinson, 2009.). Syntactic structure is 
more problematic still. Evans and Levinson claim that free word order 
languages fatally undermine certain principles of CGG, claiming that if 
‘constituency is not the universal architecture for sentence structure then the 
entire generative apparatus of c-command, bounding nodes, subjacency, and 
so forth collapses, since all are defined in terms of constituency’ (ibid: 476). But 
this misses the fundamental point that in CGG these relations are presumed to 
exist in LF, while externalisation, whether constrained or random, has no 
bearing on this. Nevertheless, there are more robust questions arising from the 
domain of syntax. One example includes the case of propositions that may be 
encoded in fewer clauses in some languages than in others, such as the 
question of how epistemic modality is expressed. For example, a language such 
as Tuyuca (Whaley, 1997) has a set of markers for evidentials which other 
languages, including English, lack, and therefore need to include additional 
clauses to express mood. Likewise, while in English it is possible to express 
change of state in a single clause, other languages, relying on periphrastic 
causatives, require two or more. One such case is the African language Fongbe 
(Lefebvre and Brousseau, 2002):   
 (1)  s b  blo b   n s n     kp  n  
  Asiba make COMP Sauce DEF become.thick  
  ‘Asiba thickened the sauce’ 
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Recursion gives rise to similar questions. Evans and Levinson note ‘how easily 
a language can dispense with subordination (and hence with the primary type of 
recursion), by adopting strategies that present a number of syntactically 
independent propositions whose relations are worked out pragmatically’ (ibid.: 
442). As well as languages which have little recursion, it has also been claimed 
that there is at least one language, Piraha, in which recursion is completely 
absent (Everett, 2005). The problem is how a sentence with multiple embedded 
clauses in one language could share an invariant LF with propositions encoded 
in multiple independent sentences in another language. 
 
An alternative, less orthodox, approach accepts that there is variation in the 
narrow syntax and thus in LFs corresponding to the same thought. Holmberg 
and Roberts (2014) defend the notion of parameters and argue that they arise 
as an emergent property of the three factors in language design discussed in 
Chomsky, 2005. Through a comparative analysis of answers to yes/no 
questions in English and Finnish they claim that all that is truly invariant is ‘the 
linguists’ representation of the shared syntactic structure of a particular type of 
expression, not a representation in the mind of the language user’ (ibid.: 80). 
They note that English yes/no answers consist of a positive or negative particle 
whereas Finnish licenses an echoing of the finite verb of the question, an option 
prohibited in English. Structurally these options are in some respects different, 
involving different forms of movement and ellipsis, and the authors maintain that 
they cannot be accounted for by variation in selective spell out. Holmberg and 
Roberts argue that ‘two expressions convey the same thought if they are truth-
conditionally equivalent and interchangeable in the same discourse context’ 
(ibid.: 73). Under this definition the two possible responses to yes/no questions 
are taken to express the same thought, though clearly there is significant 
pragmatic work to be done in both cases to arrive at any proposition. The 
authors conclude that ‘the same ‘thought’  can have I-language representations 
which are different in some respects, although we would still expect them to 
have the same basic syntactic structure’ (p.72).         
 
As Evans and Levinson have shown (2009; Levinson and Evans, 2010) there is 
vast variation in the world’s languages and the question endures of how the 
same thought in all languages (or indeed all individual, internal I-languages – 
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Chomsky, 1986) corresponds to a single linguistically derived LF (or at least 
very similar ones in Holmberg and Roberts’ hypothesis). It certainly remains 
difficult to explain in ‘minimalist’ terms (at the very least a great deal of covert 
internal merge would appear to be necessary). Further discussion of this topic is 
resumed below (especially section 5.2), in particular in relation to radically 
different sentences in the same language, with identical truth values, and the 
need for pragmatic enrichment of anything that is ‘encoded’.    
 
     
While language is clearly necessary for aspects of those concepts which we 
only acquire through learning (such as [ATOM], [QUARK] and so on) it also seems 
obvious that language helps to refine, or to make more precise, more natural 
concepts. Nevertheless, as many philosophers of mind and cognitive 
anthropologists point out, humans are endowed with universal, cross-cultural 
and cross-linguistic modes of thought or ‘folk mechanisms’ (Wynn et al., 2009), 
as a consequence of which we characterise and think about the world in 
identical ways. The different languages of the world (including those that are 
extinct) exist (or existed) to express, and thus are constrained by, this way of 
thinking, and it is this that will be examined in the next section. 
 
5.1.1.3 The Language of Thought  
Amongst others, Jackendoff (2012) comments that even if chimpanzees were 
suddenly to develop a symbolic communication system, the thoughts expressed 
would not be comparable to those of humans as we have evolved to entertain 
different types of concepts and combinations of concepts. One popular proposal 
to account for these differences, with adherents in ‘Cognitive Linguistics’, is that 
humans have evolved an embodied cognition that is situated in interaction with 
the physical environment. However, this appears to me to be the wrong way 
round: what humans appear to have evolved is a slower, reflective mode of 
thought that is less embodied, and this is addressed in section 5.3.3 below (for 
discussion of embodied cognition see Wilson, 2002).  
 
The central tenet of the LoT hypothesis is that humans have concepts and an 
innate, universal system for combining these concepts into propositions. In 
these terms concepts are ‘mental symbols, the units of thought’ (Carey, 2011). 
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Harnad prefers the term ‘category detectors’ to concepts, and offers the 
definition that ‘[t]o categorise is to do the right kind of thing with the right kind of 
thing’ (2010: 213): to eat an apple, to avoid a predator, and so on – though note 
this says nothing about what the content of [APPLE] actually is. He rejects 
theories of concepts based on prototypes or exemplars as either inviting an 
infinite regress or failing to account for category construction, and explains the 
acquisition of concepts/categories as induction grounded in sensorimotor 
perceptions (1990)18. In addition to this ‘sensorimotor toil’, concepts may be 
inherited (‘Darwinian theft’) as well as learned through language (‘symbolic 
theft’) (Harnad, 2003). The notions of inherited concepts and a universal, innate 
category detector rely on the premise of innate primitives, an idea which is 
assumed by many writers, and there are presumably some basic concepts 
shared with other primates (Emonds, 2011; Tomasello, 2008). However, there 
are good reasons for believing that other innate concepts, and, more obviously, 
modes of thinking, have evolved since our split with the LCA. Wynn et al. (2009) 
discern three types of universal conceptual thought. The first is grounded in 
basic ontological categories which, they claim, are uniquely human and innate, 
and are displayed by preverbal children. These include concepts such as [TOOL] 
which they associate with an area of the left occipital and temporal lobe (BA 37) 
and estimate an emergence in early Homo around 1.5 mya. The second 
involves multi-sensory categorisation which constitutes folk biology, a form of 
essentialism, mirroring Harnad’s rejection of prototype or exemplar based 
theories. The evidence for this is pace Hinzen and Sheehan, who claim that 
relations of hyponymy and hyperonomy are ‘subject to significant variation 
across speakers and languages’ (2013: 43), the existence in all cultures of at 
least three biological ranks or taxons: kingdom (e.g. plant), form (tree) and 
specific (oak). Given that these ranks are based on the integration of 
multisensory features, processing must involve the parietal lobe and the 
appearance of this type of cognition would then be contemporaneous with 
changes to that particular brain region. The final category is complex, abstract 
thought, linked to the PFC, and it is this type of thought that a LoT hypothesis is 
intended to account for. 
                                               
18 See also Fodor’s (1998) argument against prototypes on the grounds that, as prototypes do not 
compose, they fail to account for complex concepts: the concept [PET-FISH] is neither a prototypical [PET] 
nor a prototypical [FISH]. 
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However concepts are defined, a LoT hypothesis proposes that they are 
represented by grounded symbols which are manipulated in the production of 
propositions as part of a ‘computational theory of mind’ (CTM). Such a theory is 
founded on the systematicity and combinatoriality which characterise thought 
and are the foundations of infinite productivity. It is on the basis of these 
features that CTM is explanatorily more appealing than accounts of thought 
based on connections in neural networks (see Fodor, 1997). In such a CTM, 
thoughts are compositionally structured ‘sentences’ in LoT and it is the relation 
between these sentences that constitutes ‘thinking’. Positing a LoT solves the 
problem of ambiguity in natural language, indeed LoT is the source of 
disambiguation. Furthermore, the hypothesis helps explain the acquisition of 
language, providing an answer to the puzzle of bootstrapping referred to in 
chapter 1.   
 
Animal minds may be simply sentient and responsive to percepts as qualia, or 
more advanced and conscious in the sense of processing a greater level of 
awareness of sensation. Only humans, though, have a yet higher, well 
developed, reflective, self-consciousness that enables them to have thoughts 
about things and be aware of those thoughts, and have further thoughts about 
thoughts (Jacquette, 2009). This is the property of Intentionality and is the result 
of adopting a propositional attitude, such as believing or wishing, to a LoT 
sentence19. 
 
Accepting the notion of a LoT in which thoughts are the result of being in a 
relation to a generated ‘sentences’ that are independent of their expression has 
major consequences for a theory of language, and this is examined in the next 
section. 
  
 
5.2 Language 
 
If, as I have suggested, there is a LoT that is separate from any system for 
potentially communicating thoughts, then a theory of the human FL needs to 
                                               
19 Though this is not necessarily the way in which Fodor imagines a LoT 
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account for this. Consequently, this section introduces the Representational 
Hypothesis (RH) as an explanation of language in terms of a semiotic system 
for representing thought (Burton-Roberts, 2000, 2011, 2013; Burton-Roberts 
and Poole, 2006). In the light of this theory of the relation between language 
and thought, I also review the relationship between ‘meaning’ and ‘semantics’.   
 
5.2.1 What is necessary in a theory of language? 
While I have suggested (chapter 2) that the status of the psychological reality of 
syntax as it is conceived in the MP (and CGG in general) is problematic, there is 
nevertheless a general assumption in the field that syntactic operations are real 
mind/brain processes20. Devitt (2006) questions this and distinguishes the 
psychological processes involved in the execution of speech from linguistic 
structures as such. The study of one does not necessitate the study of the other 
except to the extent that any theory of processing must be able to account for 
the structures of the output, that which he calls ‘The Respect Constraint’. But 
this does not mean that linguistic rules, constraints on ‘merge’ and ‘move’, are 
necessarily represented in the mind; when we ride a bike, as with many intricate 
acquired skills, we need to abide by several complex laws of physics to do with 
motion and balance, but surely we do not want to say that algorithms 
embodying these laws are represented in the mind? Language, says Devitt, 
shares the properties of general cognitive skills in terms of speed and 
automaticity, and thus is not inevitably represented as either explicit (or implicit) 
declarative or procedural knowledge (see discussion below of implicit System 1 
processing). If the psychological reality of linguistic rules is not a necessary 
condition for language, then it raises the question of why such a level of 
representation would exist, and why it would have evolved (either gradually or 
abruptly). A sentence that a hearer encounters as phonetic material needs 
ultimately to be translated into mentalese, to have propositional content 
(semantics), so what value lies in positing an intermediate level of 
representation? In interpreting the English word ‘cat’ why does the phonological 
string /kæt/ not lead straight to a mental representation of [CAT], and skip 
representation as a noun, a syntactic object? On the basis of folk mechanisms, 
everyone who has encountered cats is aware of the concept and everyone who 
speaks English recognises the phonetic label, however it is only linguists, those 
                                               
20 See discussion in chapter 2 
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who created the terms, who are aware of properties of nouns, adjectives, 
determiners and so on (other than basic distributional patterns). Devitt attributes 
the thesis that ‘representations are not to be multiplied beyond necessity’ (ibid: 
51) to Pylyshyn and, borrowing from Occam, terms it “Pylyshyn’s Razor”.  
 
Burton-Roberts and Poole (2006) agree that there is an unnecessary level of 
representation in CGG and attribute this to a ‘Saussurian legacy’. For Saussure, 
language consisted of a number of signs that could enter into syntagmatic and 
paradigmatic relationships in the construction of sentences. The Saussurian 
notion of the sign involves a signifier (sound image) and a signified (concept) 
which stand in an asymmetric, semiotic relationship (the signifier represents the 
signified, but not vice versa). Recall from section 5.1.1 above though, that 
Saussure is firmly committed to the belief that thought requires language and 
consequently he believes the signifier and signified cannot be separated: ‘[j]ust  
as it is impossible to take a pair of scissors and cut one side of paper without at 
the same cutting the other, so it is impossible in a language to isolate sound 
from thought or thought from sound’ (1916/83: 156). So in addition to the 
semiotic association these two components are envisaged to also have a 
symmetric mereological (part~part) relationship in constituting a third entity, the 
sign (see figure 5.1). 
 
  Sign 
 
 
 
Signifier  Signified 
 
 
(Sound Image) (Concept)   
 
figure 5.1 The Saussurian Sign 
 
A semiotic relationship however, only requires the existence of the signifier and 
signified, thus there is no necessity for postulating the third entity. Burton-
Roberts and Poole further argue that not only is this entity a conceptually 
unnecessary complexity, it is actually not coherent. They offer instead idea 
development of the sign as proposed by C.S. Pierce (e.g. 1873) in which the 
signifier is the sign and together with the signified are the only two permissible 
semiotic 
mereological 
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relata in the semiotic relationship. Pierce identifies three types of sign: natural 
signs, or indexicals, in which signified and signifier naturally co-occur (e.g. 
smoke indicating the presence of fire), iconic signs which signify by virtue of 
resemblance to the signified (e.g. a painting), and finally symbolic signs which 
represent by convention and in which the relation between the signifier and 
signified is an arbitrary one (e.g. a road sign such as figure 5.2). 
 
 
figure 5.2 Sign for UK national speed limit (from Google Images) 
In all three cases, Pierce stipulates that it is a ‘condition that a Sign must be 
other than its Object’ (1910: 230); signs, by definition, cannot be that which they 
represent, encapsulated in Burton-Robert’s representational axiom (e.g. 2011: 
2091): 
 R(x) ≠ (x)  
In order to clearly distinguish semiotic representation from other uses of the 
term in linguistics and CGG in particular, Burton-Roberts and Poole refer to this 
as m-representation21 (2006: 597) in reference to Magritte’s La Trahison des 
Images in which the point is made that a painting of a pipe is not a pipe and 
shares none of its properties other than a physical resemblance qua an iconic 
sign (see figure 5.3)  
 
                                               
21 Although Pierce refers to all three types of signs as ‘representations’, Burton-Roberts (2013)  
distinguishes between non-representational natural signs (indexicals) and signs which are intended  by 
someone to represent.  Smoke is not a representation of fire in the sense that a portrait is a representation 
of an individual  
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figure 5.3 Magritte’s La Trahison des Images (from Google images) 
 
A further objection to the Saussurean sign with regards to language, is that it is 
composed of items consisting of a sound image (i.e. something with 
phonological properties) and a signified with conceptual properties. Burton-
Roberts and Poole argue that these are ‘SORTALLY distinct…, things whose 
respective properties are incommensurable’ (ibid.: 595, small caps in original). It 
just is the case that things interpretable by the CI system are not interpretable 
by AP systems and vice versa, a fact recognised in CGG (including the MP) in 
the principle of full interpretation and ‘spell out’. Numbers for example do not 
have phonological properties; the number 7 for example, cannot be bisyllabic. 
Similarly, sounds do not have inherent conceptual properties, they cannot be 
prime, or the sum of 4+3 and so on (see discussion below on the distinction 
between ‘semantics’ and ‘meaning’). In particular, thoughts, objects of the CI 
system, have purely hierarchical – that is, non-linear – structure; a train of 
thought may proceed through a linear process in time, but individual thoughts 
do not. Conversely, language when spoken must be linear with one phone 
preceding another in real time. The assumption that languages have 
hierarchical structure is challenged below.        
 
5.2.2 Saussure and CGG 
Nevertheless, despite the objections to the Saussurean sign reported in the last 
section, it has retained a (usually unacknowledged) significant role in much of 
linguistic theory. In the field of ‘Cognitive Linguistics’ for example, Evans and 
Green explain that ‘while there are important differences between the 
Saussurean model and the cognitive model, the cognitive model adopts the 
idea of the Saussurean symbol’ (Evans & Green, 2006: 476), and, writing from 
a similar perspective, Nerlich & Clarke note that ‘at least some cognitive 
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linguists, like Langacker, share with Saussure a concern with the linguistic sign 
even when this term is not explicitly used’ (2007: 598). CGG is far from immune 
from this. Although Chomsky rarely discusses Saussure, his oft repeated claim 
that language is a ‘system that links sound and meaning’ (2005: 10) is clearly 
potentially Saussurian in character. The view of lexical items in CGG as ‘double 
interface property’ (DIP) objects firmly establishes the link with Saussure (see 
figure 5.4) 
 
Saussurian Sign    Lexical Item in CGG 
 
 
       
 (Sound Image) (Concept)    /phon/    [SEM]   
 
figure 5.4 Saussurean sign and the lexical item in CGG 
 
Evans and Levinson believe that the MP has taken Chomsky in such a direction 
that the object of his concern now is not language (and certainly not languages) 
but rather ‘the nature of recursive thought’ (2009: 477). Certainly Chomsky has 
made it clear that he considers language to have evolved first as an instrument 
of thought with externalisation being an epiphenomenon, restricting linearization 
to ‘spell out’ and the mapping to the AP interface (e.g. 2005, 2007). This 
enables Chomsky to maintain the pursuit of perfection in language by 
conceding that ‘[o]ne massive case (of imperfection) is the phonological system. 
The whole phonological system…has every bad property you can think of’ 
(2002:118). The phonological is then relegated to a secondary, peripheral 
status (see discussion of FLB and FLN in chapters 2 and 3). Sigurðsson and 
Maling cleanse even more of the ‘imperfections’ by suggesting that the 
‘computation proceeds after transfer to PF, that is, much of syntax in the 
traditional sense is actually morphosyntax or “PF syntax”, invisible to the 
semantic interface’ (2010: 64). But if we accept the objections to the 
Saussurean sign in general, and in particular the ‘sortally incoherent’ (Burton-
Roberts, 2011: 2092) notion of DIP objects composed of phonological and 
semantic properties, then proposals such as Sigurðsson and Maling still fail to 
account for the problems of a computation that acts on objects of this type at 
any stage.  
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5.2.1.3 The Representational Hypothesis explained 
The idea of covert syntax, post spell-out, acting on objects with only semantic 
properties has been a central feature of CGG at least since the Revised 
Extended Standard Theory. The RH, on the other hand, suggests that all 
semantic structure is the result of a computation operating on concepts with no 
phonological properties. As the output of the computation is a hierarchical 
structure, it must by definition have syntax (or at least a syntax, that is, a 
hierarchical structure), as Burton-Roberts argues, ‘no-one who admits of LoT 
would want to deny that it has a generative syntax. Syntax-free (syntax-less, 
recursion-free – and thus finite) semantics is inconceivable’ (2011: 2094). The 
RH is a development of the Piercian notion of sign in which it is proposed that  
there is a wholly internal, invariant syntactico-semantic system which generates 
structured concepts. These structured concepts (Representatum) may then be 
represented – not realised – externally by speech sounds (Representans). As 
speech sounds must be linear and temporal, they have an arbitrary relationship 
to the hierarchical, atemporal thoughts they represent: ‘nothing non-linear is 
“linearized”’ (Burton-Roberts and Poole, 2006: 603). Particular languages are 
Conventional (symbolic, semiotic) Systems for the Physical Representation of 
thought (CSPRs), morphophonologically constituted systems that mediate 
representationally between sound and semantic properties (see figure 5.5 
below). Each CSPR defines what constitutes acceptable, representational, 
phonetic phenomena differently. Diversity among languages, far from being an 
‘imperfection’, is therefore to be expected.   
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figure 5.5: A model of the Representational Hypothesis (adapted from Stenzel, 
2013) 
 
There are significant consequences of this for the ‘division of labour’ as 
traditionally understood in the study of linguistics. The scope of phonology is 
vastly increased, becoming a richer ‘representational phonology’ which Burton-
Roberts and Poole label -phonology (2006: 602). The traditional study of 
(morpho)phonology has included the specification in any particular language of 
phonetic features, their combination into phonemic segments, the phonotactic 
constraints on acceptable sequences of segments in syllables, and the 
arrangement of syllables in the formation of bound morphemes and free words. 
To these Burton-Roberts adds the stipulation of ‘which sequences of words 
constitute well-formed (representational) phonetic forms in [any language]’ 
(2011: 2100). There is no hierarchical structure or syntax in spoken language; 
speech is, by virtue of being spoken must be, entirely linear  and thus in the 
realm of phonology. It is only by parsing speech that we can attribute a 
hierarchical structure to the thought represented and eradicate any ambiguity. A 
second consequence involves the area of study in linguistics generally referred 
to as semantics. As noted above, LoT is a syntactico-semantic system and 
languages, as understood in RH, lack not only syntactic but also semantic 
properties. The implications of this are addressed next. 
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5.2.3 Meaning and Semantics 
Chomsky refers to the DIP theory of language as ‘one way to express the 
traditional description of language as sound with a meaning, traceable at least 
back to Aristotle’ (1995: 2). However, based on his most explicit writings on 
language, in De Interpretatione, what Aristotle actually meant could be argued 
to be closer to a semiotic notion of language than that held in traditional CGG:  
‘Spoken expressions are symbols of mental impressions, and written 
expressions [are symbols] of spoken expressions. And just as not all 
men have the same writing, so not all make the same vocal sounds. But 
the things of which [all] these are primarily signs are the same mental 
impressions for all men, and the things of which these [mental 
impressions] are likenesses are ultimately the same’. 22 
The problem in much current linguistics seems to arise with the conflation of the 
terms ‘meaning’ and ‘semantics’. Jackendoff (2012) for example, explicitly 
addresses the relationship of language, thought and ‘meaning’ but appears to 
use the latter term interchangeably with ‘semantics’, thus we get repeated 
statements that ‘meanings are hidden’ from us (p.49) and discussion of 
‘meaning systems’. Von Evkardt clouds the issue further, even distinguishing 
between ground relations (by which she seems to mean indexical and iconic 
signs) and symbolic representation e.g. ‘the word “cat” refers to the set of all 
cats’ (2012: 32) which she labels ‘semantics’. Burton-Roberts seeks to clarify 
these terms: 
The relation between meaning and semantics… is this. Meaning is a 
relation to semantics – an antisymmetric semiotic relation from α 
(anything) to conceptual/semantic content. Since semantic content is 
necessarily one of the terms of the semiotic/meaning relation, it follows 
that you can’t have meaning without semantics. But it doesn’t follow that 
meaning is semantics; this relational account of meaning distinguishes 
meaning and semantics’ (2013: 19/20, emphasis in original).  
The meaning of any sign (indexical, iconic or symbolic) lies not in the sign itself 
but the thought it causes an individual to token on any particular occasion. 
Anything can be ‘meaningful’23 for someone – smoke, a picture, a string of 
                                               
22Translation by  H. G. Apostle 
23 Although I am insisting that ‘meaning’ is a relation, I adopt common usage of terms such as 
‘meaningful’ which denotes a property. Such terms are hard to avoid but should not be taken to suggest 
that any ‘property’ is being implied.  
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spoken words – and they can enter into a ‘meaning’ relation, as iconic and 
symbolic signs do when used intentionally to represent; but they do not have 
semantic properties. A road sign such as that in figure 5.2 above, stored in a 
depot does not signify that a particular speed limit must be adhered to on 
encountering it. On this occasion it has no obvious meaning to me, though it 
might have a new meaning for a depot worker who sees it and, knowing it has 
to be on a lorry, had previously assumed that the task of moving it had been 
undertaken by someone else. Similarly, words as spoken signs do not have any 
inherent sematic properties, but rather may be used by convention and intention 
to represent a concept or thought which is the only locus of semantic content.     
 
This distinction appears to be acknowledged by linguists and philosophers of 
language at various times, but its significance does not seem to have been 
grasped. Thus Fodor can speculate that ‘[m]aybe all there is to what “cat” 
means is that it’s the word that English speakers use to say what they are 
thinking about when they are thinking about cats. That, of course, isn’t 
semantics’ (1998: 68). But this insight, captured in the RH, is treated as little 
more than an aside by Fodor. Hinzen and Sheehan are more explicit in their 
discussion of the topic. 
 
Hinzen and Sheehan claim that: 
‘[t]he point of language,… is infinity: we can refer to ever new objects, 
whatever the fancy may be that strikes us. One wouldn’t suppose that, 
before such a fancy strikes, all of these possible objects of reference 
already pre-exist our reference to them’ (2013: 95) 
However, in the vast majority of cases, relying on folk mechanisms (rather than 
expertise), I think I would suppose that most, if not all, objects of reference pre-
exist our labelling them. Furthermore, our modes of classification are not, I 
suggest, a matter of ‘fancy’ but the result of an inherited (in fact an evolved) 
mode of classification. Hinzen and Sheehan disagree, arguing that ‘it is words, 
which do not belong to anyone, which are shared between speakers, not 
concepts, which are in individual speakers heads’ (p. 51, emphasis in original). 
However, Burton-Roberts (2013:12) cites the example of Mrs Malaprop’s “Sir, 
you are the pineapple of politeness!” where the very essence of the humour 
arises from our awareness that are we dealing with a shared concept (for most 
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English speakers conventionally represented by ‘pinnacle’) and an attempt to 
represent that concept that fails to utilise the standard convention and instead 
employs a symbol which for most of us conventionally represents something 
entirely different. Real life examples of this are common, though generally less 
amusing, and include the use of terms such as ‘disinterest’, ‘refute’, hopefully’ 
and so on, all of which so animate prescriptivists.  
 
 
Hinzen and Sheehan do agree with the premise of the RH that words do not 
have semantic properties: ‘[t]here is no semantic value that [e.g.] ‘horse’ as 
such has and that we could insert into the compositional computation of 
grammatical content’ (Hinzen and Sheehan, 2013: 89). But they claim that it is 
by virtue of becoming part of a grammatical structure, entering into grammatical 
relations with other words, that a semantics is created. Yet, as argued above, 
individual grammars vary, while thought is (species wide) invariant. Not only 
that, but grammars permit the ‘encoding’ of (potential) meaning in different 
formats. Burton-Roberts and Poole (2006: 591) give the example of the two 
English sentences 
3) You can’t often bribe officials 
4) It is not often possible to bribe officials 
both of which represent a proposition with the hierarchical scope relations of   
 5) [NEG] > [TEMPORAL] >[MODAL] 
even though the representations of these are differently ordered in the two 
sentences (and English is a relatively strict fixed word order language). It could 
be argued that there are subtle differences in the semantic content represented 
in 3) and 4), and that strict synonymy across different grammatical constructions 
does not exist. However, as I briefly discuss below, it is generally recognised 
that whatever is ‘encoded’ vastly underdetermines the totality of ‘meaning’ that 
speakers generally intend to communicate (Grice, 1989; Sperber and Wilson, 
1986) and the truth conditions of any particular ‘encoded/linguistic’ sentence are 
radically different from those of the complete, or even its most salient aspect 
(the full propositional content of any utterance). Pragmatic inference is not just a 
matter of implicature or an optional appendage, rather it is the case that the 
linguistic ‘meaning’ of the code is (often) too underdetermined to provide any 
proposition, but rather acts as input into the pragmatic processor. In the case of 
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one effective approach to pragmatics, Relevance theory, this processor is said 
to generate the truth-conditional proposition in the form of an explicature where 
‘the conceptual content of an explicature is an amalgam of decoded linguistic 
meaning and pragmatically inferred meaning’ (Carston, 2004: 636). Only at this 
level of explicature can ‘real’ (as opposed to purely formal ‘linguistic’) truth-
conditional semantics be engaged. It is important to note that in RT this 
‘identification of explicit content is seen as equally inferential… as the recovery 
of implicatures’ (Wilson and Sperber, 2004: 615).  
 
 
Languages as viewed from a RH perspective are conventional systems of 
symbolic signs that are utilised by speakers in a particular context; that is, to 
represent a thought that is imbued with semantic properties. It is this intentional 
use of symbolic signs that appears to make human communication unique. 
Animals do not seem to employ symbols, though some do look as if they are 
subject to influence by symbolic systems. For example, it has been shown that 
when offered two varying amounts of food chimpanzees will always choose the 
larger one even when this is to their disadvantage. However, when the actual 
food is replaced with a symbol (a number) the chimpanzees will selectively 
choose the smaller of the two when advantageous (Boyson and Yocum, 2012). 
An equally intriguing aspect of intentional human communication is why we 
engage in it at all. The next section will consider the question of what particular 
properties evolved in our species that gave rise to this ability and propensity for 
ostensive, representational communication. 
 
 
5.3 What evolved that made language possible?      
In this section I consider in more detail ‘theory of mind’ (ToM) and its 
evolutionary record in humans. Closely related to this is the notion of recursion 
and its importance for creative thought. The final part of the section looks at 
‘dual processing theory’ as an account of uniquely human cognition. 
 
5.3.1   Theory of Mind 
ToM essentially involves the appreciation of other individuals as intentional 
beings with purposive mental states and independent (and therefore possibly 
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false) belief systems (Call and Tomasello, 1999). These properties are 
fundamental to language in which ‘communication depends upon the ability of 
human beings to attribute mental states to others’ (Origgi and Sperber, 2004).  
 
As noted in the previous chapter, ToM is a notoriously difficult trait to identify in 
nonhuman animals, despite research going back over 30 years (e.g. Premack 
and Woodruff, 1978). Deliberate deception is taken as one source of evidence 
of the presence of ToM and I have already referred to a number of experiments 
involving food sources in which a less dominant primate will not access rewards 
in the presence of a more dominant conspecific from whom the source is 
hidden. In addition to these there have also been claims of false indications of 
predators, hidden grooming and hiding sexual arousal, though none of these 
claims is conclusive (for discussion see Pearce, 2008). The picture is little 
clearer with other aspects of knowledge attribution (see previous chapter), 
though Call and Tomasello’s review identifies evidence that chimpanzees are 
able to understand each others’ goals and display an awareness of different 
perception and knowledge held by conspecifics. In the case of false belief tasks, 
though, chimpanzees appear to be resounding failures. Call and Tomasello’s 
inconclusive judgement is that: 
‘[i]n a broad construal of the phrase ‘theory of mind’, then, the answer to 
Premack and Woodruff’s pregnant question of 30 years ago is a definite 
yes, chimpanzees do have a theory of mind. But chimpanzees probably 
do not understand others in terms of a fully human-like belief–desire 
psychology in which they appreciate that others have mental 
representations of the world that drive their actions even when those do 
not correspond to reality. And so in a more narrow definition of theory of 
mind as an understanding of false beliefs, the answer to Premack and 
Woodruff’s question might be no, they do not’ (2008: 191).   
 
While Ernst Haeckel’s dictum that ‘ontogeny replicates phylogeny’ is no longer 
taken as an infallible indication for the point at which any trait appeared in 
evolutionary history, it is nevertheless interesting to note the very early 
appearance of aspects of ToM in human infants. As Eagleman notes, human 
babies ‘pop into the world with neural programs specialized for reasoning about 
objects, physical causality, numbers, the biological world, the beliefs and 
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motivations of other individuals, and social interactions’ (2011: 83). Almost 
immediately following birth (average 9 minutes) neonates show a greater 
attraction to face shapes than other types (Goren et al., 1975) and by 8 weeks 
are able to process features of faces and distinguish between individuals 
(Morton and Johnson, 1991). Between 11 and 14 months infants are able to 
engage in coordinated joint attention based on gaze and pointing (Scaife and 
Bruner, 1975). It was generally thought that the ability to recognise false belief 
(typically tested in ‘Sally-Ann’ type experiments) does not emerge until the 
fourth year, though more recently there have been suggestions for an earlier 
appearance of this capacity including claims that infants as young as 15 months 
can pass non-verbal false belief tasks (Onishi and Baillargeon, 2005)24. It 
certainly seems to be the case that, as Shatz puts it, ‘[a]nimal cognitive 
sophistication is not qualitively comparable even to toddlers’ rudimentary 
knowledge about imagination and mind’ (2008: 146). One of the most important 
aspects of ToM in relation to the evolution of language is its association with the 
notion of recursion, and I will briefly consider this next. 
 
5.3.2 Recursion 
Recall from chapter 2 that we have defined recursion as consisting of two 
properties: that the output of one stage constitutes the input to the next, and the 
ability to embed an object of type X in another object of the same type. A multi-
order Intentionality ToM which enables me to have a thought about your belief 
about someone else’s belief and so on, is generally seen as an archetypal 
example of recursion. As Kinsella points out, this recursive property may be the 
source for the apparent recursion in language: ‘a reasonable evolutionary 
conjecture is that recursive language was a response to the requirement for an 
optimal solution to expressing recursive thought’ (2009: 152; see also 
discussion in van der Hulst, 2010). And, as Hurford notes, other animal 
communication systems lack recursion of the type discussed, ‘[n]o proper 
recursion is evident in birdsong or whalesong’ (2011: 84 fn.56), and 
communicative systems such as these can all be accounted for in terms of 
context free grammars.  
 
                                               
24 Though it has been claimed that infant ToM is restricted to ‘subitizing’ limits and System one ‘dual-
processing’ as discussed below (Apperly and Butterfill, 2009)   
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It has been argued that it is recursion that enables the infinite creative power of 
human thought.  And without it we would be limited to thought processes of a 
type somewhere between a chimpanzee and human cognition. Hurford 
discusses ‘the magical number 4’ (2007:90; 2011) as the natural limit at which 
humans are able to visually keep track, with a high degree of accuracy, of how 
many items constitute a group, a process called ‘subitizing’, also known as 
‘subitization’, distinct from counting. Claims have been made that the limit of 
subitization is actually 3, others maintain 5 (for discussion see Dehaene, 2011) 
though the figure 4 plus or minus 1 seems to be the consensus. This is a 
cognitive feature that has been fixed and not subject to evolutionary change 
from far back in our history. Hurford reports that 4 is also the average maximum 
number of objects that can be held in short term memory concluding that the 
structure of a single thought ‘is derived from the limits of our ancient visual 
attention system, which only allows us to keep track of a maximum of four 
separate objects in a given scene’ (ibid: 95). Thoughts expressed as 
propositions through predicate structure in any known language are also limited 
to three arguments (two internal and one external) and a predicator (Juarros-
Daussa, 2010). A non-recursive thought system could conceivably link up to 
three arguments but no more; events consisting of more participants than this 
would be beyond the creative power of such a system. Only by recursive 
embedding are humans able to engage in productive, creative thought limited 
only by our repertoire of concepts and constraints of working memory. If 
recursion is a central (or even the central) component in the evolution of human 
thought, and recursive thought in turn gave rise to language, then we need to 
consider when it emerged in our hominin ancestors and this question is the 
subject of the next section.    
 
5.3.3 Dual processing and human thought 
Unlike other animals, adult humans have numerical capacities far beyond the 
limits of subitizing. As Apperly and Butterfill note, ‘infants, human adults and 
nonhuman animals have analogous abilities that enable them to solve number 
tasks with little or no recourse to general cognitive processes’ (2009: 953). 
These number tasks involve no figure higher than 4 (though there is 
disagreement of the exact figure, the consensus if 4 plus or minus one) if an 
accurate number is required as a solution; for quantities beyond this only 
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comparative judgements can be made. This capacity for subitizing is not, I 
suggest, analogous but rather a homologous trait that is distinct from adult 
humans’ sophisticated numerical abilities. It has long been established that 
there are unconscious brain operations that affect our routine perception and 
thinking. Eagleman (2011) discusses Mariotte’s blind spot, a small area in our 
wider field of vision that neither eye is able to perceive, yet no-one notices this 
as our brain ‘invents’ material to occupy this slot. He also refers to Helmholtz’s 
‘unconscious inference’ in which the brain creates arbitrary explanations for 
changes to visual stimuli (see also the reference to split brain patients in the last 
chapter).  
 
 
As is well known, nearly 100 years ago Freud developed an elaborate theory of 
the role of the unconscious in human cognition: 
‘[y]ou cannot … get around the fact that acts of a mental nature, and 
often very complicated ones, can take place in you, of which your 
consciousness learns nothing and of which you know nothing’ 
(1926/1962: 107) 
More recently, dual processing theory (DPT) (two mental systems: one 
conscious and one unconscious) has arisen as a mainstream theory in 
psychology based on the premise that ‘there is a fundamental duality in human 
reasoning’ (Frankish, 2009: 105). The DPT hypothesis is not a trivial conjecture 
but rather a substantive claim that humans have two utterly distinct types of 
mental processing (sometimes in conflict, vividly seen in ‘alien hand syndrome’ 
in split brain patients [Eagleman, 2009: 131]) linked to two separate systems, 
each arising from different architectures of the mind/brain. The evolutionary 
rationale for maintaining two processing systems is to minimize the effect that, 
as noted in the last chapter, the brain has as an extremely expensive organ, 
consuming a far greater proportion of nutrients than its size should entitle it to. 
Eagleman argues, though, that it is only conscious activity that is high energy, 
so by allowing much of the function of the brain to remain unconscious and 
saving on resources, evolution ‘has presumably tuned the exact amount of 
access the conscious mind has [to primarily unconscious processes]: too little 
and the company [the individual] has no direction; too much and the system 
gets bogged down in a slow, clunky, energy-inefficient manner’ (2011:73). The 
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division of labour is made on the basis of efficiency and speed versus reflective 
control. The advantage of a self-conscious, reflective system is that it enables 
the species to deal with novelty, anticipate the future and make complex 
inferences, while at the same time overriding potentially harmful intuitions from 
an unconscious processing system (Sloman, 1996)       
 
5.3.3.1 An overview of dual-processing theory 
Exponents of DPT are explicit in the distinction between the modern school of 
thought and Freudian dual-processing. DPT has no role for repressed impulses, 
or ‘pleasure principles’, nor is the role of the ‘unconscious’ restricted to exerting 
an influence on the ‘conscious’, rather than directly controlling motor 
mechanisms itself (Frankish and Evans, 2009). Modern DPT posits two systems 
of learning, reasoning and decision making: System 1 and System 225. System 
1 is the evolutionarily older of the two and is shared, at least to some extent 
(see discussion below) with other species. System 2 is an evolutionarily recent 
development that is unique to humans26. It is System 2 that most people 
imagine to be ‘in control’ and is responsible for deliberate, reflective thought that 
functions on the basis of rule-based logical relations. However, an intuitive, fast, 
unconscious System 1 is also at work and may be responsible for much more of 
an individual’s actions than the controlled, conscious system; as Eagleman 
observes, ‘[o]ur brains run mostly on autopilot, and the conscious mind has little 
access to the giant and mysterious factory that runs below it’ (2011: 5). 
However, if time and conditions allow, then (conscious) System 2 can override 
System 1; this is seen in the Stroop Effect where subjects are asked to give the 
name of the colour that words are written in. When the word refers to a colour 
that contrasts with that in which it is printed (e.g. the word ‘green’ in red ink), 
subjects often give the name of the word rather than the colour (an automatic, 
System 1 reaction), though if they produce the correct answer the response 
time is significantly longer, indicating a conflict between the two systems at 
work. A typical contrast of the features of the two systems is given by Frankish 
and Evans (2009) and is reproduced as table 5.1 below.    
                                               
25 Eagleman (2009) adopts the term ‘emotional/zombie’ for System 1 (and suggests there may be many 
such systems at work) and ‘rational’ for System 2. Bickerton (1995) uses the terms ‘on-line’ (System 1) 
and ‘off-line’ (System 2) thinking 
26 Though Evans argues that System 2 processing is not strictly exclusive to humans but is ‘uniquely 
developed’ in our species (2009: 38). 
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System 1 
 
System 2 
 
Evolutionarily old 
Unconscious, preconscious 
Shared with animals 
Implicit knowledge 
Automatic 
Fast 
Parallel 
High capacity 
Intuitive 
Contextualised 
Pragmatic 
Associative 
Independent of general intelligence 
 
Evolutionarily recent 
Conscious 
Uniquely (distinctly) human 
Explicit knowledge 
Controlled 
Slow 
Sequential 
Low capacity 
Reflective 
Abstract 
Logical 
Rule-based 
Linked to general intelligence 
table 5.1: from Frankish and Evans (2009) p.15 
 
Frankish and Evans make no explicit reference to the place of language in this 
schema, but language use (as a means of representation) clearly corresponds 
to the properties of system 1; it is fast, automatic and high capacity. On the 
other hand, complex thought (in the LoT), characterised by the property of 
recursion, is, as noted in section 5.1.1.3 above, abstract, reflective and logical. 
In other words, it belongs to system 2. However, as also previously noted (see 
section 5.3.3), system 1 is far more efficient in terms of energy consumption, 
and processes that may initially be under the control of system 2 may become 
automated and subsumed under system 1; successful (i.e. bilingual) learning of 
a second language in adulthood would seem to be a clear example of this (see 
also brief reference to movement from system 2 to system 1 in conclusion in the 
final chapter).   
 
 
5.3.3.2 Evidence for DPT 
Much of the research into DPT focuses on reasoning biases, such as that in the 
Wason Selection Task discussed in the last chapter. Another classic example of 
System 2 logical reasoning is the syllogism of the type: 
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 6) All men are mortal 
  Socrates is a man 
  Socrates is mortal 
However, even in cases such as these it has been shown that there may be a 
belief bias effect whereby subjects are more likely to accept a conclusion if it is 
intuitively believable, even if it does not follow from one of the premises such as 
(example from Klauer et al., 2000: 875): 
 7) Some fish are not acquerites. 
  All acquerites are trout. 
    Therefore, some fish are not trout.  
Similar belief bias effects have been recorded in valid (modus ponens; modus 
tollens) and invalid (denial of the antecedent; affirmation of the consequent) 
arguments (Evans et al., 2010). The effects of such belief biases are believed to 
be increased where there is lower general intelligence (though this seems to be 
a highly circular argument as syllogisms and similar reasoning tasks are 
generally used as measures of intelligence), and when there are additional 
strains on System 2, such as supplementary concurrent working memory tasks 
and time constraints. 
 
Other biases are clearly seen in different task types such as the Monty Hall 
problem in which subjects are offered three doors behind one of which there is 
a reward. Having chosen a door, subjects are then told that one of the two 
unchosen doors can be excluded, and they are given the choice of remaining 
with their chosen door or swapping to the other one. Despite that fact that 
swapping doubles their odds of winning, from 1:3 in to 2:3, the vast majority of 
subjects remain with their initial choice (Franco-Watkins et al., 2003). It seems 
that repeated exposure to the outcomes of such tasks does little to mitigate the 
influence of System 1. Evans notes that even when subjects are exposed to 
repeated failures they still react to choices on the basis of the same intuitions. 
This is the source of the ‘gambler’s fallacy’ in which subjects overwhelmingly 
opt to bet on outcomes that have not occurred recently, e.g. if tossing a coin 
has resulted in 5 consecutive heads, there is a strong temptation to bet on tails, 
although the actual odds remain at 50:50. As Evans remarks, examples such as 
these suggest that humans are susceptible to a ‘fast and frugal heuristic that 
makes us dumb rather than smart’ (2010: 104). 
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5.3.3.3 What are System 1 and System 2 like? 
DeSalle and Tattersall observe that we make many decisions in a fast and 
efficient manner using evolutionary older parts of our brains, and conclude that 
human brains ‘are still operating under all the same constraints that have 
governed brain evolution in other organisms’ (2012: 240). However, this does 
not mean that System 1 processes have no uniquely human features. Although 
Jackendoff rejects a DPT of the human mind of the exact kind proposed here, 
he does recognise a distinction between a System 1 type of thought (which he 
labels ‘intuitive thought’) and a System 2 type (‘rational thought’). He is clear, 
though, that it is his belief that it is not just one of these systems that is 
exclusively human, rather, he speculates, it is the case that our ‘System 1 is 
doubtless more sophisticated than that of chimps’ (2009: 214 fn.3). 
 
One popular explanation for the difference in human and other animal System1 
types is offered in terms of ‘massive modularity’ (Frankenhuis and Ploeger, 
2007) briefly referred to in the last chapter. Mithen (1996) for example, suggests 
that the evolutionarily significant development in hominin cognition was the 
emergence of modules and a system of ‘cognitive fluidity’ that enables output 
from different modules to be combined. Similarly, Stanovich (2009) proposes 
‘The Autonomous Set of Systems’ (TASS) as a collection of modules that have 
evolved to process inputs from the environment and feed into an ‘analytic 
processing’  System 2. There have even been suggestions that System 2 
processing is itself a form of massive modularity, with no domain general 
cognition of any sort (Mercier and Sperber, 2009). However, unless the 
explanation of the mind in terms of massive modularity is restricted to a useful, 
if limited, metaphor, then numerous problems arise if you exclude the existence 
of any central control system. In order to recognise that our visual system is 
modular and that we are deceived by illusions such as the Müller-Lyer surely 
relies on some form of overall processing. Furthermore, it has been argued that 
any account of massive modularity in evolutionary terms is highly implausible, 
both in terms of time scales and the nature of evolutionary change (see Fodor 
e.g. 1998, chapter 13). A more parsimonious explanation in DPT is the proposal 
that there are only two systems, though outputs from System 1 may have an 
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immediate impact on motor activity, or may be the ‘preattentive’ input to options 
for reflection by an analytic System 2, as in figure 5.6 below. 
  
Autonomous 
processes 
  
Preattentive 
processes 
 
System 1 
     
    
Working memory/ 
Analytic processes 
 
System 2 
     
   
Behavior 
 
 
 
 
 
figure 5.6: adapted from Frankish and Evans (2009) p.43   
 
5.3.3.4 Neural correlates of dual processing 
For over 30 years it has been known that subjects demonstrate an unconscious 
‘readiness-potential’ to act, up to as much as a full second prior to subjective 
awareness of intention to carry out any operation (Libet et. al., 1983). Much of 
the research in this area has been based on fMRI scans and recently there has 
been some criticism of findings, focusing on the tendency to have used small 
sample sizes and noise effects arising from a failure to triangulate analyses (Vul 
et al., 2009; Kriegeskorte et al., 2009; Button et al., 2013). Nevertheless, a 
substantial body of evidence has been built up, using a variety of techniques, 
that indicates that an unconscious predisposition to behave in a certain way can 
be detected before the individual is cognisant of the intent (e.g. Haggard and 
Elmer, 1999; Blankertz et al., 2003). Furthermore, the actual brain areas 
involved have been identified to a remarkable degree of precision. For example, 
Haynes et al. (2007) were able to locate an area of the medial PFC which was 
activated in deciding which of two simple mathematical tasks (addition or 
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subtraction) to perform, analysis were able to predict with 71% accuracy which 
of the two a subject had chosen. Lieberman (2009) identifies areas of the brain 
which correspond to the two systems, which he terms, on the basis of what he   
maintains is the most relevant distinction, the X (reflexive) and the C (reflective) 
systems (see table 5.2). 
 
X System C System 
Ventromedial PFC 
Ventrial striatum 
Amygdala 
Lateral temporal cortex 
Dorsal ACC  
Lateral PFC 
Medial PFC 
Lateral Posterior parietal cortex (PPC) 
Medial PPC 
Rostral ACC 
Medial PFC 
Medial temporal lobe 
table 5.2: adapted from  Lieberman (2009) p.294 
 
 
Much recent research has focused on even more precise regions of the brain 
and in the light of this the correlation between single concepts and identifiable, 
localised neural activity has been established. Such work had been largely 
dismissed since Sherrington’s (1940) theory of a ‘millionfold democracy’ model 
of the mind/brain in which vast populations of neurons are presumed to be 
involved in coding concepts. However the proposal was resurrected in the late 
1960s in the theoretical ideas of Konorski’s ‘gnostic cells’ and Lettvin’s 
‘grandmother cells’ (for discussion see Gross, 2002). In recent years, with more 
advanced technology working with patients undergoing treatment for intractable 
epileptic conditions, Quiroga et al. (2005) have observed that so-called ‘Jennifer 
Anniston’ neurons fire in the inferior temporal cortex and the hippocampus in 
the presence of pictures and other representations of the actress, but not other 
figures of a similar status (e.g. not Oprah Winfrey). Similarly, other ensembles 
of neurons are activated in response to other concepts. It is not that specific 
neuronal activity is shared across individuals, but in any one subject a unique 
group of sparse (perhaps as little as a few thousand) concept cells can be 
reliably identified as correlates of particular concepts: ‘the presence of the 
[concept] can, in principle, be reliably decoded from a very small number of 
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neurons’ (Quiroga et al., 2005: 435). The chances of finding the only neurons 
that fire in relation to a particular concept are unrealistically small, and we know 
that neurons die while memories may be retained so there must be a degree of 
plasticity. Nevertheless the correlation of particular neuronal activity in the 
presence of specific concepts seems to have been established (Quiroga, 2012; 
Suthana and Fried, 2012). 
 
 
5.4 A theory of language evolution 
 
I have argued that Penn et al. are correct in their conclusion that  
‘the functional discontinuity between human and nonhuman minds 
pervades nearly every domain of cognition – from reasoning about 
spatial relations to deceiving conspecifics – and runs much deeper than 
even the spectacular scaffolding provided by language or culture alone 
can explain’ (2008: 110)  
While we share with nonhuman animals a similar, though not identical, system 
of fast, intuitive cognitive processing based on evolutionarily older brain 
systems, we have also, at some point in the last 7.5 million years, evolved a 
capacity for systematic, computational thought that enables us to be logical and 
reflective and on occasions to override instinctive, associative reactions. The 
remaining questions are: when did these developments occur and what is the 
relation to language? I suggest that there were two significant periods in the 
evolution of human cognition, at least one of which is worthy of the often used 
epithet ‘great leap’. These are the topics that will be addressed in the final 
section of this chapter 
 
5.4.1 Language, cognition and Homo erectus 
As we saw in chapter 3, there were numerous genetic mutations in the hominin 
species in the period running up to the speciation event of Homo and the 
appearance of H. erectus. The most striking physiological change associated 
with these genetic and epigenetic alterations in the new species was the 
evolutionarily rapid doubling in brain size, an alteration that carried such 
deleterious effects that it must have been the result of a significant adaptive 
pressure. The cultural advancements that accompanied this period of 
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punctuated equilibrium included the first creation of mode 2 stone axes and the 
first migration out of Africa. The former of these involves mental rehearsal, 
taking a large lump of rock and, from this, imagining a finished tool, and so 
repeatedly knapping the rock until the desired shape is achieved. Travelling out 
of Africa indicates a capacity for innovation and accommodation to new 
environments, far quicker than evolutionary change could accomplish. There 
are also suggestions that H. erectus made use of fire and engaged in 
coordinated hunting and scavenging. So was this the result of an enhanced 
System 1, the emergence of System 2, or aspects of both and their interaction?  
 
Our System 1 is clearly different to that of chimpanzees. We may be prone to 
costly, instinctive errors in Monty Hall type reasoning but we are at least 
capable of undertaking such tasks. However, just as there are claims for a basic 
first order ToM in chimpanzees, some authorities on DPT maintain that there is 
a rudimentary System 2 in great apes (Carruthers, 2009; Evans, 2009 – see 
footnote 9 above) and that it is this system that enables trained primates to 
communicate with humans. If we suggest that H. erectus had acquired a 
protolanguage then that would imply a more developed System 2. In the opinion 
of Holloway et al., a ‘reorganizational pattern, involving Broca’s region, cerebral 
asymmetries of a modern human type and perhaps prefrontal lobe enlargement, 
strongly suggests selection operating on a more cohesive and cooperative 
social behavioural repertoire, with primitive language a clear possibility’ (2009: 
1333). Brain growth and reorganisation may have bestowed a proto-LoT on 
hominins some time before 1.5 mya. Greater cognitive capacity led to an 
awareness of the value of cooperation and consequently the appreciation of 
conspecifics as Intentional beings. The proto-symbolic capacity that appears to 
be evident in trained primates could then be harnessed to intentional 
communication, very possibly as an exaptation of existing mirror neurons as 
discussed in the previous chapter. Prior to the existence of any shared 
conventional system, the earliest communication will have consisted of iconic 
gestures, including pantomiming. However, in contrast to the gestural theories 
discussed in the last chapter, I believe the advantages of vocalisation would 
have become manifest early on and a spoken protolanguage emerge as a 
Baldwin effect (see chapter 3) with epigenetic consequences and possibly 
genetic assimilation later.       
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Many writers (certainly all gradual nativists, see chapter 3) agree with Levinson 
and Evans that ‘there can be no doubt that premodern humans were talking’ 
(2010: 2742) but what was that talking like? As Sperber and Origgi (2010) point 
out, there is very little that actually needs to be in a shared code, complex 
codes being neither necessary nor sufficient for simple communication. All that 
is required is enough to kick start pragmatic inference. As more complex 
communicative needs and desires arise, then simple concatenation can be 
employed for functions such as modification of heads and proto-predicates, in 
order to trigger more precise inferences.  
 
And yet the period after the emergence of H. erectus does seem to be 
characterised by a long period of stasis. As Stringer recalls, in response to the 
point that Acheulean hand axes were so sophisticated that they indicated the 
presence of language in the species who were responsible for them, the 
archaeologist Desmond Clark pointed out that as the axes ‘had hardly changed 
shape through a million years…and across three continents’, then if these 
hominins had language ‘these ancient people were saying the same thing to 
each other, over and over and over again’ (2011: 125). If the minds of these 
early Homo lacked recursion and were limited to simple thoughts constrained by 
the limits of subitizing then it would account for the lack of cultural development 
(and complex language) for this long period. So, contrary to those theorists ( 
principally gradual nativists) who claim that protolanguage was limited by the 
lack of a linguistic syntactic modular component in the brain, it is more likely that 
ancestors of modern humans just did not have much that was very interesting to 
say; more interesting than chimpanzees, but still very restricted and of limited 
instrumental use to conspecifics. The crucial deficiency in comparison to Homo 
sapiens was not linguistic but cognitive recursion. As Blondin-Masses et al. note 
in relation to the notion of a protolanguage, ‘[a] language is just a set of symbols 
with which we can say anything and everything, whether in gestures or in 
speech, whether quickly or slowly, and whether with a vocabulary of many 
symbols or few’ (in press). The issue of just when we started to use many more 
symbols, and use them very quickly, is the issue addressed in the next section.         
 
5.4.2 The emergence of complex thought  
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Although brain size had doubled in H. erectus, it stopped at an average of just 
under 1000 cc. As this is significantly below the maximum size that the species 
could anatomically tolerate, presumably the adaptive advantages (greater 
cognition, innovation, cooperation and communication) were increasingly no 
longer sufficient to offset the disadvantages (metabolic consumption, increased 
danger in child birth). Thus when the brain again began to demonstrate 
reorganisation and further growth some million years later, increasing the 
deleterious effects, there must have been a further adaptive pressure. I suggest 
that this is the second period of cognitive advancement and the true ‘great leap’.  
 
One of the distinguishing characteristics of human thought is its recursive 
hierarchical structure . It is recursion that enables us to move beyond the 
magical number 4 of subitizing, and embed propositions inside each other, 
theoretically ad infinitum, constrained only by the limits of working memory. It is 
recursion that underpins a multi-order Intentionality ToM. Given that recursion is 
a rather simple process in itself, regardless of the immense consequences it 
has for our power of thought, it is clearly possible to associate the emergence of 
a recursive LoT with relatively minor mutations and changes to gene 
expression. If recursion really is present in some form in non-humans then a 
single mutation or two could enable it to be exapted from a domain specific 
System 1 function (e.g. navigation) to a domain general System 2 one. 
Alternatively, if not present in non-humans then it is the result of unique 
evolutionary development, again the consequence of a small but significant 
rewiring of our brains. Sommel et al. concur that the ‘second phase, which led 
to the emergence of the cognitive traits that produced the human cultural 
explosion ~200,000 years ago, may have been driven by only a few mutations 
that affected the expression and/or primary structure of developmental 
regulators’ (2013: 124) and they note that there have been 10 or fewer 
mutations related to cognition since our split with the last common ancestor with 
Neanderthals. It is therefore not implausible that at a point in history an 
individual was born with a greater, recursive cognitive machinery than other 
conspecifics, an internal, recursive LoT. It is interesting to note that recent 
research has suggested that the rapid nature of the second phase of cognitive 
evolution was not without cost, and links have been made with reduced 
methylation levels in the human PFC, allowing greater gene expression, but 
140 
 
showing links with a variety of psychological disorders (Sommel et al. ibid.; 
Zeng et al., 2012) 
 
5.4.3 The emergence of complex language 
Given a new, recursive system of thinking, the protolanguage that had already 
evolved would be harnessed for the expression of more complex thought. The 
demands of both the more complex cognitive capacity and the need for a more 
intricate linguistic (i.e. phonological) system in which to express those thoughts 
would themselves become adaptive pressures on brain evolution. As the 
semantic content became more complex so the means of representation – the 
CSPR consisting of a -phonology – similarly increased in complexity, a 
process we might characterise as the ‘evolution of a representational capacity’. 
Language, understood in this sense, requires a finely tuned pattern finding 
ability and the memory capacity to cope with a substantial lexicon. Landauer 
(2008) discusses various computer modelling techniques and concludes that 
the ability to acquire a large vocabulary such as we have today would require a 
brain the size of modern humans. Furthermore, language use entails a high 
level of awareness of intentionality and relevance for which our species seems 
particularly well adapted.  
 
So, the emerging language was constrained by the need to represent a 
recursive LoT (hence the appearance of recursion in language), and by both the 
articulatory-perceptual and pragmatic capacities of the organism. These 
constraints on all languages require the hierarchically structured semantic 
content to be represented in a linear string. Word order, agreement marking and 
case marking are all tools that can be deployed to indicate relative positions and 
relations in a hierarchical semantic structure. As Burton-Roberts and Poole note 
with regards to the first of these, languages ‘that have conventions constraining 
word order do so as a way of harnessing linearity to the m-representation of 
structural relations in the C-I (conceptual-intentional) system’ (2006: 605). 
Deacon has argued for an additional constraint that arises from the existence of 
symbolic systems that must conform to various universals that are inherent in 
the nature of symbolic representation and that the human brain has evolved to 
cope with such systems:  
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‘Semiotic universals are emergent constraints, like the emergence of 
symbolic reference itself. But even though they need not be biologically 
pre-specified, the evolution of human brains may also have been 
influenced by the presence of these semiotic selection pressures so as to 
make discovery of these constraints easier. Despite their abstract nature, 
these constraints create ‘adaptation demands’ that may have selected for 
functional differences in hominid brains that ease their discovery’ (2003: 
138)          
 
Rather than any specific ‘module of the mind’ for language, humans evolved the 
capacity for creative, recursive thought, and the ability to represent this, in a 
variety of ways, to conspecifics. Features which are shared across all 
languages, may be features of a truly universal grammar, and an indication of 
the admittedly very difficult problem of what exactly LoT is like. As Burton-
Roberts points out, there is already progress in this area and the sceptic 
‘seriously under-estimates the extent to which discoveries hitherto regarded as 
discoveries specifically about FL structure are in fact discoveries about LOT 
structure’ (2011: 2095).   
 
The precise consequences for the arguments made in this chapter, and the 
preceding ones, are dealt with in the final chapter. 
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Chapter 6: Conclusion 
 
 
6.0 Introduction 
 
I have argued that the logical problem of language evolution requires a 
reassessment of the nature of FL. Just as addressing ‘Plato’s problem’ was a 
major motivating factor in the foundation and advancement of generative 
grammar (which has certainly provided numerous indispensable insights into 
language) so solving ‘Darwin’s problem’ (Boeckx, 2009) requires a revision to 
that understanding of FL which is inherent in the current generative enterprise. 
 
Despite all appearances to the contrary, language is not, I claim, special in the 
sense of being a hardwired module of the mind. What is special, and what 
evolved in our species as the FL, is primarily the capacity for generating 
complex recursive thought, and then being able to represent those thoughts 
within the constraints of symbolic systems. Languages have the appearance of 
hierarchy and recursion by virtue of representing a system that is truly 
hierarchical and recursive.   
 
 
6.1 Evolution as a constraint on conceptions of the FL 
 
Of the four classes of theories of language evolution considered above (gradual 
and sudden; nativist and non-nativist) I believe significant problems have been 
identified in each. This is because of a misunderstanding of what evolved, and 
at what stage. Hominins have gradually evolved unique physiological features 
over a period of million years since our split with the LCA, and significant, 
though limited, cognitive changes in a period of punctuated equilibrium around 2 
mya. However, somewhere after 700 kya there was a second, dramatic period 
of change: a rewiring of the brain that resulted in a unique, internal syntactic 
system of thought. Extant physiological and cognitive developments – our ability 
to articulate, our short and long term memory, our basic theory of mind and 
more general pragmatic competence – which were already utilised in 
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protolanguage, were employed to far greater effect for the purposes of 
expressing vastly more complex internal thoughts, and in themselves evolved 
further as this function was refined. I propose that by clearly differentiating these 
two systems (thought and its mode of representation) we allow two different 
evolutionary scenarios which best accord with the known, and hypothesised, 
story of hominin evolution and a more elegant and logically coherent 
explanation of the human faculty for language than is currently offered.  
 
6.1.1 Language Evolution and the MP 
Despite Chomsky’s first major intervention into the debate on language 
evolution, and all the work since then, the state of the relationship between 
language and thought in CGG remains unclear. If, as Chomsky claims, 
language first appeared with only a mapping to the CI system, and yet gave an 
enormous adaptive advantage to those who were endowed with it, then it 
seems, as Hinzen and Sheehan (2013) argue, that language was the medium in 
which thought was carried out. Its subsequent externalisation does not change 
that. Hinzen and Sheehan might claim that rejecting the ‘language equals LoT’ 
hypothesis would deprive us of the best prospect for explaining semantic 
structure. However, this does not mean that the hypothesis is correct, and, as 
noted at the end of the last chapter, there are grounds for optimism that a 
reanalysis of linguistic findings may result in a greater understanding of LoT.  
On the other hand, as Chomsky sometimes claims, if there is a separate LoT, 
then it is more parsimonious to see ‘languages’ representing thought rather than 
the external ‘realisation’ of a system whose function (neither thought nor its 
representation) is not entirely clear. As I have argued above, I favour the 
explanation based on an independent LoT for all the reasons outlined.  
 
Proposals here, and in the RH, are sympathetic to Chomsky’s stated 
minimalism. However, while language is understood as acting on DIP objects it 
is always going to be problematic, hence the tension between ‘crash-proof’ and 
‘merge only’ versions of the MP. It is because in the MP language 
simultaneously derives hierarchical, semantic LF at the same time as a purely 
linear PF that complexities are unavoidable. On the other hand, as a truly 
minimalist theory of FL, the RH is concerned only with the linear. There is 
neither ‘move’, nor ‘features’, nor operations such as ‘procrastinate’. Burton-
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Roberts and Poole posit a far more minimalist conception of the ‘signing 
theorum’ in which ‘there is no criterion for structural C-I position other than 
Interpretation in the C-I system and no criterion for linear position other than 
temporal succession of hearable events’ (2006: 607). Thus the variation in word 
order in examples such as 3) and 4) in Chapter 5 is not the result of complex 
derivations producing different PFs with an identical LF, but a consequence of 
the fact that a phonetic sign ‘just is – and will be interpreted as -  the sign of a 
C-I property’ (ibid., 606) regardless of the linear position of the former, or the 
hierarchical position of the latter. There are conventions adopted in different 
languages to aid such interpretation, but, as with all conventions, they can be 
overridden and our general cognitive and pragmatic capacities will prevent a 
breakdown in communication. 
 
 
6.2 Final thoughts 
 
Christiansen and Kirby may be accused of hyperbole in claiming that the study 
of language evolution is ‘the hardest problem in science’ (2003). Nevertheless, 
the cross-disciplinary nature of the endeavour, and the difficulty in researching 
occurrences from hundreds of thousands, if not millions of years ago, as well as 
the rapid developments in research techniques across the subject areas does 
make the topic a challenging one to keep abreast of. The ‘abduction’ I have 
presented here does, I believe, accord with the vast majority of the amount of 
evidence. It is also clearly falsifiable (in the Popperian sense) and new data 
from any one of a number of disciplines could potentially undermine the overall 
thrust of the argument.  
 
There is of course further work to do in the area of linguistics; I will mention just 
two. Burton-Roberts and Poole (2006) make some tentative suggestions as to 
how languages might be seen in terms of default conventions and how and why 
these might be overridden. The RH presents a major challenge to conventional 
linguistics (the eradication of notions of hierarchy and focus on linear 
representation) and is an important and challenging area to explore, especially 
in relation to insights it might offer to the nature of LoT. Secondly, there is the 
position of language in a DPT theory of cognition. Complex motor acts, such as 
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riding a bike, are under the responsibility of System 1 and are guided by an 
implicit procedural memory that is doubly dissociated from explicit memory 
(Cohen et al., 1985). The act of acquiring such skills involves the development 
of automaticity which is the transfer from explicit (System 2) to implicit (System 
1) memory. Language appears to require similar processes. It is perhaps the 
interaction between System 1 and System 2 that is uniquely human, and 
language may be a window into how the systems operate and relate to each 
other. Both of these research areas have the potential to recreate the 
anticipation that the study of language will reveal insights into the characteristics 
of the mind that Jackendoff (2002) referred to in chapter 2 above. 
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